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Abstract 
This thesis is an empirical analysis of the factors which 
led to the emergence of the liberation movements of Iacaragua 
which resulted in the fall of the dictatorship of the Somozas, 
in July 1979. The Somoza family's reign of more than 45 years 
in power, contributed to a deepening of the economic and politi-
cal contradictions which existed between and among the various 
social sectors of the country. 
The thesis provides a background c:hapter which explo·res 
these contradictions and shows how Nicaragua became dependent 
on the international market. The internal political conflicts 
between the so-called Nicaraguan liberals and conservati ver:-3 
and the precarious conditions of the labouring population are 
outlined to provide the setting against which the nationalist 
struggle of Augusto C. Sandino arose in the 1920's. This early 
struggle was to inspire and contribute to the ideological 
platform of organizations like the FSLN which led the recent 
anti-dictatorial struggle. 
The thesis shows how the liberation movement encompassed 
the participation of groups from diverse social sectors. It 
examines how the shaping and consolidating of the movement 
necessitated a whole process of mass mobilization and of decision 
making from the political and military forces involved. The 
attitudes taken by the various. groups towards the dictatorship 
and what should be done about it and in what ways change could 
be achieved and what direction it should take, reflected the 
class position of the variou.s groups. The thesis shows how, 
in the process of incorporating the masses into the liberation 
struggle, certain groups came to play an outstanding role. 
During the task of raising consciousness in the population 
various groups involved in the task, such as the progressive 
sectors of the Church, women's organizations, workers' 
organizations, students, peasant groups, and various others 
came together in a common cause. 
In order to examine this process of convergence and to 
highlight the factors which precipitated the liberation move-
ment and the eventual national uprising, case material from 
the city of Esteli, collected during fieldwork, is presented. 
The struggle brought the interchange of experiences and of 
relationships amrmg individuals from various social and economic 
strata • Attention is drawn to the way in which people's 
perspectives changed during the pre-war and war conditions 
and how they adapted to the needs of an altering situation. 
The thesis also attempts to show how, after the liberation, 
social reconstruction took place and how popular participation 
was required to fulfill the short and longer term goals of the 
new government and the FSLH. The significance of mass organisa-
tions for this process of change is highlighted. Popular part-
icipation is outlined against the background of political and 
economic obstacles faced by the country, and against the contra-
dictions arising from the new political ard economic forces and 
alliances. I show how the organizations created during the 
guerrilla struggle are developing and becoming the pillars for 
production, and mass mobilization and partic{pation in a new 
democratic process. 
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Introduction 
The main concern of the present work is to analyse the 
factors which led to the formation of the broad movement that 
overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua in July 1979, 
and to document some aspects of the process of social recon-
struction during the first year in power of the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front - FSLN. 
Although the discussion raises issues relevant to more 
general theories of social change, power, dependency and 
revolution, the thesis is essentially an empirical work which 
attempts to explore one particular revolutionary process. 
In order to comprehend the emergence of the liberation 
movement in Nicaragua, I have provided an outline of the country's 
recent economic and political history. The need for structural 
change does not arise fortuitously but is the response of 
social groups to the gradual accumulation of a complex series 
of social and economic contradictions. I have also tried to 
show how the ruling groups in Nicaragua came to exhaust their 
alternatives in attempting to solve the general political and 
economic crisis. 
The Central American region is an area characterised by 
strong foreign interference in national affairs. However, the 
increasingly open intrusion of the US government throughout the 
region has generated a series of reactions .from diverse social 
and economic groups. Thus I have also discussed US strategies 
of domination and the reaction of various social sectors to 
them. 
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Given the fact that the birth of the Nicaraguan liberation~ 
movement was an organized response to the country's political 
and economic crisis, it is fundamentally important to identify 
the factors which made such a response possiblee Hence, I 
have tried to analyse the conflicts among and between diverse 
social groups, and to understand why and how they came to combine 
to stand against the Somoza regime. 
The anti~dictatorial struggle went through various phases 
and entailed the work of many organizations in attempting to 
mobilise the massese In the following analysis I have described 
the main organizations which managed to convince various sectors 
of the population of the necessity of questioning the social 
order using a number of different methods. The significance of 
.Sandi no's struggle, the role of the FSLN, the participation of 
the Church and the way in which each organized themselves to 
face the different situations are included~ 
Special attention is also given to the kinds of changes 
.which took place after the fall of Somoza. This theme is closely 
related to the question of the political ideology promoted by 
the leading organization, and to its consequences for the new 
national political and economic system. Moreover, as the pro-
cess currently being implemented aims to build the grounds for 
further structural changes, I have focused on those organizations 
that are most important for the task of social reconstruction. 
I have also examined the motives for individual participation 
in this process of change' and discuss people's expectations 
before the ultimate triumph of the J:ilSLN. 
rpo accomplish this aim, and ih order to reduce the "anon-
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ymity" of the role of the "masses" in the whole process, I 
have chosen to present individuals' accounts of their own 
participation. By means of personal descriptions, one is 
able to grasp the effects of the existing economic and politi-
cal contradictions at different moments. It also permits one 
to study individuals' changing perceptions and make an analysis of 
the local and national context, and the effects of specific 
events on people's patterns of behaviour. 
MY individual accounts were collected in the city of 
Esteli, in the north-west of Nicaragua. I first visited Esteli 
because of its reputation for having shown a very high degree 
of participation during the struggle. When I arrived there, 
the popular local slogans were "Est eli three times the martyr", 
"Esteli, first in the insurrection" and "Esteli three times 
heroic". And when I left Esteli after a six month stay in 
January '198'1, the slogan was "Est eli first in the insurrection, 
first in the Literacy Campaign, first in the Popular Militias". 
These assertions had a basis in fact. Esteli had achieved 
first place in the first National Congress of the Literacy 
Campaign in June '1980 and had been chosen as the first city to 
organize its own popular militia. Later on, I also observed 
that the level of consciousness among social groups in Esteli 
concerning participation in the country's process of reconstruc-
tion was particularly high, especially in comparison with other 
towns I visited. 
Another aspect which attracted my attention was the social 
composition of Esteli's leadership in the mass organizations. 
Most of them were from the area itself and from relatively 
iv 
humble backgroundso The leaders of the CST1 were mainly 
tobacco workers or had been shoemakers (now working full-
time); most of the CDS leaders had been either tailors or 
workers in garment-making workshops; the leaders of the 
women's organization AMNLAE were mostly housewives from low 
economic sectors and the leaders of the peasant organization 
ATC had been agricultural labourers. There was also a broad 
participation of elements from other sectors such as students, 
teachers, clerks and so on who devoted a large part of their 
time to organizational activities. 
The interviews were initially conducted with the leaders 
of mass organizations; but later I was able to widen the 
sample to include other informants who presented their views 
on the processes of social change. During my conversations I 
observed that individuals' retrospective accounts of the libera-
tion struggle were marked by a high degree of optimism and 
pride. They were convinced of Esteli's broad and decisive 
participation as well as of the effectiveness of their organiza-
tions in confronting the repression and the uprisings. 
It was clear that in spite of most people's recognition of 
the importance of solidarity aid from foreign countries, this 
did not prevent them from being somewhat guarded in the informa-
tion they were prepared to give to foreigners. An outsider was 
normally asked why he was staying in the town, his occupation 
and his specific interest in the country's revolutionary process; 
many informants also asked for some form of personal identifica-
tion before chatting or providing specific information. The 
people of Esteli had had previous experience of the distorted 
1 For abbreviations and a glossary see pp.193-199. 
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use by foreigners of locally provided information. Thus 
individuals tended to want to satisfy themselves about the 
ultimate purpose of the interviews. 
The oral accounts were collected in the course of directed 
interviews and informal conversations. Some statistical data 
was collected from available local and national studies made 
by various municipal and government institutions, and much of 
the information was also gathered in the course of participant 
observation in meetings or activities to which I was invited. 
During my stay in Esteli I lived with families whose 
members were profoundly involved with the FSLlT. This helped 
me to see all the dimensions of the process of change and the 
multiple difficulties faced by organizations wishing to acceler-
ate it. In the houses where I lived I could also observe the 
constant visits of persons from all social sectors (peasants, 
workers, priests, artisans, students and so forth) to discuss 
common political and economic conerns. This experience enabled 
me to gain a deeper insight into the broad character of partici-
pation at several levels and the degree of commitment of 
individuals to the solution of everyday problems. 
One of my difficulties was the collection of precise data 
on such matters as population, land extension, and the number 
of losses during the war. Frequently, when I tried to cross-
check my data against other similar sources the figures did not 
coincide. Nevertheless my uncertainties about the reliability 
of these statistics do not materially alter any of the conclu-
sions I have reached, and I have in any case been very circum-
spect in their use. 
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The study of the contemporary process of change in 
Nicaragua has been divided into five chapters. Chapter I 
analyses the historical, political and recent socio-economic 
background of the country, and forms an introduction to the 
case material presented in the rest of the thesis. Chapter 
II describes the main features of economic and social develop-
ment in Esteli before the uprisings began. Chapter III con-
tains a number of different accounts by individuals of their 
experiences and forms of participation during the period of 
mobilization before the first uprising, and .also s'aows the 
various strategies adopted by different groups in order to 
survive the war. Chapter IV analyses the economic and political 
situation in Nicaragua after the fall of the Sornoza family, 
the effects of the war on Esteli itself, and the process of 
social reconstruction which was taking place there. The con-
cluding chapter draws attention to a number of the points 
which have been developed and attempts an overall assessment 
of the dynamics of the process of change in Nicaragua. 
Chapter I 
The Economic and Political Background to the 
Anti-dictatorial Movement in Nicaragua 
In this chapter an attempt will be made to analyse briefly 
the context in which Nicaragua's economic and political structure 
evolved from early in the '19th century up until the overthrow of 
the Somoza regime. 
I will try to highlight some of the relevant factors that 
have influenced Nicaragua's social and economic development, and 
the political events which shaped the arena in which later on, 
a broad popular movement was to take place. 
The effects of Spanish Colonial Rule 
In this first section I sketch some aspects of the effects 
which Spanish colonization had on the country's economy a.nd social 
order. This historical background is important as it represented 
the framework on which economic and political'~ forces interacted 
during major events like the country's insertion into the inter-
national market. 
One important historical antecedent of Nicaragua's present 
social structure is the specific pattern. of resource distribution 
(e.g. the latifundio-minifundio combination which arose during 
colonial days). Later a process of decomposition of the peasantry 
began as agriculture turned progressively towards large-scale 
export production based upon a small number of agricultural 
products. This form of agricultural development benefitted a 
small landed &lite. 
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king to his subjects ( encomendero s) who were also allotted 
forced labour (the Indians\, and those communal lands which 
were given to the Indians as an 'acknowledgement' of their 
former rights before the Spanish conquest (see Torres Rivas, 
'1973). 
When the separation of the Central American people from 
Spain was proclaimed in '182'1, .the existing social groups 
which had been administering the resources of the Crown found 
themselves lacking in both experience and adequate institutions 
to manage alone within the wider commercial sphere. These 
groups found themselves, as owners of huge areas of idle lands, 
with an economy based predominantly upon grain cultivation and 
livestock production, most of which was for internal consump-
tion, since export channels had not been developed. The 
annexation of the Central American provinces to Mexico shortly 
after the separation from Spain, and the attempts to form a 
Central American Federal Republic (which finally failed in 
~842) were evidence of their attempts to overcome the chronic 
backwardness in which the regi0n was left after the prolonged 
and weak colonial administration. The lack of dynamism in 
the colonial economic administration had left them.without a 
cohesive economic structure and without any effective social 
group for confronting the post-colonial situation and develop-
ing important productive activities which could broaden the 
links with the external economy (see Torres Rivas, '1973; 
Wheelock, 1979; Black, 1981). 
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Characteristics of the Nicaraguan Economic System in the 
first half of the 19th centur_l 
Prior to the ~821 Declaration of Independence, England had 
been trying to establish its dominion over the Spanish colonies. 
After 1821, British firms increased their commercial affairs 
with the ex-colonies with the purpose of maintaining their 
leading position in world trade; thus a new impetus was given 
to the commercial 0rder in the economy of the Central American 
isthmus. Former exports such as blue indigo, cocoa and cotton 
were in demand again to supply part of the requirements of the 
British Industrial Revolution. Although this commercial trade 
between the Central American region and Britain did not result 
in a definite and consolidated link for the former into the 
world's market, it brought new economic expectations. British 
Sterling, for example, constituted the first financial link 
between the Central American States and a foreign economy: 
public loans were given to the ex-colonies and some investments 
were made in each. By that time, the Central American Federation 
was hardly functional and, when it was eventually dissolved, 
debts had to be paid individually and propor-tionally by each 
country. Such debts were taken advantg,ge of by the British to 
further their own interests and constituted a factor which 
limited internal capitalization (see Torres Rivas, 1973). 
During British domination, the Republic's economy pivotted 
around agricultural production f1r local c0nsumption and the 
export of dyes of either vegetable or animal'0rigin. The end-
ing of Spanish domination and the new commercial relationship 
with the British did not generate significant alterations in 
the social and economic structures of the Central American 
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countries because their main fjrms of livelihood continued to 
be based upon production for h0me c;nsumption, i.e. the cultiva-
tion of staple crops, livestock, and the export of small-scale 
agricultural products like leather, tobacco, cocoa, spices, 
.blue indigo and similar. 
In Nicaragua, as well as in the neighbouring countries, the 
predominant economic groups shortly after ~82~ were composed of 
families of Spanish descent born and bred in the country (criollos). 
These groups were settled around Granada and Leon which since 
colonial times, had been the main administrative centres. Goods 
were concentrated there and distributed within and out side the 
territory. Therefore, the big farmers of Granada and Leon were 
better placed to develop their agriculture and, apart from pro-
ducing to satisfy regional subsistence demands, they produced 
some surplus for external trade (e.g. with Spain and its other 
colonies and later on England). 
There were, as I already indicated, two distinct forms of 
production within the country's economy. First, production of 
the sefiorial type, which consisted of large haciendas acquired 
during colonial times, characterised by extensive cattle raising. 
Their labour force was drawn from the nearby peasant population 
or from the tenant household living within the hacienda (colonos). 
The haciendas also produced cocoa, sugar cane, cotton, tobacco, 
vanilla and traded craft goods made by the native population 
living either inside the hacienda or in villages nearby who 
I 
brought their craft products to the landlord to sell. The 
larger haciendas were in the hands of individuals and rich 
merchants living in the Central, Central-Western, Central-
Eastern and Southern parts of the country (e.g. Granada, Leon, 
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Chontales, Rivas). 
The second type was the subsistence production of cereals 
which was in the hands of small agricultural producers dispersed 
in the Northern regions of Nicaragua, like Matagalpa, Jinotega, 
Esteli and Las Segovias. They cultivated maize, beans, some 
wheat, potatoes, and raised a few cattle and other domestic 
animals like chickens and pigs; nearly all of their products 
were for self consumption (see Wheelock, ~979 : 54-58). There 
was also production of this type along the Pacific Coast, but 
it differed from the rest because, as a result of the tributarian 
regulations established during Colonial Rule, the small producers 
generated a surplus to supply the urban population, while those 
in the Northern region were cultivating for subsistence. This 
was linked to the existence of the larger cities on the Pacific 
Coast and the relative isolation of the northern towns. 
By the middle of the ~9th century, before Nicaragua became 
influenced by the coffee boom, its economy was still poorly 
developed. The country continued to lack a strong internal 
market which could expand towards other areas of the country 
and establish a more effective network. Furthermore, though 
the mercantile activities with Britain had re-animated the 
production of former agricultural products, this did not lead 
to significant economic growth. Some productive sectors of 
Nicaragua became more integrated into a broader system of inter-
change of goods. The following table illustrates the 'industrial' 
level and urban occupations which N~caragua had when coffee 
cultivation for export began to acquire importance. 
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Table I Industries and urban occupations around 
the 1860-1870s. 
a) Industries 
Bakeries 
Confectionari e s 
Cloth 
Soap workshops 
Shoe workshops 
Blacksmiths 
b) Crafts 
Basketry and precious 
metals 
Leather 
Di stillori es 
c) Other crafts 
Clock menders 
Stonemasons and stone 
decorators 
Characteristics 
Only in Leon and Granada; the rest 
domestic. 
Very few; generally Indian, honey, 
fruits of the country. 
In tailors; a lot with rnachi;Jes; 
only cloth for men; women's cloth 
domestically made. 
Very primitive (of animal tallow); no 
use of coconut or coyol (fruit) oil. 
Made with Indian leather techniques; 
some use of imported materials. 
A lot of small workshops; all iron 
work. 
In the hands of the Indian population. 
Pottery, cotton textiles, hats, ropes, 
hammock-making, etc. 
Mainly Indian leather objects, har-
nesses, etc. 
Nearly all horne made; "clandestine" 
circulation but could be obtained 
everywhere. Government had estancos 
(corner shops) in rundown condition. 
Only for repairs. No replacement of 
parts. 
Constructions of sun-dried bricks, 
taguezal with little ornamentation 
Boatmen, sawmillers, butchers, tanners, (most of them zambos -
negro s) 
d) Occupations not present 
hat makers, book binders, lithographers, engravers, wood 
carvers, baconers, architects, civil and mechanical engineers, 
general technicials. 
Source Paul Levy in Wheelock, 1979 66) 
' ' 
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The broad generalities given above concerning lTicaraguan 
society illustrate, though in a superficial way, the state of 
the country at the time of the coffee boom. During the steady 
move from ercantile production towards agrarian capitalism, 
a gradual division 0f labour developed before the main impact 
of the coffee trade. 
The political setting of the ~9th century 
Before 1821, the country's dominant economic groups became 
divided into two main regional groups. There were the big 
cattle ranchers, landlords who cultivated sugar cane and blue 
indigo, and the large merchants. This group had Granada as its 
main centre and identified itself politically as Conservative. 
The other group was those landlords of similar kind though not 
as big a group as the Conservatives, and some artisans who had 
their main centre in Leon, and who called themselves Liberals. 
It is said that the Conservatives clustered around the Chamorro's 
family of Granada and the Liberals around the Sacasa' s family 
(see JVI:i..llet, 1979; Wheelock, 1979; Aguilera, 1979 and lTACLA, 
1978). The political differences seemed to have emerged well 
before Nicaragua's separation from Spain. The Conservatives 
were descendants of the c0lonial military and bureaucratic 
elites and had the support nf the Church hierarchy. The 
Liberals seem not to have had the same degree of social status 
and were therefore less influential at a national or regional 
level (see Black, 1982). Gradually, the Conservatives and 
Liberals developed somewhat different views with regard to 
how to stimulate economic growth. For example, the Liberals, 
it has been argued, maintained a more open position towards 
free trade, and to improving the country's infrastructure, 
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while the Conservatives had a narrower and more rigid view 
regarding investments and broadening their economic activities 
(see JVIillet, '1979; Wheelock, '1979; NACLA, '1978). Differences 
also stemmed from the growing dissatisfaction shown by the 
Liberals towards the Conservatives, who since colonial times 
had represented the ruling elite. When their direct role as 
delegates of the Spanish Crown disappeared, the Liberals used 
the occasion to try and gain power themselves. As a consequence 
both factions went into a long struggle, each one fighting to 
either gain or maintain power. 
Shortly before the middle of the '1850's, the Liberals 
attempted to overthrow the Conservative regime. However as 
they failed they hired from abroad the filibuster William Walker 
to defeat the Conservatives. He succeeded but shortly after, 
turned against the Liberals and proclaimed himself President of 
the country. However, the two main political parties decided 
to join forces in a National Liberation War and succeeded in 
expelling Walker and his troops from the country (see Wheelock 
and Carrion, '1980 : '17). Such a union between Liberals and 
Conservatives did not last because once again they competed for 
power. After Walker's expulsion, the Conservatives managed to 
remain in power for 36 years. 
The geopolitical pretensions of the USA a~ded to Nicaragua's 
political instability and their various attempts to occupy the 
country led to armed conflict causing the death of many people. 
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The Liberal-bourgeoisie Reform 
Before the middle of the 19th century, coffee cultivation 
in the Central American countries became of noticeable import-
ance as a result of its demand in the international market. 
In Nicaragua the traditional oligarchy saw their economic 
interests affected by the incipient coffee group, 1.vho showed 
more flexibility \<Vith regard to the new perspective in the 
country's economy. The oligarchy had proved to be incapable 
of bringing about substantial change in the country and thus 
most of the population had continued tr) live essentially in 
nearly the same conditions as those existing shortly after the 
1821 independenceo 
When eventually the liberal Jose Santos Zelaya came to 
power in 1893, he initiated a "modernising policy" at all 
levels of the country's structure, which ranged from "moderni s-
ing" the army, to improving the infrastructure, and reforming 
the legislative systam. However, most of the reforms made 
had the purpose of providing the liberal faction with the 
necessary means to expand their economic interests in the 
field of coffee cultivation, which in terms of·profits was by 
then the most favourable agricultural export product in the 
Central American area, although in comparison to other Central 
American countries, Nicaragua was late in cultivating coffee 
on a large scale for export. It did not do so. until after the 
1850's, owing to the political turmoil of the chronic civil 
wars between Liberals and Conservatives and because of the con-
tinual attempts by foreigners such as the British and the North-
Arner·icans to gain rights over the territory because of its 
rruitability as an interoceanic passageway. 
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The regime headed by the liberal Zelaya had important 
political and economic consequences for Nicaragua. It re-
structured the country's agrarian system which consolidated 
the dualistic latifundia/minifundia pattern, the purpose of 
which was to back the incipient coffee growing bourgeoisie's 
interests. That is, adjustments to the State laws were made in 
order to legalize the dislodging of the peasantry from their 
land and to support the expropriation of land suitable for 
coffee growing to the benefit of the Liberal landlords. 
Secondly, as a consequence, the process of decomposition among 
the peasantry became accentuated. 
Moreover, the Liberal Reform showed a nationalistic 
position particularly with regard to foreign interference, 
that later on led to open conflict with the USA and those 
regimes which had special sympathy to the White House. For 
instance, Zelaya's attempts to broaden commercial relations 
with Great Britain and Japan created an increasing discontent 
among the North Americans, w4o came to the support of Zelaya's 
rivals in order to engineer how downfall, which they succeeded 
in doing in ~909. Nevertheless, the Liberal Reform in Nicaragua 
as in other Central American countries meant the institutional-
ization of new patterns of social organization related to 
coffee production, the internal widening of commercial interests, 
the bringing in of strong commercial interests from Europe like 
Germany (see Adams, ~973 : ~38) and the improvement of public 
services (e.g. roads and railways) to facilitate the coffee trade. 
From the end of Zelaya's administration onwards, the 
country's governments were to rely more and more on the USA for 
both economic and military aid. Presidents like Jose Estrada, 
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Adolfo Dl.az, Carlos Solorzano and Emiliano Chamorro in order 
to rule, needed military support. Later on, in ~927 the 
establishment of a National Guard would prove through time to 
be an institution which led to the direct interference of the 
USA in the country's affairs (see Lopez, et al., ~980: ~7). 
This was to be reinforced, when in ~933 a former car dealer, 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia, was appointed as its chief director. 
This man was to be specially singled out by the USA State 
Department because of his sympathy to the North Americans. He 
was to count on their prolonged support not only as c:llef 
director of the National Guard but also in gaining the presi ... 
dency in ~936 and ruling by means of a dictatorial regime. 
General characteristics of the Nicaraguan social and economic 
structure 
From the end of the ~9th century up to the present, the 
Nicaraguan economy became progressively involved in the export 
of agricultural products for the international market; first 
with coffee and later on in the ~950's with cotton cultivation 
on a large scale. This accentuated the agroexport character of 
the country's economy, and produced a series of changes in the 
social and economic organization of the population engaged in 
their production. This ultimately permitted the establishment 
of forms of wage labour in the agricultural sector. 
The process of accumulation of capital in Nicaragua, as in 
other Central American countries, has been linked to the process 
of external accumulation through foreign investment in the main 
forms of cash-crop production. The low productivity latifundios 
in the form of large haciendas in Nicaragua concentrated upon 
13 
the extensive cultivation of staple crops and cattle raising 
using tenant and some seasonal peasant labour. Later the 
development of coffee production led to some reorganization of 
labour and to the taking over of peasant holdings on the peri-
pheries of the haciendas. 
Coffee cultivation for export produced, then, a series of 
changes in the patterns of economic and social organization of 
the peasantry. Peasants who had been throwri off their lands, 
or those whose lands were reduced, had to look for other plots 
or engage in wage labour to meet their basic consumption needs. 
Although a part of the peasantry became engaged in wage labour, 
which could be considered the beginnings of "a process of rural 
proletarianization", such work was seasonal, due to the agri-
cultural cycle of coffee. In the preparatory period which lasts 
for most of the year, for instance, only a small number of rural 
workers are required. This period is popularly kno-vm as the 
'dead period' (tiempo muerto). While during the harvesting 
season, large numbers of peasants move from their homes to the 
coffee plantations and work there for approximately 90 days. 
It has been calculated that only '1 CP/o of the number needed for 
harvesting were permanent employees (see Wheelock, '1979 : 84). 
This pattern of production, therefore, reinforced the dualistic 
agrarian structure of the latifundio-minifundio type. 
As long as the demand for coffee was sustained in the inter-
national market, it constituted the mainstay of the Nicaraguan 
economy. However, this made the country dependent on the ups 
and downs of the international market. When the market was low 
it affected the foregoing currency situation and this in turn 
influenced internal investments. Public services were cut, 
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import prices increased and difficulties arose over the 
capacity to purchase goods from abroad. This reduced the 
mobilization of resources within the country, decreasing the 
level of internal investments. The effects of economic depend-
ency was seen in ~897, ~907 and especially during the ~930 
World Recession which had important repercussions on the Central 
American economies. During the ~930's, the income carried from 
coffee exports decreased by between 4ry~ and 507~ compared with 
previous years. This caused serious damage to the national 
economy (see Torres Rivas, ~973 : ~55). 
It is important to emphasize that though coffee plantations 
entailed a "new modern modality" in comparison to the agrarian 
system of colonial days, such modernization did not extend 
evenly within the countryside. It penetrated mainly in the 
areas of the large coffee farms while it remained nearly absent 
in the areas where small producers lived. In other words, 
coffee cultivation did not undermine subsistence based peasant 
agriculture; rather it provided a diversified household economy 
whereby in addition to cultivating small plots, the peasants 
worked outside in order to supplement their incomes. 
The rise in coffee production in the country, especially 
during Zelaya's administration, gave rise to the emergence of 
new socio-economic groups concerned with coffee affairs and 
led to the predominance of the coffee bourgeoisie over the trad-
itional oligarchy that controlled the haciendas. 
With the establishment of cotton cultivation in the ~950's, 
the weak 'capitalist' relationships - that had started to 
develop with the coffee- became more stressed. ·Former grain 
producing areas on the Pacific coast ·were converted to cotton 
cultivation, and the larger farmers began a process of en-
croachment of peasant holdings. The displaced peasants were 
forced into selling their labour during peak periods of the 
agricultural season. 
At the end of the ~950's, the country experienced another 
economic contraction. The price of cotton had decreased and 
the Nicaraguan economy was badly hit. The impact of the Cuban 
revolution coincided with the formation of the Central American 
Common Market - MCCA - which was set within a broader regional 
plan of development directed mainly at industry. This plan 
was to be supported with USA financial and technical aid and 
pursued, on the one hand, in order to expand US economic 
interests through broadening their market in the Central American 
region and, on the other hand, in order to develop a strategy 
to release the political tensions of the region. As there had 
been a process of capital accumulation in Nicaragua originating 
from agro-export production (coffee, cotton, sugar cane and 
meant), the regional development plan represented by the MCCA 
was aimed at promoting internal investment in order to stimulate 
economic growth. However, although industry in Nicaragua 
showed some progress, most of the new enterprises, firms and 
business houses that appeared in the 1960's were under the con-
trol of foreign capital. North American investors opened 
business branches either by establishing new firms or by absorb-
ing existing smaller enterprises. In Nicaragua especially, 
Somoza had granted foreign investors a lot of facilities with 
regard to low taxation, few legal restrictions and the like. 
Tbi s was made all the more easy since Somoza had shares in 
many of the businesses. Some 63 North American transnationals 
and 70 subsidiaries, for example, were functioning in Nicaragua, 
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representing 76% of all enterprises under foreign control 
(see Castillo Donald, ~979). 
Economic dependency also had its political consequences, 
leading to increased conflict between and among the different 
social and economic groups. In Nicaragua, shortly before the 
~930's international economic depression, the peasant sector, 
spurred on by the hard living conditions and the high level of 
unemployment, showed support for the rebellion led by Augusto 
Cesar Sandino. As we will see later, this struggle aimed not 
only at arresting North American intervention in the country, 
but also at agrarian reform. Moreover, it was during the long 
economic depression that efforts were made to counter the in-
creased social tensions through the imposition of regimes of a 
dictatorial kind, like those of Jorge Ubico in Guatemala and 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia in Nicaragua (see Torres Rivas, ~973 
and Adams, ~973). 
Consolidation of the Dependent Character of the Nicaraguan 
Economy 
During the first half of the 20th century, the Central 
American countries reinforced their role as suppliers of raw 
materials. It was also the time in which the USA began to expand 
its economic interests in Latin America. Nicaragua provided 
rubber, wood and other products f0r the Second World War which 
it had not exploited before, and at the end of the War, lJicara-
gua had become one of the world's main rubber producers, its 
export representing ~4% of the country's total exports (see 
Banco Central de Nicaragua, ~975). 
The export of raw materials and agricultural products, 
like coffee, permitted certain capital accumulation. From the 
'1950's onwards, Nicaragua experienced a period of economic 
expansion with regard to the diversification of agro-exports. 
The penetration of North American capital into Nicaragua in-
creased markedly and the country deepened even more its depend-
ency on the US for economic aid and markets. This tendency had 
started in the 1930's: by 1938, 25% of Nicaragua's exports 
went to Western Europe, 15% to Germany and 67% to the USA. By 
'1 '144, 6% went to Latin America, just ~% to Europe and other 
Central American countries, and 91% to the USA (see CEPAL, 1966 
'19). 
The "industrial boom" that Nicaragua and the other Central 
American countries experienced in the 1960's justified by develop-
ment of the MCCA, was in essence an instrument used by North 
American investors to locate their capital and expand their 
economic interests, which, in turn, permitted the relocation of 
national capital. The process of industrialization in lTicaragua 
was characterized by the development of light industry producing, 
for example, food, tobacco, chemical and plastic goods. It was 
closely linked to the processing of agricultural products, such 
as vegetable oil, sugar cane, spirits, and meat; led to an 
increase of imported goods necessary to the processing of commodi-
ties which previously had been totally imported. 
Industrialization in Nicaragua was accompanied by a closer 
participation of the State with regard to financial aid. The 
groups that benefitted most were the multinational and trans-
national firms that established numerous business branches, and 
the local economically dominant Somoza family and its associates 
who were able to take advantage of the improved economic climate 
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to expand their economic interests. 
The Economic Elite in Nicaragua 
The tradition in Nicaragua when referring to the dominant 
groups has been to link them with the first political parties 
that emerged in the 19th century, the Conservatives and the 
Liberals. IJ1he extent to which the main economic groups have, 
since their beginnings, been associated with one or the other 
political party or whether political affiliation has been a 
fundamental factor in their economic role remains an open 
question and is not my main concern in this section. 
R mghly speaking we can say that there were two distinct 
local bourgeois groups, that operating as financial, industrial-
ists (usually owning businesses con~ectedwith the processing of 
agricultural products), and that consisting of landlords who 
had large estates. These were in various ways clustered around 
the so-called Banamer, Banic or the Somoza groups. 
The Banamerica group: originally it is said that this group 
started to operate representing the historical and economic con-
tinuation of the old Conservative oligarchy headed by the known 
Conservative families, like the Pellas, Chamorro, Bernard, 
Gomez and others, and who had interests in the commerce, live-
stock production and sugar cane around Granada (see Wheelock, 
~976; Black, 1972). The name of this group derived from the 
foundation in ~952 of the Banco de America, a bank regarded as 
being associated with the Conservatives. When this bank c•mm-
enced operations its main function was to provide aid to exist-
ing Conservative entrepreneurs: it had direct ties with US 
banking institutions, especially with the Wells Fargo Bank and 
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the. First National Bank of Boston (see Strachan, 1979). In 
the 1960' s, the Banameri ca group wide ned their acti viti es to 
include insurance, construction, real estate and.industrial 
investment, and many entE:'rpri ses which had been established 
earlier experienced growth. Well-known firms like SOVIPE 
(Solorzano, Villa, Pereira>-predominantly engaged in the 
marketing of electrical appliances and construction materials-, 
BIRSA (Bienes y Ral.ces S.A.)-a real estate firm~, and the 
Inmobiliaria de Ahorro y Prestamo (a loan and savings institu-
tion) became economically stronger enterprises once they formed 
partnerships with the Banco de America. 
The Banamerica group increased its economic power and went 
on to organize financial enterprises like the FIA (Financiera 
Industrial Agro:pecuaria) which focused upon supporting indu;:;trial, 
agricultural and livestock operations by developing sugar refin-
eries, meat processing, alcohol and soft drinks industries. FIA 
also came to assist a large number of subsidiary firms like 
NI1'1AC (Nicaraguan Machinery Co.), DIDATSA (a car dealer enter-
prise), La Prensa (the largest local newspaper:,, and the Ingenio 
San Antonio, considered to have the largest rum distillery of 
the country and one of the largest sugar refineries of the isthmus 
region,and many ')ther smaller businesses. In brief, the Bana-
merica group developed a business network in such a vray that all 
its components were linked together and capital circulated amongst 
them. 
The Banic gr~u~ : was regarded as the counterpart of the Con-
servatives. This group was formed by non-Conservative families 
and headed by the well-known l'1ontealegre Callejas, Reyes, 
Sacasas, and Guerreros families who brought together cotton 
20 
farmers, merchants of the western part of the country, and some 
industrialists from Managua clustered around the Banco ~:-icara­
guen.se which was e.stablished in 1953, stimulated by the cotton 
boom. From the beginning this group focused on providing 
economic aid to cotton farmers from Leon and Chinandega and had 
regional institutions in those Departments. .Similar to the 
Banamerica group, during the 1960's, the Banic group broadened 
its range of economic ac~ivities. The Banco Nicaraguense's 
partners invested with more emphasis in the industrial sectJr, 
in the real estate and in the c 1nstruction industry. This led 
to some competition between the Banamerica and Banic groups. 
Firms like INDESA (Inversiones Nicaraguenses d~ Desarrollo)- and 
investment entity centered on industrial development-, FIITAJ:TSA 
~a financial institution-, Financiera La Vivienda - a financial 
firm for house construction-, the insurance firm La Protectora 
and many others competed for the control of resources and of 
business. 
A feature of the economic activities of the Banic group 
was that within their enterprises, the members incorporated 
institutions containing programmes of "social promotion". rrhese 
programmes aimed to carry out activities for improving the 
living conditions of difference social groups, under the label 
of development projects. For instance, FUl'ifDE-IHDE (Fundaci6n 
Nicaraguense de Desarrollo) was an institution which introduced 
programmes to collect contributions, savings and resources in 
order to help particular groups like some rural communities. 
However, likely programmes aimed to collect savings from the 
lower economic groups in order to improve their situation, 
without questioning the need for deeper changes in order to 
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improve their living conditions. The "social promotion" 
strategy was backed by the Alliance for Progress and financed 
by agencies such as AID, IDF (Agency for International Develop-
ment and International Development Fund~ and other US institu-
tions. 
Similar to the Banamerica group, the Banic group had its 
main financial backing in the USA: the Chase Nanhattan Bank, 
Norgan Guarantee Trust and the Multibank and Trust Co.; and 
also their enterprises depended upon North American multi~ 
nationals like the Consolidated Food Corporation, Booth Fish-
eries, Pepsi cola International and others (see Strachan, 1979). 
The Somoza group : started to increase its economic assets in 
the 1930's when Anastasio Somoza Garc1a- ASG- became chief 
director of the National Guard under the north American protec-
torate and during the regime of Juan Bautista Sacarm. By then, 
ASG was heir of a small broken-down coffee farm in Carazo and 
had been a car dealer as well as a gambler. When he became 
President of Nicaragua in ~936 by means of a coup d'etat, he 
started to take advantage 0f his p0sition, especially during 
and after the Second World War. During the War, ASG established 
close connections with US entrepreneurs and exchanged favours 
with members of the North American G'vernment and in thi.s way 
he managed to enlarge his wealth!: gold, rubber and timber, 
for instance, were traded with lhrth Americans who, in turn, 
gave their political support to Somoza while he vmi:::l er:.>tabli sh-
ing profitable businesses (e.g. commercial firmr>, importer 
houses for machinery, iron appliances, ·jewelry). In addition, 
ASG expelled the German farmer.s fr'lm Nicaragua in order to seize 
their lands. By 1944, Somoza Garc1a was considered to be the 
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large.st landowner of the country. His property included 5'1 
cattle ranches, 46 coffee plantations and a large real ~state 
holding in Managua. At the time of his death in ~956, it was 
calculated that his agricultural assets had reached ~~6 of 
the nation' s arable land (see NACLA, '978 ~·. 
The Somoza family went on building a wide and selective 
network which embraced foreigner businessmen, high officers 
of banks, influential individuals in US politics and in diplo-
matic levels. The institution which used to finance Somoza's 
businesses was the National Bank. The family had spread to 
occupy key offices within the State institutions and therefore 
had been able to manipulate the available resources in favour-
ing their interests. 
Similar to the other groups - BANIC and BM~AMERICA -
Somoza broadened his economic activities mainly during the '1960 
decade following more or less the same pattern of investments 
as the other groups, but with the advantage that given the 
large part of the aid oriented to develop the industry - which 
was provided by North American agencies - was to be canalised 
through State institutions, Somoza could dispose of it with 
more facilities than the rest of his competitors. 
From the '1972 earthquake, the existing construction firms 
developed remarkably and the Somoza family also invested heavily 
in this sector. Moreover, as the Liberals and Conservatives had 
their respective banks and financial institutions, Somoza 
managed to organise the Banco de Centroamerica and the financial 
firm, INTERFINMTCIERA as institutions to administer his private 
enterprises in the country. His properties were, at the same 
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time, mortgaged in the National Bank as a form of insurance 
against any threat of expropiation. In the agricultural and 
industrial fields, the Somozas and their partnerships con-
trolled firms like CARNIC (meat enterprise), the Nicaraguan 
Cigars (with Batistian Cubans as partners), NICALIT S.A. (a 
factory of cement and asbestos), and many other enterprises 
related to sugar, coffee and rice plantations, fish packing, 
distilleries, cooking oil, textiles and so on (see NACLA, '1976) .. 
By '1975, Somoza's businesses in the country were estimated to 
be worth between US $ 400 and 500 millions - excluding his out-
side investments which were protected locally by family members 
and close friends in the government institutions including the 
National Guard (see NACLA, '1978 and IEPALA, '1978). 
H~wever, in spite of the history of political conflicts 
between the traditional political groups and later on with 
Somoza's family, the local bourgeoisie have shown that their 
conflicts diminish before their economic interests. For 
instance, during Somoza' s administration, Conservatives and 
Liberals had come into political agreements with the regime for 
having in return economic allowances like· the formation of the 
Banco de America and the Banco Nicaraguense in the '1950's. 
There was some convergence of economic interests between 
the Banamerica and Banic groups, as shown by the formation of 
broader associations such as the COSIP (Consejo Superior de 
la Iniciativa Privada), which served to embrace all individuals 
with private enterprises and to establish price policies for 
the local market, indices of fixed salaries for workers, 
marketing, distribution and. a·greements to maintain their 
businesses running with better profit margins (see Strachan,'1979). 
r ' 
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The COSIP, in turn, was under the C•1ntrol of the most dominant 
economic factions of the private entrepreneurs, and their goals 
could be merged as long as they could carry ahead their economic 
interests. Although the Liberals and Conservatives on some 
occasions acted together to put pressure upon Somoza in order 
to obtain economic and/or political demands, in practice, in 
the running of their enterprises, links among all these groups 
existed. 
The Popular Movement that Overthrew Somoza Dictatorshi£ 
The main purpose of this section is to present a retrospec-
tive account, highlighting some of the factors that influenced 
the formation of the broad movement which eventually brought 
down the dictatorship that had been established in the early 
'1930's. It will thus be necessary to give a brief analysis of 
the significance of Sandino's struggle, the outstanding role of 
the FSLN in re-interpreting his purposes in relation to the pre-
vailing conditions of Nicaragua in the 1970's, and to describe 
the events that eventually led to the alliance of a number of 
different social groups in the effort to bring about major 
social and economic changes in Nicaragua. 
I also intend to examine the events that preceded the fall 
of the dictatorship. This will familiarise the reader with the 
national political and economic context and will offer a better 
understanding of the case study of Esteli which i::-o presented 
later in the thes~s. 
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Sandino's Struggle 
The present-day anti-imperialist and nationalist 
revolution in Nicaragua has its historical roots in the 
struggle begun by Augusto Cesar Sandino in the ~920's. His 
struggle has been an example which has served to enrich the 
experience of all subsequent liberation movements in Latin 
America as the Sandino movement pioneered the fight against 
US intervention in the continent. Earlier we described how 
Zelaya's regime was defeated in ~909 and replaced by a mixed 
Government of Liberals and Conservatives approved by the 
Department of State. It had as President the Liberal Juan 
Jose Estrada and as Vice-Pre side nt the Conservative, Adolfo 
Diaz. Nonetheless, contrary to what was expected, i.e. that 
with a mixed Government Liberal-Conservatives conflicts would 
diminish - the regime did not last and Diaz removed Estrada 
from power in ~9~4. 
In order to rule, however, Diaz and the Presidents that 
followed him, were to request stronger military support from 
the North Americans (who had maintained forces in Nicaragua 
since the last half of the ~9th century in order to protect 
their geopolitical interests in the country). The North 
American armed forces were to remain without interruption, 
with the exception of a short period between ~925-26, up to 
~933. After ~933, the National Guard with Anastasio Somoza 
~arcia as its chief director, was to be responsible for keeping 
law and order in the country. 
But continual armed foreign incurions in the past, 
the reluctance of the Frorth American army to leave Nicaraguan 
territory, the chronic Liberal-Conservative conflict and the 
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overt reliance of the ruling groups on direct US support, were 
to give rise to revolts among sectors of the population that 
saw North American interference as one of the main obstacles 
to solving the country's internal problems. Thus there vrere 
revolts, such as the one in October 1912 in Masaya headed by 
Benjamin Zeled6n. This rebellion was put down by the army under 
Conservative le~dership and particularly by the interference of 
North American troops (see Fonseca Amador, 1980; Millet, 1979; 
Wheelock, ~ 979). 
Later on, a worker of peasant background who was born in 
Ni qui no homo, a village in the Department of l'lasaya in 1895, 
Augusto Cesar Sandino, was to take the leadership of the anti-
interventionist struggle against the North Americans. When he 
began fighting against the marines, he had already worked and 
acquired political experience in Honduras and Mexico during 
the 1920's. In Mexico he had worked in the oil fields of 
Tampico and had become impressed by the nationalism of the 
Mexican revolution; and it is here that he probably first 
became interested in socialist ideas (see Macaulay, 1967; 
Wheelock and Carrion, 1980). 
The conflicts between the Conservatives and Liberals 
generated an armed struggle in 1926, which became known as 
the Constitutionalist War. Each political group established 
their own "legitimate" government. The Conservatives were rep-
resented by Emiliano Chamorro and Adolfo Diaz, the Liberals by 
Juan Bautista Sacasa. During the C0nstitutionalist War, Sandino 
formed his first permanent forces recruited from workers in a 
gold mine located in the Northern region of the country. He 
established his military camp in the area of Guanzapo at the 
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extreme north of Las Segovias, and, using the dynamite taken 
from the mines, Sandino began fighting the Conservative army 
who were from time to time defeated. 
Although the Constitutionalist War ended in Hay '1927 vr.ith 
the Espino Negro Pact between the Liberal Jose Maria 1'1oncada 
and the Conservative Diaz, Sand:i,.no remained with his armed group 
in the mountains of Las Segovias. He considered that the agree-
ments made with the Conservatives, using US officials as media-
tors, were inadequate since they did not stop Horth American 
intervention in Nicaraguan affairs. Thus, Sandino refused to 
lay down his arms until all the North American troops had left 
the country. As he had suspected, the marines in fact remained 
in Nicaragua and therefore reinforced the anti-imperialist 
struggle. The fight against foreign intervention had an impact 
not only among the Nicaraguan population but also abroad. For 
example, in a message sent to all Latin American Presidents in 
August '1928, Sandino said: 
"Do the Latin American governments perhaps think 
that the yankies will be content with the conquest 
of Nicaragua? Have these governments perhaps for-
gotten that of the 2'1 American republics, six have 
already lost their sovereignty? Panama, Puerto 
Rico, Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua 
are the six unfortunate republics that have lost 
their independence and have become colonies of 
yankie imperialism. 11 
(see Escobar, '1980.) 
Sandino's anti-imperialist stand and his internationalist reputa-
tion brought him the support of prestigious contemporary figures 
like the Mexican educator Jose Vasconcelos, the politician Victor 
Raul Haya de la Torre and the Chilean poetess, Gabriela Mistral 
(see Macaulay, '1967). Although Sandino's struggle did not 
achieve any very great measure of international solidarity, he 
set an important historical precedent for the encouragement of 
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movements with similar goals. 
Sandino fought the North American troops until they left 
the country in '1933, having proved incapable·of defeating his 
Ejercito Defensor de la Soberan:la Hacional de Nicaragua - EDSH -
(Army to Defend the National Sovereignty of :Nicaragua). rr'he 
guerrilla tactics used by Sandino proved superior to those of 
the North American armed forces. The sophisticated weaponry 
of the North American forces became ineffective against the 
detailed knowledge of the terrain and peasant support of 
Sandino's combatants (see Ortega, s/d). 
The importance of Sandino's struggle to the recent day 
revolution in lilicaragua rests on the fact that his example and 
political thought provided the basis for the development of an 
id.eological platform which could appeal to diverse social and 
economic groups. In many ways it served as the ideological 
basis on which organizations like the FSLN were formed in '196'1. 
Sandino's thought was not simply an anti-imperialist stand; it 
also comprised a detailed programme which revealed a high level 
of class consciousness which has itself remained valid for the 
uniting of various social sectors. The Sandinista ideology 
stressed, for example, the establishment of a popular, democratic 
and independent government; the collectivization of the land 
for the benefit of those who worked it; the suppression and re-
evaluation of treaties and agreements which were damaging the 
national sovereignty; integration of continental organizations 
to protect Latin American in~erests and reject North American 
influence; the rescue of the country's natural resources on 
behalf of the masses; the encouragement of respect for national 
values and the maintenance of the EDSN (Army to Defend the 
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Hational Sovereignty of Hi caragua) (see Escobar, 1980 >. 
Thus, although Sandi no, who was assassinated in 'i 934 in a plo·::-
involving Somoza Garcia, was unable to achieve all of his goals, 
he left a legacy which was to prove an example for the anti-
imperialist struggle and a political tradition emphasizing 
collective political consciousness among the masses and other 
s,)cial strata committed to the struggle. 
The Reviyal of Sandino's Thought 
0nce Sandino had died, Somoza Garc{a managed to oust Juan 
Bautista Sacasa from power and thus became President in 1936 by 
means of rigged elections. Though his period of office was to 
end four years later, he modified the Constitution in order to 
stay in power; in fact he remained in power until a young revolu-
tionary poet Rigoberto Lopez Perez assassinated him in ~956. By 
then, the Somoza family had amassed immense power by enlarging 
its wealth and retaining the control of the National Guard, the 
most powerful armed institution in the country. It is worth 
pointing out that the sons of Anastasio Somoza Garc:La, Luis and 
Anastasio junior, had already been trained to continue control 
of the State apparatus with the support of the US Department of 
State. They had built a network of supporters in the Porth 
American political sphere which through economic returns had 
been able to maintain the flow of Washington aid towards Somoza's 
regime. Thus, after Somoza Garc:La' s death, the family had the 
internal and external mechanisms both for expanding their 
economic empire and reinforcing their p0litical power with the 
total assistance of the US g0vernment. Somoza's fortune had 
started to grow from the seizur~ 0f land and capital resources 
in the 1930'E3, accumulating more capital with the profitable 
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businesses the first Somoza had established during the Second 
. 
World War in response to the outside demand for raw materials 
for war industries and they continued increasing their wealth 
with the diversification of their economic interests during the 
~960's onwards. Their economic empire was sustained and ex-
tended by the use of State institutions. 
The contradictions of the political system Somoza Garcia 
had set up, the effects that the cotton slump had on the popula-
tion in the 1950's and the impact of the Cuban revolutionary 
movement among organisations aiming at major social change 
created conditions in Nicaragua to stimulate popular mobiliza-
tion in protest against their deteriorating living conditions. 
The Socialist Party (Communist) which had been founded in the 
1940's had been making efforts to organize the incipient labour 
movement that had been promoted by the cotton boom and the 
economic diversification that followed. However, as the Social-
ist Party had not been able to set out a programme which could 
unite satisfact0rily the ec0nomic, social and political aspira-
tions of many of its members, s0me university students who had 
begun to read Sandi no's writings started to explore the po s ,-,i bili-
ties of rescuing his ideas and putting them into practice. 
Thus, in 1951 the former university students, Carlos Fonseca 
Amador, Silvio Mayorga and Tomas Borge took the decision to 
create a new organization adapting. the basic ideas of Sandino's 
struggle to meet the needs of the contemporary situation of the 
country. The success of Fidel Castro's overthrow of the Batista 
Dictatorship using guerrilla tactics also seemed to reaffirm 
Sandi no's conception of the necessity for armed ,struggle. So, 
for the first time after sandino's death, the seeds were there 
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to develop an organization which contemplated armed struggle 
as well as political tasks. So as to defeat the enemy, Car·los 
Fonseca suggested that the new movement should be called the 
FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n NacionaL:. 
Small groups directed their political acti viti es to\vards 
organising students' cells who worked to get in touch with 
peasants who had fought with Sandino in the northern regions of 
Nicaragua, aiming to form a human and material base to shape 
their organizati0n. The first ider:>logical steps were focused 
on combining and fusing Marxist theory with the Sandi~ista experi-
ence. At the same time, efforts were made t0 recruit workers, 
peasants, students, artisans and elements of the lower economic 
sectors to open new diverse fronts of political action and acti-
vity, although the initial work of organization was very slow. 
As in Sandino's time, the northern regions of Nicaragua were the 
main areas where the FSLN members were able to establish their 
first cells. These included peasants, seasonal rural workers 
and artisans from the Departments of J.Vlatagalpa, Esteli, Somoto 
and Ocotal. The areas along the frontier with Honduras became 
0he first training places for the future guerrilla fighter::~. 
By 1963, the FSLN had already formed their first guerrilla 
column and had had their first armed clash wi.th the national 
Guard in the Northeastern part of the c:mntry. 'I'hroughout the 
1960's, the FSLN worked hard tn develop their political and mili-
tary infrastructure annng different socio-economic groups. This 
process was slow because 0f the clandestine character of the 
work, political repression, and because of the difficulties of 
gaining the trust of the peasantry. As a result, many of the 
members of the guerrilla army were from the ci tie::~ and of middle-
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class origins. However, the FSLlJ gradually managed to build a 
base, although it was not until ·1967 that it Has able to spread 
more widely the notinn of their struggle as an organization with 
a future and a programme. The FSLN had been able to organize 
a regular guerrilla army. This meant that its members had been 
capable of strengthening their support networks in the country-
:::-oide as well as in the urban centre.s, such a.s 1'1anagua, Leon, 
JVIatagalpa, Esteli and others. Somoza responded by sending the 
National Guard to the area where the FSLlT had established their 
guerrilla camps, and many FSLN- main leaders died in battle. 
Guerrilla actions in 1967 were to be remembered as the heroic 
epic of Pancasan (in the Department of Matagalpa> which, though 
it was a military defeat, politically had the effect on the 
population in terms of bringing to their attention a new alter-
native for fighting the distatorship, searching for structural 
changes as well as raising nati0nal consciousness about the 
brutality of the regime (see lrtega, H., 1980~. 
After Pancasan, the FSLH entered into a period of re-
trenchment. Intern ally the 1 eadership went on di scu~·.sing and 
establishing priorities in order to carry on to re-build their 
structures, since, with the defeat of Pancasan their base had 
almost disappeared. In their self-criticism about the work 
they had carried out in the past, FSLH members realised that 
many mistakes had been made with regard to methods of work, 
quality of elements recruited, individualism, the lol'r level of 
political education, and their isolation from the masses; the 
urban cells the FSLN had formed had been organised mainly so 
as to provide support for the guerrillas in the mountains and 
the organization had tended to neglect political activity among 
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\vorkers in cities. In consequence, two avenues were devised 
to link the organisation 'With the masses. Those who were 
inclined to abandon the armed struggle now concentrated on 
organizational tasks, while others, although recognizing the 
necessity of developing organization among students and in 
the slums, preferred to concentrate on reactivating armed 
struggle, since many of the cadres who actually had military 
training had been killed at Pancasan. Thus, many FSLH members 
devoted a lot of time to recruiting supporters from the work-
ing population (many members of the Socialist Party moved to 
the FSLN), dwellers, students, and among the peasantry, trying 
to raise their political education and training them for agita-
tional activities (see Ruiz, H., 1980). 
After the 1972 earthquake, there occurred an expansion of 
economic activities in the construction field which, in turn, 
offered possibilities for the working population in the city 
to press their economic demands. During 1973 and 1974 differ-
ent sectors organized strikes (e.g. the construction workers, 
the health workers and some industrial centres) and the mobiliza-
tion created by these permitted the strengthening of organiza-
tions like the FSLN. On the other hand, the Somoza regime had 
become progressively isolated from the local bourgeoisie. By 
taking charge of the Emergency Earthquake Relief Committee, 
Somoza managed to neutralize the Triumviate (which was supposed 
to rule until1974) and to channel much international aid into 
the pockets of his own family and friends. This created in-
creasing d_it:content among those bourgeois groups which did not 
benefit from such favours. 
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In December 1974, the FSLN carried out a major military 
action after several years of relative quiet, the seizure of 
the house of a well-known somocista, Jose nar:La Castillo Quant, 
who was JVIinister of Agriculture and was hosting a reception for 
the US Ambassador Turner Shelton. The FSLN demanded the libera-
tion of sandinista prisoners, a ransom, the publication of a 
press and radio communique to the people of Nicaragua denouncing 
the regime, and an increase in wages. The success of this 
action made the FSLN more widely known among the population and 
to the outside world. Nevertheless, shortly afterwards, Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle, who had "won" the Presidential election in the 
same month, imposed a state of emergency which was to last for 
33 months. This included a curfew, press censorship and social 
powers of arbitrary arrest. He also set up a special military 
tribunal to investigate the FSLN. All these measures nationally 
had their effect in the FSLN. Somoza directed the National Guard 
to terrorise the population in the country areas where the FSET 
had established their bases. Also, as a result of the state of 
emergency, the urban network which had provided aid to the 
guerrillas became less strongly linked to the countryside. 
The split and the unity of the FSLN 
When the anti-dictatorial movement was at its peak, during 
the urban uprisings of ~978, the FSli~ was divided into three 
factions. This had resulted from internal differences that had 
gradually evolved during the early 1970' .s. \rJe have already 
pointed out that at the enC'_ of the 1960's the FSLlT leadership 
re-analysed its strategies, having suffered serious military 
set-backs. It was important to buil~ a stronger and more con-
solidated base, which could sustain a protracted .struggle em-
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bracing not only guerrilla warfare but also the incorporation 
of larger sectors of the population working along different 
political fronts. FSLN leaders also re-thought the ·wisdom of 
concentrating their efforts on the rural guerrilla force, 
taking into account other comparable experiences, such as 
Che Guevara's force in Bolivia, and guerrilla movement in 
Guatemala. 
Some of the FSLN cadres placed more emphasis on urban 
work, thus postponing the armed struggle to a later stage, 
while others stressed the necessity of embracing both areas of 
work (countryside and city) but argued that the guerrilla work 
in the mountains was a bigger priority. Also the influence of 
orthodox Marxist ideology, which views the proletariat as the 
leading force in the socialist revolution, caused some FSLN 
members to point to their lack 0f political work among the 
incipient working class of Nicaragua. r.rhese internal differ-
ences and controversies grew and became sharper with the 
increased repression launched during the state of emergency 
resulting in open rifts in 1975. Those who believed in the 
armed struggle based their commitments on the strategy of the 
Protracted Popular War (Guerra Popular Prolongada) - GPP; 
whilst those who argued for the need to prepare the working 
class for the revolution concentrated on political and organiza-
tional aspects among the working sectors of the city. The 
latter tendency was known as the Proletarian Tendency -TP ( f:Oee 
Lopez, et al., 1980; Black, 1981; Ortega, '1980; Huiz, 1980). 
In '1976, Carlos Fonseca, who had been the founder of the 
FSLN and who was at the ti_me in Cuba, returned to Nicaragua to 
try to sort out the internal rifts~ However, he was killed 
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before achieving his objective. 1"1eanwhile, FSLN members \.vho 
were in exile reacted against both the GPP and TP, pointing 
out that they were both ultimately following a strategy of 
"protracted accumulation of f0rces", although the emphasis vras 
a little different. 
The third faction, which was known as the Terceristas or 
Insurreccionales, argued that, given the political conjuncture 
of increasing discontent among the 'popular' sectors, local 
bourgeoisie and middle economic strata towards the dictatorship, 
there was advantage in adopting a broad flexible approach lead-
ing eventually to a broadly-based popular uprising. The Tercer 
istas were, then, in favour of exercising a military offensive 
together with forming broad political alliances with diverse 
social and economic groups, thus taking advantage of inter-
bourgeois conflicts, discontentment of the 'popular' sectors 
and the growing anti-somoci sta attitude of the general population 
(see Weber, H., ~98~). 
As long as Somoza was still in power,the export economy 
heavily affected by the fall in the price of commodities such 
as coffee, cotton and sugar cane and foreign investment decreas-
ing, the local bourgeoisie increased internal conflicts and the 
dictatorship became progressively more isolated from the rest 
of the population. These conditions favoured the formation of 
a broadly-based anti-Somoza movement. Thus, the convergence of 
the factions into a single front allowed the FSLN to lead the 
movement, since it was the only organization capable of facing 
up to the National Guard. The various tasks which each of the 
factions had carried out ~ in the mountains, among students and 
workers, in the slums, among religious groups, with women, and 
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so forth, - came to coincide and complemented each other. 
The capacity of the FSll~ leadership in canalising other exist-
ing organizational action so as to create a mass base, and the 
ability to respond boldly to the manoeuvres of the·enemy, 
brought popular support to the FSLN that accorded it the central 
role in the movement. 
Th~ Y._~l:_gf tl}~_Somo ~~-Dictator ~_rgp 
When the state of emergency was imposed in December 1974, 
groups of the local bourgeoisie and middle classes associated 
with both the Liberal and Conservative parties had suffered a 
political set back. Anastasio Somoza Debayle - ASD -had 11 won 11 
the presidential elections. With these fraudulent elections 
he had expressed once more his wish to continue in power (as ipso 
facto he had done at his brother's death in 1967). and that he had 
no intention to let other groups come to power. From the beginn-
ing of the 1970's, the main electoral parties, the Conservatives 
and the Liberals, had split into several new parties. Besides 
the Liberal Nationalist Party - PLH -- (which was S'Jmoza' s party) 
and the Conservative Party - PC(O) - (Official Conservative Party 
created by Somoza to give the appearance of having support from 
the conservatives) on the one ha~d, and the already existing 
Independent Liberal Party - PLI - on the other, dissidents from 
the old Liberal and Conservative parties had formed the Constitu-
tionalist Liberal Movement - MLC -, the Authentic C0nservative 
Party - PCA -, the Aguerista Conservative Party, and the National 
Conservative Action - ANC. This dispersal of political forces 
opposed to Somoza had negative consequences since it prevented 
them from challeng~ng collectively Somoza's monopolization of 
power. 
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In '1973, an attempt to form a stronger ft·ont against 
Somoza had been made with the formati0n of the.Democratic 
Liberation Union - UDEL. This comprised the existing opposition 
political groups, including the Socialist Party. F'ormally 
UDEL's members were to work to a programme aimed at achieving 
free elections, freedom of expression, and which included 
proposals for economic development, recognising workers' rights 
to organize themselves, as well as the right of equal opportuni-
ties for all businessmen. However, the prevailing contradic-
tions among the members of these organizations tended to neutral-
ise the conditions for developing an effective political alter-
native capable of counteracting Somoza 1 s power, at least in the 
short run. 
The elllergence of UDEL was related to thE) need that some 
bourgeois elements, like the Conservative Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, 
face up to the ways in which Somoza's corruption had affected 
bourgeois economic and political interests. P.J. Chamorro was 
UDEL's general secretary. He controlled the largest newspapers 
in the country and had pretensions to challenge Somoza by part-
icipating as Presidential candidate in the '198'1 elections. He 
was keen to make UDEL a strong opposition front which would back 
him in future elections. 
The Consequences of the State of Emergency 
At the beginning of the state of emergency, Somoza's rival 
groups made no major protest. They disliked the FSllT's radical 
way of fighting the regime and did not concern themselves whether 
or not the sandinistE:J-~ were persecuted. However, as the state 
of emergency continued, political censure and martial law acted 
as obstacle[') to carrying out group activities (i.e. mobilization 
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and propaganda) in order to develop an opposition front, such 
as UDEL. On the other hand, the repression of the peasantry 
and other groups of the population which were considered to be 
helping the sandini stas had reac~l8d such a level that the need 
to organize increased. Their restlessless converged with the 
interests of the middle class in general as they had also become 
affected. As a consequence, diverse social groups began to 
organize their protests together, demanding the lifting of the 
state of emergency. Progressive religious elements also had 
become involved through their own pastoral practice, and though 
participating in activities such as the courses for Christian 
living (cursillos de vida cristiana) which promoted serious dis-
cussion of the country's social, political and economic problems. 
Accordingly, many different social groups became interested in 
joint action so as to acquire further commitment in order to 
change the social order. 
Outside the country political refugees in places such as 
Mexico and Costa Rica had been attempting to increase inter-
national solidarity towards the people of Hicaragua, denouncing 
the dictatorial regime. Thus, by '1977 :;he campaign against the 
state of emergency grew significantly. Churches were taken 
over by students and by radio and press reporters. Numerous 
marches took place in the main cities, communiques emanating 
from political parties, private institutions and various work 
organizations had been published and sectors which previously 
had not.faced the dictatorship's abuses overtly made declara-
tions requesting the eud of violence. Among the. latter was the 
hierarchy of the Church which, through its Episcopal Conference, 
sent a. message to their militants denouncing the conditions of 
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terror and making a commitment to the freedom to choose a 
better and fairer regime (see Mensaje de la Conferencia Episco-
pal, 1977). 
~:'he dictatorship tried to c'Junteract this generalised pro-. 
test by exercising more repression through its armed institutions 
and, foreseeing deeper threats, the Horth Americans asked for 
financial credit for military aid. Nevertheless, the movement 
demanding the lifting of the state of emergency had gone too far 
and the contradictions between Somoza and his bourgeois opponents, 
who on several occasions had made some agreements, were sharp 
enough to stop their campaign. 
In September 1977 the state of emergency,, martial law and 
censorship was withdrawn. At the same time the leadership of 
the protest movement had decided that the political superstructure 
was vicious and that to attempt to pursue changes by electoral 
means would not actually bring about the changes that the country 
urgently needed. Hence, on the 12th and 13th of October 1977, 
the Frente (Tercerista) attacked the garrisons of the National 
Guard in San Carlos (a port in the south of the country and the 
Lake of Nicaragua) and of Ocotal (in the north of the territory) 
declaring that these actions marked the beginning of armed con-
frontation on a larger scale. The state of emergency had consti 
tuted a political conjuncture which combined with the existing 
economic crisis to generate the conditions under which the various 
social grouprc; joined tc,gether in an anti-dictatorial movement. 
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The Anti-Somocista Jllovement and the First Uprisings 
The agitation originating from the campaign to lift the 
state of emergency and the effects produced by the killing, 
capture and disappearance of individuaLs of various social 
backgrouns, also stimulated further initiatives among the 
population to accelerate the possibilities of. political change. 
For example, on the' 16th of 0ctober, a document signed by a 
group of well-known citizens was published. They were to be 
known as the group of Los Doce (The Twelve) and embraced pro-
gressive university professors, some nationalist businessmen, 
a banker, and some progressive priests. In their document they 
asserted the need for substantial changes to. a chi eve a real 
democratic order and recognised the just struggle the FSLH had 
carried out as well as its right to participate in any process 
of change (see La Prensa, 21.10.1977). This declaration was 
made as a result of the call to a "National Dialogue" by the 
opposi"tion bourgeoisie which set out the need for social, 
economic and political reform and the participation of all the 
organized groupings, but did not mention the FSLH. By this 
time, the Frente had gained broad support from the masses, 
which made its omission appear somewhat odd. 
The FSLN welcomed the statement by Los Doce. This was the 
first time that a group of diverse composi tiori had recognifled 
their struggle, and they now declared their desire to partici-
pate in the "National Dialogue". Nevertheless, the Frente con-
sidered that for any real ,solution, the regime of Somoza and 
his followers would have t~ be eliminated. M)reover, the Frente 
called on the whole c;untry to support the struggle to end the 
dictatorship, and stated that they would back any attempt to 
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seek a national solution. Their appeal also contained some 
basic points, including the nationalization of all properties 
and interests of the Somoza family, guarantees concerning the 
exercise of democratic freedom, freedom of organization for all 
parties and citizens, freedom for local and trade union organiza-
tions, and the end to all forms of repression (see Gaceta 
Sandinista, '1977-'1978). 
By the end of 1977 the status of the organizations involved 
in the anti-somocista movement was already clear. On the one 
hand, it consisted of the opposition bourgeoisie, represented 
mainly by UDEL and the Church hierarchy, represented by Monsignor 
Obando y Bravo and on the other, radicalised middle class groups 
represented by Los Doce and worker and local groups represented 
by FSLN, including priests identified ~nth major public concerns. 
The dictatorship was thus politically isolated. Of the exist-
ing organizations in the country the only group supporting the 
regime was the FLIT (Somoza's party). Even the official Conserva-
tive Party (also called Zancudo) had developed serious conflicts 
with Somoza when it agreed to the call for a "1Tational Dialogue"; 
the somocistas took the view that a dialogue was alright but first 
the FSLN should lay down its arms. 
From the lifting of the state of emergency, the marches and 
propaganda activities am0ng the organized sectors of the popula-
tion i:}creased even more. These factors also overlapped with 
other important events, such as a number of cases of desertion 
by National Guard's men (LP, 4.'1.78) and the rnobilization in 
several work centres demanding the fulfilment of collective 
labour agreements. Since December '1977 workers in the health 
sector, the textile industry, construction and in Somoza's enter-
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prises had increased their protests against the violation of 
their rights and were ready to go on strike (see LP, 22-27.'12.77). 
The continuing agitation and mobilization of the population 
also coincided with increasing armed clashes between the FSLN 
and the National Guard, and the taking over of villages and 
towns throughout the territory. These actions were part of the 
strategy of the FSLN (tercerista) which its leadership, aware of 
the guerrillas' exhaustion as a result of the repression suffered 
over the previous months, had decided to launch a military offen-
sive. The leadership decided that in order to surmound the mili-
tary weakness of the guerrillas - whoc had also remained somewhat 
isolated in the mountains - it was necessary to organize other 
activities that could establish closer links,between them and 
the local population which could be of considerable value for 
any action in the future. 
A degree of re-grouping among left-wing organizations took 
place at the beginning of '1978. rrhe Communist Party of Nicara-
gua -PC deN. -, the CGT (i) a workers' confederation dominated 
by the Socialist Party and the Socialist Party itself~ denounced 
the manoeuvres of the opposition bourgeoisie, which had begun 
to indicate that a National Dialogue was possible with Somoza. 
The Socialist Party had withdrawn from UDEL, realising that the 
latter's leadership intended to make some agreement ~dth the 
Somoza regime which would be antagonistic to the interests of 
the Socialist Party. The National Dialogue had been posed as an 
alternative by the domestic oppo si ti on bourgeoi ::-::i e, :coo as to 
gain political hegemorw within the anti-dictatorial movement 
and to counteract the FSLN's increasing its support from the 
masses. The non-somocista bourgeoisie also tried to convince 
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the USA that they were the best political alternative in contra-
distinction to the left groups. 
The total failure of the National Dialogue to solve the 
political situation under peaceful terms was dramatically under-
lined with the assassination of UDEL's general secretary, Pedro 
Joaqu{n Chamorro, on the 10th of January 1978 •. His family accu2ed 
the regime and UDEL, together with the Authentic Conservative 
Party - PCA - and retreated from the Dialogue. The opposition 
front, led by the bourgeoisie, now turned more radically towards 
Somoza, and made a call for joint action in order to eradicate 
the dictatorship (LP, 13-20.1.78). 
As a consequence, the situation of conflict in the country 
became sharper. Political parties, trade unions, press associa-. 
tions, national and private universities, the Association of 
Clergy, students' organizations (e.g. the FER), the organized 
women's groups all condemned the assassination. As was expected, 
private enterprise organizations such as the Chambers of Industry, 
Commerce and Construction, the Higher c-,uncil of Private Enter-
prise - COSEP - and others, protested and planned to carry out 
a national strike on the 22nd of January. 
The opposition bourgeoisie clearly hoped to force Somoza's 
resignation through the businessmen's strike. However, Somoza 
did not in fact go, and as a prolonged paralysis of industry and 
commerce would inevitably have affected their economic interef~tFJ, 
the action was stopped. Thus, by the end of February most shopr; 
and businesses had started to function once mora. Although the 
strike had certainly brought the economic life of the country to 
a standstill, it had not been strong enough to defeat the regime, 
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and Somoza countered with even stronger repression. 
The strike, organized by the opposition bourgeoisie, might 
have been thought likely to bring them wider support from the 
'popular' sectors. However, the left represented mainly by the 
Frente, had already been able to accumulate such grassroots 
support. Through its base organizations in the barrios, working 
centres and among students, the sandinista cadres undertook 
intensive political actvitity in order to canalise and utilise 
the mood of restlessness among the masses. At the same time, 
the FSLN's armed actions in urban centres like Granada, Rivas 
and in the Department of Nueva Segovia (in the South and North 
respectively), also contributed to gain people's sympathy. 
The broad mobilization of groups denouncing the regime and 
demanding social and economic rights, the assassination of the 
most outstanding leader of the opposition bourgeoisie, the armed 
actions of the FSLN in different parts of the country and the 
repression organized by the National Guard in various towns and 
cities, especially those which showed a particularly strong 
rejection of the regime, were to set in motion a series of 
initiatives among different social groups, which were not 
generally the responsibility of any particular political organ-
ization. This was the case with the Monimbo's uprising. 
Soon after the end of the businessmen's strike, around the 
20th February, Monimbd, which is a barrio of Masaya (a town very 
close to Managua) began a rebellion. Its inhabitants, (about 
20,000), mostly Indians, protested against the killings and 
abuse of the Guard towards them and spontaneously went into 
armed revolt. The FSLN had not planned it and when the masses 
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suddenly started to fight, the Sandinistas in the town had 
nothing else to do but to try to canalise it. This was the 
first mass uprising in the country and after a vreek or so, 
the Guard, employing harsh repressive methods, was able to get 
the town under its control once more. However, the Monimbo 
uprising offered clear evidence of the potential mass mobiliza-
tion. The FSLN could now envisage the course of the movement 
more clearly, and besides intensifying their political tasks 
went on preparing the grounds for future actions. 
Between February and August 1978, the anti-somocista move-
ment increased its numbers very .considerably. In each town, 
city and village in the countryside, local groups kept working 
in order to incorporate more groups and individuals. Meanwhile, 
the opposition bourgeoisie continued to display various strate-
gies in order to achieve the support of the US Department of 
State, believing this to be the best way of overthrowing the 
regime. It was obvious that the North Americans still passed 
military and economic aid to Somoza to assist him in solving 
internal problems. As UDEL had practically disintegrated at 
the death of its leader, other organizations emerged attempting 
to replace it; for example, the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement -
l'1DN - formed by the industrialist and cotton grower, Alfonso 
Robelo. He was later to be one of the members of the f_i_rst 
Junta after Somoza's defeat. Robelo attempted to re-group the 
anti-somocistas, forming the Broad Opposition Front - FAO - in 
May 1978. This gave the opportunity for the FAO leaders to 
maintain contact with the FSLN through the group of Los Doce. 
Hence, the FSLN and other revolutionary organisations now 
embodied the largest anti-somocista group. Around July, the 
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United People's ~Iovement - :MPU - came into the. open. Some of 
its member organizations were: the General Confederation of 
Labour - CGT (i) -, the Rural Workers' Association - ATC -
the Revolutionary Students' Front - FER -, the Secondary 
Students' Movement - J.VIES -, the Association of Women Confronting 
the National Problem - A:MPRONAC - the Sociaiist Party - PSlT -, 
the Communist Party of Nicaragua -PC deN.-, Los Doce, the 
Independent Liberal Party - PLI - and many others (see Lopez, 
et. al. , '1980) • 
During '1978 a period of popular agitation and mass political 
mobilization began which eventually burst into a general uprising 
in the main cities of the country. On August 22nd the FSLN 
(tercerista) successfully took over the National Palace, captur-
ing '1500 hostages, including the Minister of the Interior and a 
cousin of Somoza Debayle. The latter was then forced to re-
lease 59 political prisoners, pay a ransom for the hostages, 
broadcast a communique and give guarantees that the released 
prisoners would be allowed to leave the country (see LAB, '1979). 
This FSLN operation was shortly followed by" another call 
for a general strike on behalf of the opposition bourgeoisie 
organised by the FAO. This appears to have been a tactic used 
by the non-somocista ·entrepreneurs to obtain mass support. Then, 
as in the spontaneous uprising at Monimbo, the northern city of 
Matagalpa built barricades and rebelled towards the end of 
August. This was followed by a chain of insurrections in the 
cities of Leon, Masaya, Chinandega, and Esteli, and other armed 
clashes occurred in smaller towns through the country. 
Thus, during the first two weeks of September '1978 the 
country experienced an intense period of political and military 
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activity. On the 11th September martial law was declared in 
nearly all the cities where insurrections had taken place and 
their populations were submitted to heavy bombing by air, tank 
bombardment and machine gunfire. In places ·like Esteli, "clean-
ing" operations were started with the participation of outside 
soldiers from the Central American Defense Council - COITDECA. 
By the third week of September the National Guard had re-estab-
lished control over the main urban centres. 
Although the FSLN leadership had envisaged insurrection as 
a tactical means of defeating the regime and its cadres took a 
leading part in the uprisings, it became aware of the need to 
strengthen the military training of its forces and to consolidate 
its grassroots infrastructure. JVJ:i.litarily, the FSLN had not won; 
they had retreated from the cities under heavy attack from the 
National Guard. However, valuable experience was gained from 
these encounters with the National Guard. Moreover the FSLH 
realised that the people of the cities had given support to its 
combatants (see Ortega, '1980). 
By the end of '1978, the FAO had lost the. opportunity of 
'· leading the anti-somocista movement and of reaching a peaceful 
solution with S0moza. In October a mediatory Commission had been 
established by the Organization of American States - OAS -, con-
sisting of representatives from the USA, Guat8mala and the Domin-
i can Republic. The Cornmi ssion had agreed with the FAO - ·with 
the approval of the Carter .administration -·to _negotiate with 
Somoza in order to persuade him to resign and leave the country. 
In return, Somoza would be able to keep his properties. It was 
also proposed that the National Guard should continue and a plural-
ist government be installed instead. However, Somoza rejected 
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these proposals ( see Gilly, '1 980; Black, '198'1 ) • 
The Final Sandini sta Offensive 
With the formation of the National Patriotic Front - FPn, 
on '1st February '1979, concrete steps were taken for the replace-
ment of dictatorship. The FSN was a coalition of political 
parties, trade unions and organizations representing different 
social groupings. It included all the organizations embraced 
by MPU, Los Doce, PLI, the P)pular Social Christian Party-
PPSC -, the Workers' Front - FO -, the Hicaraguan Confederation 
of W'irkers - CTN - (cmtrolled by the Social Christians) and the 
Radio and Press Union. These were to work out a minimum pro-
gramme based upon three fundamental principles: national 
sovereignty, effective democracy, and justice and social pro-
gress. However, one central condition for developing these 
three principles was the overthrow of Somoza (see Lopez, et al, 
'1980). 
The country's economic cri si .s reached its poak in April 
'1979 when a devaluation of the national currency by 43% was 
announced (ibid). In. the following months all economic sectors, 
especially the small and middle entrepreneurs (merchants and pro-
ducers) were affected; moreover, the living conditions of the 
lower income groups were deteriorating rapidly. 
The three factions of the FSLN had by now managed to achieve 
some unity and were planning their last military and political 
offensive. Their cadres dispersed among grassroots organizations 
such as the Civil Defence Committees- CDC's- the Revolutionary 
Workers' Committees- COR's -, the students associations such 
as the FER, FES, women's groups in AMPRONAC, the Rural Workers' 
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Association - ATC, and others, to prepare for the coming fight.· 
By April the FSll~ had planned to carry out a campaign of harrass-
ment in several parts of the country. However, in Esteli the 
population rose up in arms in support of the local FS~·and in 
consequence, accelerated the insurrectional offensive at a 
national level .. After Esteli, other confrontations followed 
and, in order to prevent a lack of coordination between differ-
ent local groups the FS~ called a general offensive at the end 
of May, which was to be initiated by a general strike on 4th 
June. Fighting started in the main cities: Chinandega, Leon, 
Matagalpa and Esteli, and spread to Masaya, Granada, Carazo and 
the main working class quarters of Managua. Hence hy the second 
week of June the whole coun-cry was at war (Ortega, 1980; Lopez 
et al. , 1980). 
During the months prior to the final offensive, the US 
Department of State unsuccessfully applied pressure on Somoza 
to withdraw from power. Then in June when the country was in 
complete rebellion, Washington proposed to the Organization of 
American States - OAS - the formation of a ''Peacekeeping Force" 
to intervene in Nicaragua. However, Panama, I'iexi co and the 
countries of the Andean Pact categorically rejected the use of 
any outside force to solve Nicaragua's in:~ernal problems. The 
Andean Pact countries called for the immediate resignation of 
Somoza and for the support of the new Junta which some days 
before had been formed on the initiative of FSLH. It was a 
surprise to many that the Andean Pact (Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, 
Colombia and Bolivia) resolution was approved by 17 votes to 
2 (Nicaragua and Paraguay) and there were 5 ab.stentions· from 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador,Uruguay and Chile (see Black, 
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1981). The spokesman for the resolution \vas to be the ne1v US 
Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezullo, who arrived to take 
up office at the end of June. Once again, Somoza refused to 
negotiate and insisted on remaining in power. 
The new Junta ~~~as made up of one of the leading members 
of the FSLH, Daniel Ortega; a leader of the J.VIPU, JVIoises Hassan, 
a member of Los Doce, Sergio Ramirez; the industrialist leader 
of the JVIDN, Alfonso Robelo, and the widow of the former UDEL 1 s 
general secretary, Violeta Barrios Chamorro. 
'Jn the international level, Somoza 1 s regime was now almost 
completely isolated. Mexico and Costa Rice, for example, had 
broken diplomatic relations with nicaragua in nay; the countries 
of the Andean Pact had condemned the dictatorship and the FSLIT 
had received support from a number of European social democratic 
countries (e.g. Holland, Sweden and West Germany), Panama, Cuba, 
Costa Rice and others (see Gilly, '1980; LAB., 1979; Possamay, 
1980). By the end of June, the National Guard was no longer 
capable of controlling any part of the country, and the fall of 
the regime seemed inevitable. The FSLH 1 s military Central Front 
(which embraced the armed forces of Granada, JVIasaya and Mana-
gua) had decided to withdraw tactically in order to re-group 
its forces in JVIasaya and launch them with much more strength 
towards the capital city., Somoza 1 s main fort still remained 
untaken, (see Barreto, 1981) but eventually on 17th July Somoza 
decided to abandon the country and placed one of his relatives 
(by marriage), Francisco Urcuyo, in the Presidency. Presmnably, 
he hoped t0 continue "negotiating for power". However, by the 
next day, Urcuyo had also left Nicaragua (see Urcuyo, 1979) 
and on the '19th the FSLN forces took control of Somoza 1 s mili-
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tary fort ("bunker") and assembled a huge crowd in the central 
square, from where Daniel r)rtega, the President of the new 
Government Junta for National Reconstruction - JGlli~ - announced 
the expropiation of all the property of Somoza and his group 
and the organization of a new national army •. A few days later, 
the new Junta and the FSLN moved towards a re-organization of 
the State apparatus and delineated the first tasks to be carried. 
out to achieve national reconstruction. 
The movement that overthrew Somoza's dictatorship was 
characterized by a broad participation of groups from nearly all 
social and economic sectors of the country. It made use of a 
varied set of strategies in order to achieve popular support. 
The movement against Somoza was also an expression of a class 
struggle that varied according to the stage of its development, 
and depended upon the subjective understandings of the indi vi-
duals, and groups involved in analysing and responding to the 
particular situations they faced. The state of emergency, for 
instance, generated a more explicit questioning of the social 
order. The movement also responded to the large US involvement 
in the country's political affairs and more specifically its 
links with the dictatorship. 
T~is chapter has attempted to describe the historical, 
political and social context within which the SEmdinista move-
ment and the liberation struggle emerged. 
The next chapters form a case study of these developments 
in a specif-i_c locality, the town of Est eli. 
CHAPTER II 
The Economic and Political Setti~g of Esteli 
Introduction 
Part II covers the analysis of data collected in ~980 
during fieldwork in the city of Esteli. It aims to present 
information on social groups in Esteli, the patterns of 
social and economic development, and an account of local 
participation during and after the Liberation struggle. 
The analysis is largely based upon subjective interpretations 
provided by various individuals who took part in the events. 
As I explained in the Introduction, the case· study has as its 
primary objective the elucidation of actors' perceptions of 
political experience and of how this experience has shaped 
their understandings of the present situation and the tasks 
before them. Where possible, the discussion is complemented 
by more general data on changes in the local economy and on 
the social reconstruction process. 
The present chapter focuses on the economic background 
and defines the major social groups in Esteli in the events 
preceding the ~978 uprising. It also uses case material to 
document the political roles played by individuals from 
different social groups. The following chapter describes the 
process of political mobilization during the insurrectional 
period (~978-~979), drawing upon individuals' accounts of 
their participation and the sequence of events. Chapter IV 
offers an analysis of the post-liberation period, concentrating 
upon the problems of re-channelling political participation 
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in order to consolidate the organizational structures at local 
levels, with· the aim of sustaining the ne1v social order and of 
promoting direct participation in the new national development 
tasks. 
It is important at the outset to recognise, as I have 
argued in Part I, that Esteli's struggle for liberation cannot 
be explained as an isolated phenomenon but must be treated 
within the wider national and international contexts. Another 
significant point is that the liberation struggle constituted 
a process of extremely fast change which had a profound effect 
on political consciousness, to the extent that the grassroots 
organizations established then have come to play a central role 
in the political and productive life of the country. 
~. General Background 
a. Geographical location 
Nicaragua's territorial surface is ~30,000 Square Kms. 
The population in ~977 was 2,325,000 inhabitants, distributed 
among ~6 administrative units (departamentos)~ Each department 
has its own municipios (municipalities) and its own departmental 
capital which constitutes the largest urban centre. (See 
Datos basicos sobre Nicaragua, ~980 : 7). 
The Department of Esteli is located in the Northeastern 
region of the country. It has five municipios: 
Pueblo Nuevo, San Juan de Limay and La Trinidad; 
Esteli, Condega, 
its depart-
mental capital is located in the municipio of the same name, 
Esteli. The Department's limits are: to the North, the Depart-
ment of Madri z; to the East, Jinotega; to the South by 
l"Iatagalpa and Leon; and to the West, Leon, Chinandega and 
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JVIadri z (see Haps I and II). 
'~he city of Esteli is 150 Kms. to the north of the 
country's capital, Managua, being located on the Panamerican 
road which goes to Honduras. The city is sited in the river 
valley of Esteli. Its natural limits are: to the West and 
East, a series of plateaux (mesas) which run parallel until 
they reach the ravines (garganta) of the municipio of La 
Trinidad, towards the south; to the North, low hills; and 
to the South a mountainous belt. The nearest plateaux to 
the city reach a height of between approximately 1200 to 1400 
metres above sea level, with Esteli located at 830 metres 
(MINVAH, Entrevistas, 1980). 
b. Population 
The population 1f the Department consists of 94,133 
inhabitants living in an area of 2,199 Kms. 2 (OEDEC, 1977). 
The largest concentration of population is found in the municipio 
of Est eli which has 42,577 persons, just over· 4596 of the Depart-
ment's total population. ,)f the municipal total; the urban 
population is 25,093 and the rural 16,584 inhabitants, making 
up 61% and 39% respectively of the municipio (see Table I, 
Appendix I). The city embraces approximately 27% of the 
Department's population. 
c. Economic background 
The main economic activities of the Department are agri-
culture and cattle raising. JVIost of the population plant staple 
crops (e.g. beans and maize) and Esteli is among the eight most 
important departments of the country for grain production. How-
1'1ap I 
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f~p II : The Department of Esteli 
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ever, the main agro-industrial activity is tobacco. This 
generates a large source for work in the municipios of Condega 
and Esteli, the main areas for tobacco. Other surrounding 
places growing tobacco transfer the leaves to the city for 
drying and processing. The crop is exported to US markets and 
secondly, to European countries. Prior to the Liberation War, 
tobacco generated around 4,061 jobs embracing agricultural 
activities, the drying of the leaves, curing and selection, and 
the elaboration and packeting of the product. There v.rere also 
a number of administrative and transport jobs,available (see 
Table II, Appendix I). 
The cultivation of staple grains involves more than half 
of the economically active population, which grows in order of 
important: maize, beans, sorghum and rice (see Table III, 
Appendix I). With regard to cattle raising, unfortunately there 
are no data available to illustrate the quantitative importance 
of this sector. Nevertheless, we can draw some inferences by 
the following facts: Esteli 's ecology permits cattle raising 
and limits the cultivation of other products due to its low 
rainfall. On the other hand, the surrouding Departments of 
Chinandega, Leon, l"ladriz and Nueva Segovia raise cattle on a 
large scale, trading with Honduras through Esteli. During the 
war, approximately 60,000 head of cattle were transported out 
of the Northeastern region into Honduras. There is also some 
evidence that during the war many veterinary shops were 
destroyed at an estimated loss of 0 2 millions (approx. $ US 
200,000), indicating that there was an economic sector specializ-
ing in the supply of necessary items for livestock production 
(l"JJtNAH, Esteli, 1979 : 23). 
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'::Ohe commercial activity of the Department was centralized 
in the city. The city used to serve not only the surrounding 
towns and villages of its department but also the populations 
of other nearby departments. The city of Est eli Has '\.vell known 
for its efficient supply of a wide range of goods in the ~:orth­
ern region. The commercial sector included electrical and 
domestic appliance businesses, car dealers, spare parts shops, 
cloth and fabric shops, large groceries and a great number of 
general shops which stocked a variety of items. 
There were also furniture factories that exported to Central 
American countries; confectionary, clothing and ice factories 
as well as shoe workshops, saddleries, tanneries, and bakeries 
could be found. Commercially, the city was well located on the 
Panamerican Road, making possible easy access for neighbouring 
communities. Often people from the municipios of La Concordia, 
Yali (Department of Jinotega), Somoto (Madriz.), San Nicolas 
(Leon), San sidro (Matagalpa), Ocotal (Nueva Segovia) and other 
towns came to buy in Esteli. 
Summarizing, we can state that the main economic activity 
in the Department was agriculture and livestock production 
(58.4% of the economically active population}, followed by the 
services (commerce, transport, banking, etc.) which were 
centralized in the city of Est eli ( 26. 9%). Industrial, manu-
facturing and construction activities were also important, 
making up 14.7% of the economically active population (see 
Table IV, Appendix I). 
In the next sections I examine the major social groups in 
Esteli, drawing upon textual materials taken from interviews 
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with a number of individuals in the tov.m (see Appendix II 
for details). The data also depicts the responses of 
individuals and social groups to prevailing economic and 
political circumstances during the years leading up to the 
1978 uprising. 
2. The Economically Dominant Groups 
a. Some historical trends 
The following account, given by a well-knovm and politi-
cally articulate trade union leader (18)* reflects in various 
ways the process by which the different economic groups evolved 
over time: 
* 
"Approximately from the 1930':.:: to 1945, we had a 
situation in which the "patronos" had their work but 
mixed with the peasants, that is to say, there was 
not a notorious class division, at least not in 
appearance. The relation between "patronos" and 
workers was blurred. There were rich people, but 
they were illiterate. That is why cultural differ-
ences were few. Traditionally rich families did 
not surpass more than ten. This place was a sort 
of isolated area. The system of trade was by means 
of wagons (carretas) pulled by oxen and horses to 
Leon. But then, with the introduction of roads 
which starts in 1944-45, the ideological penetra-
tion ( "penetracion ideolc5gica") (of capitalism) is 
felt; ambitiousness begins and some people sell 
themselves to the National Guard. People are thrown 
off the land and from this time the rich are no 
longer regarded as "trusted friends". The mentality 
(mentalidad) of the sons of the rich changes and 
their relationship to the workers also changes ••••• 
you know, before, the rich used to give cows to the 
peasants and ~hey were allowed to consume "~j_ada" 
(fresh cheese) ••••• but with the road, the market 
expanded and then the "cuajada" was no longer given. 
'fhe 12._atr6n sold it and used to say': if you want it, 
buy it, or it will go to the market ••••• This was a 
new practice. Yes, the rich families were the ganaderos 
(cattle ranchers;. Then the lthrker' s Club was formed -
CCextual quotation in the ca.se study are identified by the 
informants reference number. See Appendix II for details 
on the social characteristics of interviewees. 
between 1946-50, and the rich didn't go there. 
They formed their own Club Social and the Lions 
Club. These as::,;ociations bound together (aglutinaba) 
the bourgeoisie. The cultural and econorni c differ-
ences became sharper. Capitalist relations became 
accentuated (se acentuaron). The Asociacion de 
Ganaderos (Cattle Rarichers Association; was formed 
at the time when the (Panameri can) road 1vas opened. 
The association was controlled by the rich who used 
to make their agricultural fairs (ferias con 
exposi~i~~)." 
"During this time, workers and peasants observed 
the changes. When large-scale tobacco cultivation 
appeared, the confrontation (enfrentamiento) between 
workers and atronos was felt even more and the 
class struggle lucha de clases) became more frontal. 
The small tobacco producers-rn-the munici io of 
Esteli sold their tobacco leaves to TN~IC rabacalera 
Nicaraguense). There was a collecting centre-[c~ro 
de aclpit) which purchased the product. TA;nc had its 
own pan ations ••• the men were paid more than women 
and children workers. The workers' movement was con-
cerned (about this situation) and started studying 
the Constitution and the Labour legislation (Codigo 
de Trabajo). In 1960, El Sindicato de Oficios Varios 
(Trade Union for Miscellaneous Workers) vras formed 
which embraced shoemakers, masons, peasants and the 
like. In 1961, SCAAS (Trade Union of Construction 
and Similar Workers) was also organized, and together 
with the Shoemakers Union, the Workers' Federation of 
Esteli - FTE - was constituted. SCAAS had around 100 
members, El Sindicato de Oficios Varios about 100 and 
the Shoemakers 40. · 
From the 1960's onwards the "gusanos" (Bati.sta 
Cubans) came with the tobacco crop and formed the 
bourgeoisie of the 1960's onwards. And therefore we 
had a landlord bourgeoisie, a foreigner tobacco bour-
geoisie •••• , and a commercial bourgeoisie. Together 
they were a repressive bourgeoisie (burguesia repr~siva) 
••••• you know, approximately in 1965 the bourgeoisie 
met with the Commandant of the national Guard and vii th 
the Bishop (of Esteli) in order to 'destroy communism'. 
They set on fire a house and made terrorist actions, 
for example throwing molotov bombs to frighten the 
population ••• At that time, about 16 companeros were 
jailed. It was a time of repression for Esteli •••• 
yes, I remember there were fights also in Santo Domingo 
(in the Caribbean) ••• From that time, the armed struggle 
started to expand and the local bourgeoisie leaned 
more on the National Guard for repressive action. The 
gusanos used to give money to civilian groups to kill 
working class leaders ••••• ". 
The above account describes the character of the econorni-
cally dominant groups in Esteli. This picture is complemented 
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by the views expressed by other individuals. F,>J,, example, an 
adult worker, Don Gerardo (25), who at the time of the inter-
view was working as Labour Inspector for the Eunicipal Council 
explained that: 
" •••• in general, here in Est eli social cla.sses had 
never been as sharp as in other places like Jinotega, 
Leon, Granada and Chinandega. Frequently, workers 
and landlords mixed, specially for recreational 
activities ••••• Where we had troubles with the land-
lords it was over Labour regulations, especially 
with the owners of the tobacco enterprises, 
Nicaragua Cigars, Cuba-Nica, Victor Tabaco of whom 
most were cuban-somocistas, that came in the 1960's. 
Traditionally, rich people born in Esteli are few, 
•••• there are about seven to eight families. There 
are mainly cattle ranchers whose properties range 
from 2,000 to 15,000 manzanas. Some of these families 
have grown a lot and have-oeGome stratified vrithin 
themselves. Thus one may find rich and working-
class members within one family. With respect to 
the city, there are now about four rich landlords -
after the triumph - living here and the rest of the 
better-off groups are involved in commercial and 
construction business. These are the so-called 
petty bourgeoisie ••• Some have their money distributed 
in various branches, for example, in commerce, agri-
culture, and small industry, and others have their 
money in just one business, like the ironmongers or 
chemists ••.••• In the 1960's cubanos-gusanos came as , 
technicians of INFONAC (Instituto de Fomento Nacional; 
to develop tobacco cultivation. Shortly afterwards, 
they became owners of farms and enterprises closely 
linked to Somoza's business and constituted the bour-
geoisie of Esteli (burguesia Esteliana) and part of 
the national oligarchy (oligarguia nacional). They 
did not permit trade union organization ••••• They con-
trolled amongst themselves the tobacco and wood 
business. They had a furniture factory in partner-
ship with Somo za; now they are all gone. They left after 
the September insurrection (1978). Their properties are 
now in hands of the State". 
Comments 
From these statements and other views of local people, one 
can infer that, prior to the 1960's, there was a group of 
families who effectively held large extensions of land mainly 
for the production of livestock and grains. These landowners, 
as others in the country, maintained tenant sharecropping 
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relatio~ships with the rural labourers. The latter were 
allowed to cultivate a plot of land belonging to the landlord 
and in return had to pay in kind a certain proportion of their 
crop or provide labour on the landlord's farm. E8teli's land-
lords seem to have followed the hacienda's pattern of cultiva-
tion. 1l'hey cultivated grains for their ovm and their workers' 
consumption needs and they raised cattle. The livestock v,rere 
marketed either in local or external (e.g. J:Ionduras; markets. 
Nevertheless these landlords did not maintain an economically 
aggressive attitude towards profit marimization; neither did 
they invest substantially in other productive sectors such as 
industry. Thus, even though tobacco cultivation existed in 
Condega and Pueblo Nuevo before the coming of the Cubans, 
tobacco production marked the development of a branch of 
specialized, export-oriented agriculture. This resulted in 
the reinforcement of forms of production geared to capitalist 
markets. Coffee production, although it was found in some 
places of the Department, seems not to have had the same 
importance either in relation to land extension, as c~mpared 
with cattle raising and grain production, or in economic terms 
of the returns from tobacco. 
b. The emergence of commercially dominant groups in the city 
One estelian0. (26), coming from a background of modest 
resources, but who became a prominent figure among the business-
men, gave some account of the development of trade in the city: 
"The route to Managua was opened in '1943 •••• with 
macadan [i.e. tarred road]; before that, the trade 
was with Leon passing through El Sauce as that road 
was of macadan. But to, travel from El Sauce to the 
city of Leon, and from there to Managua, one had to 
go by train. Therefore· once the road to Managua 
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opened, everything was easier for travelling ••• 
Esteli then, given its geographical location, 
offered good conditions for establishing businesses. 
People from the surroundings came to buy here, even 
people from places like Cuanigiquilapa and Cinco . 
Pinos (Department of Chinandega) came through Limay 
to shop to Esteli. It was always like that. In 
~965 trade and commerce grew a great deal. There 
was a demand for goods and for work. The city 
expanded due to the growth of the tobacco planta-
tions; for example, in Villa Vieja (near the city) 
around 3,000 persons worked on tobacco farming and 
processing. Part of them were people from the city 
and part of them from the countryside. From that 
date, new barrios emerged: San Antonio, Jose Benito 
Escobar, Bella Vista, Aristeo Benavidez, Los Angeles, 
La Habra. Then, furniture factories appeared and the 
city continued growing. With the asphalting of the 
Panamerican road the city flourished". 
Comments 
During the ~960's the city seems to have had a group of 
families running large enterprises (e.g. ironmongeries, 
furniture factories, motor spares and car dealer agencies, 
electrical appliance shops and clothing workshops) who, during 
that time, increased their economic assets. Prior to this, 
before the construction of the main access roads, the city 
functioned as a supply centre for the local region and some 
families must have specialized in trade and service activities. 
However, evidence for the period immediately prior to the Libera-
tion struggle suggests that during the ~960's and ~970's there 
was a considerable growth in the number of merchants in the city. 
It would appear that there were something like 64 to ~00 large 
enterprises (see Table V, Appendix I). The extent of the 
economic power of this commercial elite is also difficult to 
measure. I attempted to collect material on the amount of taxes 
paid to the Local Council for various periods but all the files 
and documents had been lost with the burning of the building 
during the war. 
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3. The Labouring Classes 
Esteli has become well known for the fact that it has 
produced a number of important political leaders \'Iho come from 
a working class or peasant background. This fact is linked to 
the antiimperialist movement led by Sandino in the late 1920's 
and which had its first roots in the Lorthern regions of the 
country (e. g. Hueva Segovia, :Madriz, Est eli, Jinotega, etc.). 
As a consequence, many peasant families and their descendants 
have brought with them the legacy of the Heroe of Las Segovias. 
The following accounts attempt to illustrate the deep influence 
that such a struggle has had on the population. 
l"Iargarita (16), the mother of Rulfo 1"1arin Ucles, a deceased 
prominent Sandini sta leader, and his sister gave us some details 
about his life one day when we met: 
"Rulfo's father was Pio :Marin Bellorl.n. He had 
been an old fighter in Sandino's army and first 
cousin to Ramon Raudales ~ famous survivor of 
Sandino's guerrilas who died fighting in a battle 
with the Hati onal Guard in 1958]. Rulfo wa::; born 
on the 5th of September of 1950 in El Jicaro, 
Department of Nuevo Segovia, but came to E:-otoli 
at the age of three. Thus he vms reared here and 
lived in the barrio of El Calvario and grew up 
influenced by his uncle's- Ramon Raudales-
ideas; •••• I remember from the time he was an 
adolescent he read books like "The :Mother" (Gorki's 
work), "Night of Torture" (by Rigoberto Lopez Perez, 
a Nicaraguan poet that made justice to Somoza 
Garcia) and the like. He also met and studied with 
Filemon Rivera (a dead FSLN leader) and both were 
encouraged to do something against the oppression 
in which we all lived. For example, when Rulfo 
was 13, he started working in a shoe workshop and, 
shortly afterwards, went to the tobacco factory, 
La Padron; there, Rene :Molina (a somocista share-
holder) invited him several times to participate in 
meetings with la _patronal· but Rulfo rejected any 
such invitations because he was mostly interested 
in the formation of the trade union. His intention;~ 
drove .Molina to sack him and so he returned to Don 
Tano's shoe workshop. There he stayed until, to-
gether with Alesio Blandon (a dead combatant), he 
was accused of placing a bomb aimed at Fermin I1eneses, 
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a National Guard Captain, and so decided to go 
underground. By the late 1960's [the mother 
explained] I had also become a FSLN colaboradora 
and had met great persons like Jose Benito Escobar,* 
Pedro Arauz Palacios, Oscar Turcios, Enrique 
Lorentes, etc., a lot of well-known Sandinist 
leaders •••• Meanwhile, my son participated in 
battles against the National Guard and. follo1.Jing 
the action in Las Deli ci as del Volga, l'Ianagua, 
and because of persecution, he had to leave the 
country. The National Guard was looking for him. 
He was then captured in Costa Rica along Hith 
others when attempting to rescue Carlos Fonseca 
[the founder of FSLN] who was a prisoner there. 
However all were later freed due to successful 
counter-action by the FSLH at the beginning of 
1970. The prisoners were released and taken to 
Mexico and from there flew on to Cuba. From 
here onwards, I never saw my son again; he 
dedicated his life to study and the fight ••.•• 
I learnt of his death in an armed confrontation 
carried out in la Cordillera de Sta. Isabelia, 
Zelaya only in 1976. Yes, he had died fighting 
to see our country free 11 • 
We also had the opportunity to meet Pepe ( 17), a young man 
who, at the time of fieldwork, was a fulltime political and 
military leader in one of the mass organizations. Pepe was 
born in Esteli around 1953 in El Zapote, a lower class barrio 
of the city. He studied at Primary School but could not con-
tinue as he needed to find a job to help his family. Thus, he 
started working in an ice cream parlour where he remained for 
nearly nine years and afterwards worked as a carpenter, as a 
bricklayer and, as he said: 11 I did all kind of jobs •••• life 
was very hard for the poor 11 • Pepe then continued to describe 
how the influence of his closest friends drove him to help them 
attempt to change the state of affairs which oppressed hi.s 
brothers, the peasants and the working class. He explained: 
11 The relationship I had vvi th a particular friend 
was important in giving the hope that some day we 
could be free and have the chance to build a 
better society. His name was Filemon Rivera [a 
* Jose Benito Escobar was a national sandinista leader who was 
killed in Esteli in July 1978. 
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tireless revolutionary who was among the founders 
of the FSLN here in Esteli in ~963]. I was very 
young but Filemon had been like a brother to me ••• 
You 1:now, when he was born, his mother became very 
ill and because my mother was already breast feed-
ing a tierno (baby) she undertook to breast feed 
both of them. We can then be considered real 
brothers. Filemon was very concerned about the 
conditions of the poor and, since I was a clrild, 
I used to help him and his friends in taking 
messages, finding out useful information and 
listening to his ideas. Later, around 1966, 
Filemon adopted a clandestine life, since the 
National Guard was trying to arrest him because 
of his involvement in trade union organization. 
I then used to lodge friends in my house. My 
place was always a 'security home' (casa seguridad) 
the name given to those houses which were considered 
as reliable and safe for holding meetings and for 
keeping political documents, etc. Fileman was a 
well prepared in all senses combatant and his 
younger brother had also become very concerned 
with political matters. Hence, I was a close 
colabordor of them. When Filemon died, I went on 
working with his brother. Once I assisted him when 
he had contracted "lepra c1e la montana" [leshmaniasis, 
a kind of leprosy] and it was very difficult to cure. 
Somoza had forbidden the sale of medicines to treat 
it, because he thought guerrillas might suffer from 
it and, for him, it was better to let them die". 
Pepe continued working quietly incognito until the 1978 
September uprising when he decided to leave the city and go to 
the mountains. His wife died at the end of the 1979 April 
battle giving birth to a child and Pepe now continues working 
energetically for the revolution. Pepe is well-known as a 
committed revolutionary of proletarian origins. 
In Esteli, there was another popular figure recognized for 
his long history of militancy for the working class, Don Augusto. 
He was born in the 1930's and, from being very young, he learnt 
the shoe makor's trade. He has been an active leader who part-
icipated in tho :r·eorganization of the Shocrnakerr-;' 111rac1e Union 
in the early 1950's. Besides'being involved in one of the most 
dynamic trade unions, Don Augusto was also motivated by the 
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miserable living conditions around him. He joined the 
Socialist Party (PS~, which at that time vms the only organiza-
tion that was concerned with working class issues, and enrolled 
in the CGT(i), the Party's Confederation of Workers, until he 
became one of its prominent leaders. In "'963, Don Augusto 1vas 
among the founding members of the FSLH in the Department, work-· 
ing in alliance with the Socialist Party which together formed 
the l'1R (.Movilizacion Republicana}.This organization, however, 
split up after differences in strategy arose: the Party 
emphasized legal - civil action whereas the FSLl~ took the 
decision that little could be achieved through normal electoral 
means and believed in the armed struggle. 
Don Augusto ('18) described in a general .form, part of his 
rich experience within the workers' organization: 
"I did political work in Est eli until '1969. The 
city was the operation centre of the FSLN and from 
here we spread out towards Jinotega, Leon, l"Iadri z, 
Nueva Segovia and part of l"Iatagalpa. Shortly after 
the FSLN foundation in La Laguna, we attempted to 
organize our first peasant trade union in Condega 
among the coffee labourers of the private haciendas. 
After this we organized the Nacascolo Trade Union 
in Leon, and underground political schools in 
Gamalote (near Yali, Jinotega~, San Jeronimo, 
Condega, Bijagual, and f1adriz. V.Je were doing 
regional work, because as I said, from here, we 
planned the political operations for the surround-
ing area, searching to form grassroot organizationB 
(organizaciones de bas~) in order to establish a 
broad network of support and advice for the Trade 
Unions and Peasants Associations. In '1.964, the 
ene~ discovered that I was a FSLN member and 
attempted to catch me several times; in '1966 I 
was captured transporting explosives. At that 
time I was working in the gold mine of El Limon, 
Leon, which is situated at some two days walk 
cross-country. However, I was released after six 
months due to an amnesty agreed in '1967. I was 
ill in those days, and while I was resting, my 
companeros clashed with the National Guard and the 
enemy captured me again; .so I spent another nine 
months in jail while the trial took place. Two 
companeros took responsibility of the chargr;n again::-~t 
me becau~>e they knew I was ill and. only in thi :-~ vray 
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would I be allowed to go into hospital. The 
hospital was in Leon. I stayed there for four 
months until one of the doctors helped me to run 
away. Later on, I carne to form part of the 
Columna of Pedro Altamirano in Senica, in the 
Department of Atlantic Coast, and began fighting 
militarily (lucha Militar). I was also jailed 
in Honduras, injured several times and spent 
nearly nine years in the mountains and tropical 
lowland areas of Zelaya engaging in both political 
and military work. I returned to Esteli after 
the triumph .•••• ". 
Comments 
In Esteli, individuals, groups of persons and whole 
families have sho~ a consistent attitude towards their social 
class position. As we have seen above and will be discussed 
later, the population of the city - and of the countryside -
in general, but particularly the agro-industrial workers and 
craftsmen, have participated actively in political movements, 
pursuing not only general economic objectives but also libera-
tion from the dictatorial regime. Furthermore, among these 
exploited groups, the consciousness to delineate the main 
enemy in the different periods of their struggle seems to have 
been well developed. This. war built upon . the. earlier political 
experiences associated with this particular region v·rhich had been 
a centre of resistance against the dictatorship and foreign 
intervention. Added to this, we have the fact that many 
individuals, through their own personal experiences of exploita-
tion and of the contradictions of the system as a whole, were 
led to define their interests in class terms and to link this 
with eristing anti-imperialist Sandino ideology. The three 
accounts given above show how the specific social and economic 
environment stimulated political consciousness and permitted 
more radical attitudes to crystallise at particular junctures. 
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4. The ~~ddle Socio-Economic Sector 
This sector is rather heterogeneous. Usually one includes 
in the middle sector those who are economically not directly 
linked to the ownership of means of production and who ideologi-
cally maintain an ambiguous class position. Indeed, oscillation 
seems to be one of the features of middle sectors (see Wright, 
1979). Nevertheless, as we are mostly interested in looking at 
people's perceptions and behaviour related to events within 
their local context in order to obtain an image of the different 
social groupings, we will leave aside the theoretical discussion 
of such issues. 
In Esteli, as in other Nicaraguan towns, there are groups 
regarded as neither belonging to the economically dominant groups 
nor to the working or peasant class. Furthermore, within these 
groups, individuals present diverse views and attitudes towards 
specific happenings, '~ometimes responding to their perception of 
their present s0cial status and sometimes apparently acting 
independently of it. In other words, their behaviour may vary 
according to their expectations and/or to the opportunities and 
experiences of their life careers. The following summarized 
examples illustrate this. 
There was an individual, Don Raul, who for a long time ran 
his parent's farm of middle size. He 1vas estimated by people 
as having "mas o menos sus reales" (i.e. he was fairly well off) 
and as being a small landlord. While running the farm in which 
he had a share, Don Raul and his wife decided to move to the 
town as their children were of school age. One of his bro:thers, 
a medical doctor, was interested in politics and had been jailed 
s.everal times because of his antigover·nrnent por;ition. At the 
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beginning of the 1970's, the two brothers used to hold conversa-
tions about the country's political and economic situation, and 
Don Raul started to become interested in this issue. Later on, 
he arrived at the conclusion that the country needed indeed 
real structural changes and that these changes would never be 
carried out while Somoza remained in power. Shortly after, he 
also realized that electoral parties w0uld not be the solution 
for real change and would not be able to get rid of the dictator-
ship. As a result, Don Raul entered into contact with FSLN 
elements and began to collaborate with them. As time vvent on 
and as revolutionary actions increased, he decided to sell his 
share in the farm, giving a considerable part of the money to 
the revolutionary cause. Each time Don Raul became more and 
more involved in politics, to the extent of working as a full-
time member of the Frente. His family (wife and children) also 
experienced a radicalization with respect to ideological 
position in such a way that each member of the family took on 
their own responsibilities within the pre-insurrectional move-
ment. Thereafter, D1n Raul and his grown-up children (aged 14, 
/ 
17, 20 and 23-years) came to fight in different spheres of the 
struggle (i.e. as guerillas, in the student movement, in CDCs, 
etc.). At the time of meeting them - after the Sandinista 
victory - all of them continued to work solidly for the new 
regime. 
Socorro ( 21), a teacher of approximately 25 years, described 
her family's story as follows: 
"We were eight brothers and sisters, all concerned 
with furniture making as my father had been a cabinet 
maker. We all had been born and raised here in Esteli. 
~ father fought with Sandino in the regions of Las 
Segovias and therefrom conscientization had come within 
the family ( la conci enti·zacion era de familia). I 
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became a teacher and worked in a primary school, 
but, you see, I never taught the Constitution 
because .I was conscious that the government was 
not good at all. Thus, when my pupils asked me 
whether Nicaragua was free, I responded to them 
saying, nicaragua is not free, neither sovereign 
nor independent, and, as a result, I had troubles 
with the school director who was a somocista, 
together vvi th three other teachers. They did not 
share my concientization at all and used to call 
me "la concientizadora" ( 'conscientizor' ). nore-
over, they used to gossip about the fact that I 
had connections with the guerrillas, putting me 
at risk before others. I remember telling them: 
Look, I am working in education because there is 
a need, but to my students I must teach the reality ••• ". 
"JVJy broth'.:rs were also anti-somocistas and that 
is why a so-called Martinez, an official of the 
genocide (la genocida) National Guard, had given 
the order that my whole family should be exterminated 
completely. They killed my three brothers and one 
day Somoza's secret police (la s~g~}dad) came to 
the school looking for me. Fortunately, I did not 
turn up at the school. I was really lucky!". 
On the other hand, there is the case of Don Felipe (27), 
approximately 50 years old, a former owner of a boarding house 
which he had managed in the '1960's until the end of the '1970's. 
He seemed to have had a fair education. On various occasions 
some neighbours of the town referred to Don Felipe in the 
following manner: 
"During great part of his life, Don Felipe was a 
neutral person, a "no pro-Frente'' person ["non-pro-
Frente", i.e. indifferent]. He was dedicated to 
his own business and did not care about the people 
suffering. He had three sons who were students. 
Two of them started to become involved in political 
activities and one day his daughter was discovered 
to be linked with the FSLN movement; thereby, she 
had to attend the tribunals for questioning. But 
being afraid of this, she decided to go underground. 
Later, she was killed by the National Guard and then, 
ha! you should have seen how D~n Felipe reacted! He 
reacted against the Frente, bla.ming the muchachos 
for forcing his daughter to leave. In addition, 
another of his sons had bec~me concerned about the 
student movement in Esteli and had problems too. 
Hence, Don Felipe had no choice but to make himself 
"sandinista a puro tuba" (i.e. meaning to make an 
effort -rG understand the Frente' s aims) and gradually 
came to grasp the people's and the country's situation." 
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There was also another type of case vrhich was very 
common among the middle commercial sector. This· can be 
illustrated by the example of Don Severo (28). He comes from 
the Eastern region of the country but settled in Esteli 15 
years ago, where he established a middle-sized electrical 
appliance and warehouse shop and lived a fairly comfortable 
life. Don Severo had two children - from two different 
mothers - and had looked after them without their mothers 
because, as he put it, 1 women are full of problem:3 1 • There-
upon, he lived peacefully, taking care of his children and 
running his shop. He expressed the view that all he wanted 
from life was to work in peace, earn enough money for his sons 1 
education and give them the opportunity to study in a foreign 
country for further training in the fields they might choose. 
During the 1978-79 political turmoil, he did as many of the 
other merchants: he closed his shop when the Chamber of 
Commerce asked shopkeepers to do so and tried to save ~11 his 
goods from the vandalism carried out mainly by the lTational 
Guard. Don Severo became aware of the destructiveness of such 
. . 
forces and, when the uprising and bombings came, he left the 
town with his children until everything was over. Later, he 
came back, worried about what had happened to his business 
premises. He has now started trying to recover the economic 
loss he suffered as a result of the war and continues with 
his main goals. As he says, "I do not like.trouble of any 
kind; all I want is some aid to retrieve vrhat I have lost and 
pe·ace for my children to grovJ up happily". 
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Comments 
The brief accounts show just some of the life perspectives 
and behaviour patterns assumed by middle sector individuals 
from Esteli, although it must not be implied·that these are 
exclusive to this group since they may appear as elements in 
individuals or groups belonging to other classes. lTevertheless, 
the middle sector, because of its ambiguous structural position, 
espouses heterogeneous ideologies that make its individuals 
susceptible to either dominate or subordinate class identifica-
tion. In other words, sometimes their life experiences move 
them towards a gradual political radicalization (e.g. Don Raul 
and his family); or they develop an existing attitude rooted 
in the family's past (e.g. the teacher Socorro); or they change 
their orientation towards life due to some personal and determ-
inant experiences (e.g. Don Felipe); or they continue to hold 
established views, despite changes at the local and extra-local 
levels, thus attempting to ignore them as long as they themselves 
are not directly affected (e.g. Don Severo). Hence the hetero-
geneity of the middle sector as a social force and their ideo-
logical permeability allows for the coexistence of students 
with a defined class ideology, small entrepreneurs acting as 
patronos, wage earners aiming to become entrepreneurs, feigned 
altruistic professionals and so on. Only is specific life 
experiences or key events intervene do they radically change 
their ideological orientations. 
5. Previous Organizative Experience in the Liberation Movement 
In this section I examine some forms of organizational 
experience which constituted the basis for the building of the 
infrastructure of the liberation movement beginning in 1978. 
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The importance of this experience is that groups working in 
different fields converge to give the liberation movement its 
populist character and in order t0 achieve its immediate aim: 
the overthrow of the dictatorship. 
a. The First Trade Unions 
In the past the city of Esteli was a centre for craft 
production, such as the lt:jather industry, se.L·ving the ci_ t37 and 
rural populations. Once the Central American Common Harket and 
the introduction of manufactured goods from overseas countries 
expanded and penetrated the Hicaraguan tovms, local craft pro-
duction decreased. Nonetheless the role of these original 
craft workshops was ~mportant as a starting point for the 
development of further forms of organization. 
Don Damian (20), an old worker in his middle 50s, who had 
worked for more than forty years as a shoemaker, gave us some 
information about craft work in Esteli and about the first 
attempts at trade union organization: 
11 
••• I am a worker, a worker during all my life and 
a worker who has always liked to read. In former 
times, the main source of labour were crafts: 
saddlery, for example, was born in the colonial 
period when horses and c0ws were brought by the 
Spaniards, and horses were the main means of transport. 
Blacksmithing was also an important activity, 
closely related to the needs of the countryside ••• 
By the '1930 1 s and '1940 1 s shoemaking was quite 
important. Between '1945 and '1952, there·was a 
large shoe workshop, the largest one we ever had, 
which had more than 20 operarios. This was owned 
by Amadeo Rodriguez and included his own tanneryn 
There was another large one, the workshop owned by 
Ramon Altamirano. I remember there were conflicts 
between the operarios and the management. Among 
other crafts in Esteli we could find carpentry, 
tailoring, jewelry and hatmaking (made of palm 
leaves). I think, however, that shoemakers were the 
most important: In '1945 there were about 25 work-
shops with 10-'15 labourers working in each: by '1950 
there were more than 50, with from Dix to 20 workers 
76 
in each. The shoe industry had flourished and we 
produced all kinds of shoes (for the countryside, 
fine and semifine), but thereafter the footwear 
industry from El Salvador and secondly from Guatemala 
affected the Nicaraguan shoe market to such a degree 
that by 1965-66 there were only about 15 workshops 
left. We, the shoemakers, have been the most dynamic 
group, as I said before, because we were the first to 
organize our Trade Union soon after the Labour Lm1r 
was promulgated in 1945. Among the founding members 
were Antonio Ruiz, Jo::_~e l"Iaria ,,Palma, Antonio Rodriguez, 
Sebastian Vega Ch., Humberto Gonzalez, myself and 
others ..•.. ". · 
Throughout other conversations we had, it seems that the 
shoemakers' Trade Union was reorganized several times and broad-
ened to include leather and tannery workers. Apparently at the 
end of the 1950's, rural workers in the tobacco farms began to 
make economic demands (e.g. payment for the seventh day of the 
week). Then, in the 1960's, as we have already explained, SCAAS 
and FTE. According to Don Damian, the Federat{on had around 
1 ,000 members. These trade unions were originally promoted by 
the CGT(i) (controlled by the Socialist Party). 
During the 1970's, repression was severe and it was very 
difficult to maintain a permanent working class organization. 
There was also the problem of the penetration of 'pro-patronal' 
trade unions. For example, around 1976-77, there was an 
attempt to form a union in the furniture making factory "La 
Princesa" owned by Somoza and partners •. This attempt was 
headed by the Nicaraguan Workers' Centre (CTN) under the guidance 
of the S·cial Christian Party (PSC), but when the majority of 
the workers wanted to go on strike, the leaders entered into 
n~egotiations with the management in order to neutralize the 
movement. This was considered as a betrayal by the workers and 
new attempts to continue organizing the union failed. 
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The FSLlJ and CG'I'(i :· are considered in Est eli as the 
most important organizations for promoting workers' interests. 
In the last few years, before the overthrow of Somoza, the 
FSLN performed the major organizing role. For example, among 
the tobacco workers a clandestine union was initiated in 1977, 
consisting of 'Revolutionary V.Jorking Committees' (COR), each 
with ten members who were responsible for transmitting the 
programme of the group. According to one of the present-day 
leaders, the tobacco workers achieved a major mobilization in 
Esteli during 1978-?9, especially in the Nicaragua Cigars 
factory which embraced 500 wage earners. In this factory, the 
workers were able to train their own cadres and vJere capable 
of facing up to the management represented by Rene I1olina (a 
somocista shareholder) who had guards around the building to 
prevent any trouble. 
Comments 
The organizative experience in Esteli seems to have 
emerged in formal terms when the Labour Law was published and 
when the Socialist Party was constituted ( 1944) (see Latin 
American Bureau, 1979) focusing on organizing the working 
population. The attempts, however, to consolidate the first 
unions were hindered by many circumstances: the continual 
repression by the regime of union leaders, the threats made 
to sack workers, the low development of the productive forces 
and the lack of experience of some union leaders in finding 
the right mechanisms to face internal structural problems. 
Consequently the battle to organize the different vmrking 
groups suffered continual set-backs which prevented a f_;table 
,., 8 
and enduring trade union from developing. nevertheless, 
the workers learnt from each experience and persisted in 
organizing the worming centres, thus creating the subjective 
conditions for dealing with later events. 
It is important to bear in mind that the trade union 
movement in Nicaragua is relatively young and its background 
in many ways specific. For more than half a century, Est eli 1 s 
main group of workers were craftsmen and, although the number 
of workshops was large containing apprentices as \'Jell, each 
workshop seldom had more than twenty 1.ororkers. The first 
unions were characterised by the dispersal of membership 
throughout the city and by the fact that the ovrners of vwrk-
shops, as well as workers, were allowed to join. r.rhi s placed 
limitations on the development of strong unions. It was not 
until the ~960 1 s, when crafts became affected by the competition 
with mass-produced goods and when large-scale tobacco cultiva-
tion for export was introduced, that the union movement 
acquired new perspectives. This was also stimulated by the 
appearance of other workers 1 gr-oups (e.g. SCAAS), which resulted 
in part from the growth of the city and wh_i_ch led to a sharpen-
ing of the patron-worker relationship. 
b. The Christians in the Movement 
Most of the persons interviewed recognized the role played 
by the local Church in the concientization process among the 
population of Esteli. Although there were many persons con-
scious of their role as Christians in lJ"icaraguan society, it 
was considered of fundamental importance to extend and tran:::~rnit 
the new interpretation of the Christian tGJ>k in l~hr; ongoing 
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situation of the country. Hence, progressive elements of 
the National Church started encouraging activities oriented 
towards questioning the social order and, therefore, implicitly 
the ruling regime. 
Trying to find out details about the Christian varticipa-
tion in the liberation movement, vfe had a conversation \vi th 
an Estelian priest (2), who gave us the follouing information: 
"Overall from the publication of the f1edellin 
Documents, the Church in Latin America began to 
read the Bible from new points of viev.r, adapting 
its content to our actual reality (la realidad;. 
Then we agreed that the Gospels, for example, 
should not be read out of political context 
because scientifically they must have, and con-
tinue to have, a relationship with that reality. 
Furthermore, we found that many texts like those 
written by the Prophets Jeremiah and Isaiah were 
rich in linking religious beliefs to practice, 
starting from an analysis of the political situation 
in Israel. Revelations and other biblical. passages 
have been reinterpreted and reinforced through 
reference to contemporaneous materials, such as 
the Encyclicals of Populorum Progress.~ from 
Pope Paulo VI, Pacem in Terris by John XXIII and 
Redemptor H'lminis by John Paul II." 
"Consequently, the 1'1ovimi en to Cursilli sta took on 
the role of being a vehicle for raising social con-
sciousness concerning our country's reality. In 
Est eli, this movement started to grow between 19'73-74 
in the barrio of El Calvario [in this barrio there is 
a Church under the direction of a Latin.American priest] 
which every since has displayed one of the most com-
bative attitudes among the people of this city. 
Nearly all persons are cursillistas and the local priest 
motivated others by spreading the political message of 
the cursillos [discussion groups] to the rest of the 
population. What were the steps of this process? : 
first, there was a selection of biblical texts. We 
started by giving cursillos to adult people, the 
majority of whom were of proletarian extraction with 
known opposition to existing social order. When we 
observed the good outcome of this, youth from all soci o-
economic groups were invited to participate. 'I'he aim 
was to bring unity, to join the rich ~nth the proletarian, 
to make them walk along a single path ••••. of course, v.re 
had some difficulties at the beginning with that mixture: 
at times the bourgeois elements complained about the 
selected texts, and so, to counter this attitude, we 
used the Encyclicals, and had good results. The cursillos 
that, 
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lasted for a week. Second, there was a 
'nourishment phase' (etapa de alimentaci6n~. 
In each school, in each barrio, there were 
coordinators responsible for holding meetings 
twice a week so as to continue studying materials 
of a political content about the situation (la 
problematica), using biblical citations to --
orient the discussion of S!lutions. And third, 
shortly after the initiation of these cursillos, 
some priests established links with the Frente, 
and the suggestion was made to organize student 
or barrio committees •••• That is how many 
cursillistas became members of the Frente. In 
a way, it was like a door, like a path leading 
to the Frente." 
"We had multiple problems going ahead with the 
cursillos; one was in choosing the participants. 
There were people who wanted to participate only 
to know what the discussions were about and to be 
piadosos (piouspersons) - without doing anything 
more practical- just to know how we thought •••• 
On occasion one of them was caught recording the 
disc~ssions ••• nobody knew him; he was an oreja 
(spy) • . . • Measures were taken to control the 
entrance of new cursillistas by giving responsibili-
ties to the old ones in recruiting new members, 
acting therefore as padrin o s (sponsors: •.••• 
Another problem was to face the rich who disagreed 
with the cursillistas. The latter were seen as 
enemies and repression was directed against them. 
These rich persons considered the need·for change 
but rejected any major structural change •.• The 
process of concientization for liberation - against 
Somoza- took years of work and it even continues 
nowadays •...• ". 
With regard to the rural population, the priest explained 
" ••• after the cursillos for the urban population, 
base communities (comunidades de base), which were 
originated in Brazil, were formed in the scattered 
settlements and villages. These base communities 
consisted of groups.of believers. The most honest 
and conscious companero functioned as the person 
responsible for transmitting our orientation. This 
position was called the 'Word Delegate' (Delegado 
de la Palabra). His main duty was to fight on behalf 
of the rural community and to raise consciousness 
about the social conditions. Many of these delegados 
were put in jail, and many of them are now cadres of 
mass organizations ••••• Yes, the purpose of the base 
communities was similar to the purpose of the 
cursillo s in Est eli." 
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Don Juan (3), one of the many Cb.ristians who received 
cursillo training and who participated in insurrection told 
us his experience in the movement: 
"I am among the oldest cursillistas of Esteli, and 
I think that the cursillos played a fundamental 
role in giving consciousness to the pe·ople here. 
This religious system called the people to live a 
Christian life, not merely by going to the Church 
to kneel down.· •• , while people were being massacred. 
The grounds for motivating Christians towards 
liberation was the desire for the birth of a 'new 
man' (hombre nuevo), and a new consciousness 
(hombre consciente). Therefore, we had to be 
committed to setting an example of how to be real 
Christians by directly participating in the 
solution of our problems." 
"The cursillos were carried out vJi th 30 to 40 
per.sons. They were either people with 'realec' 
(better-off) or proletarians, like me, [He has a 
small craft workshop] and peasants. The bourgeoisie 
did not like the idea of sleeping together with 
proletarians, but after some time, they got used 
to it ••. The aim was learning to live together, no 
matter what our social class differences; we were 
united by the idea of creating a new man, to liber-
ate men from their selfish mentality, from the ~ 
que pierdismo, which means that attitude by whiCK 
someone goes into a street, sees someone dying but 
does not do anything to help. This is indifference. 
So you see, to ·eliminate these attitudes it was 
necessary to organize ourselves in order to fight 
for our rights for a better community, for a·better 
society. An organized man working for revolution 
had to motivate the people for the struggle which 
was to benefit not a single pers)n but everybody. 
The Christian should be a person of acti.0n watching 
over everybody's needs." 
"Our work of conci enti zation had to be discreet 
(escondidas) •.•• Christians and non-Christians were 
persecuted by la genocida guardia somocista. Thus, 
by 1977, the people here were strongly motivated, 
ready to fight against the enemy. Then, a child, 
Wilfreda Valenzuela, was assassinated ••.• You should 
have seen that, the people were indignant and 
difficult to control. This boy was with a group of 
children shouting protest slogans in a street when 
a criminal named Meneses passed in his vehicle and 
shot Wilfreda dead. With this act of felony - one 
of thousands - the people gathered and launched 
themselves on to the street protesting. After the 
burials, the people burnt down the house of a known 
somocista, a Rene Molina ••••• So, you see, the city 
of Esteli, which in its majority is Christian, vras 
already motivated, the fruits of the Christian 
cursillos could be seen." 
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Dona Amanda (24), a housewife involved in the Christians' 
Movement gave her views: 
"I come from an antisomocista family and my first 
contact to the fight against the regime was through 
the Church, in the countryside when I met a 
Delegate of the Word. This was at the beginnings 
of the '1970's. I received my cursillo from F'ather 
Garcia Lav:iana [a combatant priest who died during 
the war]. From there, I went working in the rural 
communities of Tres Esquinas, Santa Cruz, Las 
Lagunas and others, bringing the message I had 
received during the cursillo. One of my satisfac-
tions was that we saw the struggle for creating 
'the new man' as one which everybody had to partici-
pate in and to contribute to. Moreover, we had to 
get rid of the resignation and conformity of the 
peasantry. We were committed to motivate them, 
showing that there was a way out of their ignorance. 
We were sure that the only way to create 'the new 
man' was by making real changes, by getting rid of 
the dictatorship through the armed struggle. I 
was willing to work in anything to achieve all 
this and, as a consequence, I got in touch with 
the FSLN - a priest helped me. It was then '1975 
and known combatants started coming to my place." 
"The Christian cursillos made me take consciousness 
as a Christian, and thereafter I acquired political 
consciousness; I became integrated to the Frente's 
activities because it was the only vanguard (vanguardia) 
which could lead us to liberation and the Frente was 
aware Somoza would not go just like that ••••• Then, 
in '1977, I came associated to AMPRJNAC, being among 
the first members [in Est eli] , together with another 
30 women. We organized activities for the defence of 
Human Rights and organized the population to protest 
against political prisoners. As repression turned 
sharper, we participated jointly with the different 
student organizations (FER, AEU, AES, AEP) - covering 
university, secondary and primary school students - in 
taking over churches to make our claims and protests 
heard. Here in Esteli, all sectors joined in because 
we have always been sandinistas since Sandino's time 
and, in my case for instance, when I met top sandinista 
leaders, they knew I was helping them because I was a 
conscious Christian (cristiana conciente) •••.•• ". 
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Comments 
'llestimoni es about the important role played by the Church, 
especially through the Christian cursillos, were abundant. This 
role, however, was linked to a process of wider change in the 
Latin American Catholic Church which started in 1962 at the 
II Vatican Council summoned by Pope John XXIII and gained more 
momentum in the II General Assembly of the Latin American 
Episcopate - CELAM- in Medellin, Colombia in 1968. This first 
event opened the door to a modernizing process at all levels 
of the Church, thus implying the direct participation of all 
catholics in a renovating process. The Medellin Conference 
constituted a further step forward: for the first time, the 
role of the Church was analysed within the framework of capital-
ist dependency, and exploitation. The issue of how the Church 
might help the oppressed was raised and a number of priests 
took the view that they should become more directly involved 
in the liberation struggle, whether or not the hierarchy approved. 
Hence pastoral work among poorer classes underwent a transforma-
tion and, as a consequence, young priests started to elaborate 
a new theology, which was to be called 'the theology o.f li bera-
tion'. The works of the pioneers of this renovating movement 
(movimiento renovador) produced a great impact on the relation-
ship of priests to their congregation. Leonardo Boff's book, 
Jesus Christ Liberator and Gustavo Gutierrez' work Theology 
for Liberation (published after the r1edellin Is Conference) 
challenged even more the traditional conception of the role of 
the Church in Latin America. By the beginning of the 1970's, 
many local parishes had focused their work action on programmes 
dealing with various economic, political, social .and cultural 
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problems (see l'1oura, C. , et al, 1981). 
In Latin America, the Church at all levels of its structure, 
carried out a re-reading of the Holy Scriptures. In J:hcaragua, 
the most advanced groups analysed them from the point of vie~cv 
of the oppressed and concluded that the Christian ideology was 
more akin to socialism than to capitalism. On the other hand, 
the country's political and economic situation led them to see 
the need for structural changes which, it was realised, required 
a fundamental change in the political system. Their position 
coincided with other groups and revolutionary organizations. 
At the micro-level, in Esteli, the Church materialized its 
actions through the cursillista movement. This was to consti-
tute another catalyst in the liberation struggle. The Christian 
leaders visualized· their work in collaboration with FSLN, 
supporting the armed struggle as the only means to overthrow 
the dictatorship. Both forces complemented each other in terms 
of canalizing discontent, working for structural change and 
building a new society. This alliance of a deeply rooted 
Christian ideology with that of a revolutionary movement born 
generations earlier in the Sandino organisation and now given 
an explicit Marxist orientation, seems to have produced an 
effective formula for the unification of forces having a 
populist character. Moreover, the direct involvement of 
Christian priests and the participation of individuals as 
Christians in a movement of such a nature was a nev.r event V>Thi ch 
in practice produced new conceptions of popular participation 
which shaped the development of grassroots organization. As I 
describe in Chapter III, the concrete expression of this dynamic 
:• 
Chapter III 
The Emergence. of the Liberation r1ovement in Est eli 
In this chapter I analyse the ways in which groups of 
different social backgrounds came together in the formation 
of a single anti-dictatorial movement. This process in 
Esteli was shaped by the wider political and economic forces 
of Nicaragua, as well as by specific local events. Although 
the FSLN came to play the major political and military role, 
the success of the movement must be understood in terms of 
how various groups and organizations, such as FER, AES, 
.Al'11?RONAC and CDC's, developed common commitments and provided 
the 'infrastructure' for the insurrections. l'1y account of 
the part played by various organizations, especially the CDC's, 
of the changing economic and political situation, draw·s upon 
individuals' perceptions of the evolving political process. 
a. Pre-insurrectional background 
By 1977, the economic and political situation led towards 
an increasing agitation among various social groups for lifting 
the state of siege, censure and martial law which Somoza had 
imposed since December 1974. The organized sectors (the unions, 
students, etc.) were growing considerably and people were mani-
festing their dissatisfaction widely. This phenomenon embraced 
the most important cities and towns of the country. 
Let us now provide a rapid overview of people's perceptions 
of the situation in 1977-78. In the interviews the following 
statements were made: 
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"we were not allowed the freedom to stud,y ••..• " 
"Youngsters were jailed ~;vi thout any reason •.••. " 
"we were not safe to walk in the streets ••.• " 
"There was no freedom to speak •••• " 
"The somocistas could do what they pleased ••• " 
"Anybody could be accused of being a sandinista and 
therefore, jailed, tortured or simply shot •••• " 
"we had no freedom to organize our trade unions •• ~." 
"Life was turningun'tearable: no well paid jobs; 
goods were more ex:pensi ve each time •.••• " 
"The guards were committing atrocities amongst the 
people •••• " 
"A lot of peasants were killed •••• " 
"we were fed up with Somoza and the somoci stas •••• " 
"Somoza and his allies must go •.• we will make them go ••• ~" 
The acute lack of freedom and high insecurity in all 
quarters of life drove the people of Esteli to use all available 
means to speak out against their unfair living conditions (e.g. 
they seized churches, schools, and organised marches). Never-
theless, as was pointed out by Don Juan (3), with the assassina-
tion of the child, wilfredo Valenzuela, the people stormed on to 
the streets and burned down a somocista house. This was at the 
end of 197'?· According to another informant (13), "Since that 
day, Est eli became restless. 11 
Mario (23), a transport manager and important cursillista 
in 1977, said: 
"we were conscious of the need to speed up the process 
of organizing. One of the first activities - in that 
period - was to organize a census in the barrio of 
El Calvaria (because it was one of the most active of 
the city) to see how many children lived without 
proper care and attention. In December 1977, the 
cursillistas decided to bring a pinata (decorated 
ball) and presents for them. we collected a lot of 
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money and neighbours frnm other barrios saw v.Ji th 
enthusiasm how we acted on behalf of the poor •••• 
Two weeks later, the people from El Calvaria 
gathered and decided to organize the barrio 
themselves. From that meeting, the idea to 
organize the whole city emerged. People from 
all social classes, middle and poor, supported 
the idea. The enthusiasm was such, that in 
two months the whole city was organized, with 
the exception of the town centre. Thus, each 
had its own barrio committee. The idea was to 
bring neighbours together to make claims for 
water, electricity, improvement of streets, aid 
for poor children and so on, but at the same time 
raising consciousness on other issues such as the 
need for changing society, the danger we all lived 
under [due to repression] and that we should stand 
together in such a way as to give the people the 
opportunity to exercise power." · 
Don Nacho ( 22), a resident of the barrio Jose Benito 
Escobar, told us one day: 
"This barrio was always marginal. ••• we were in such 
a state that in order to collect water we had to rise 
early, because by 5.00 a.m. there was no water at 
all. Owing to our poor living conditions we saw the 
need to organize a Committee of Communal Development ••• 
it was an initiative from the Church. Initiatives 
for political work had also .been given by the FSLH 
but this was clandestine work because one could be 
killed if the enemy came to know of it ••• the same 
Jose Benito Escobar [killed in July 1978] used to 
work here." 
"At the beginning, the Committee worked slowly ••• 
people could only see their own interests and not . 
that of the whole community. Later on~ they pro-
gressed and saw others problems. When the repression 
came, fraternity and consciousness increased. For 
instance, when someone was captured, everyone felt 
it as if it were from their own flesh ( su propia _carne). 
One did not feel alone and our morale was high; 
rapidly 60 persons could gather and march to the 
city protesting on behalf of ourcampafieros in jail •••• 
as I said, our morale was high and so repression was 
felt less intensively ••••. By the middle of the year (1978) we knew that at any moment, the people would 
rise up. We were conscious that some day not so far 
away we would have to fight [meaning, an armed struggle] 
and that one could lose one's life." 
"The CDC's began to organize when Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro was killed •••• [see Chapter I] ••• because 
there was a pabo (strike) and instructions were 
given to make uzones [hidden places to keep different 
stuffs] ;for medicines, food, ete.: people were more 
eooperative amongst themselves when the national Guarcl 
89 
was standing over them [i.e. threatening them], 
insecurity itself made people uni t,e, po sta 
(vigilance) was carried out at street corners to 
protect meetings. we ·"';orked very close each to 
the other." 
Dona ]\1aria (9), whom I met through a former organizer 
of the CDC's, a resident of the barrio IgarUbeda and a mother 
of adult children, told us: 
" ••••• when Pedro Joaqu{n Chamorro was killed 
on 10th January (1978) the people launched 
themselves into the streets in protest (mani-
festaciones), making pancartas (banners)-,--
demanding that the regime go, nobody could stop 
them ••••• los muchachos [a word used for referring 
to the revolutionary youth] were taking over 
State and private schools. They had their own 
organizations like the FER; also the chavalos 
[referring to children of primary school age] 
participated significantly by seizing their 
schools like the Escuela Anexa which was seized 
around May; they were very brave you know, 
they used to shout: "no !ueremos rosguillas, 
queremos fusiles y metra letas! (we do not want 
rosquillas - a kind of biscuit - we want rifles 
and machine guns). The Parents Association 
(Asociaci6n de Padres de Familia) of the schools 
backed their children, brought them food and 
looked after them •••• everybody was united ••••• 
we were receiving advice through our quarter 
committee, and were preparing everything for a 
fight; for example, shortly after the m~chachos 
[FSLN] captured the Palace in August, there was 
a general strike and the watchword was: despues 
del paro, viene el disparo [after the strike, 
comes the firing]. Thus we were sure that, at 
any moment, war was cotiling." 
Alberto (15), who had similar experiences to many students 
explained: 
"The situation here in Esteli was influenced by the 
national one. The students had been promoting and 
participating in street marches, together with other 
groups. It was a generalized repression, a repression 
against the whole country; with the attacks on the 
San Carlos garrisons by the FSLH (tercerista) in 
October 1977, repression increased, and we could not 
live in peace any more: ·workers, peasants, students, 
women, children were ~illed and tortured every day. 
The people knew who the enemy was, the people knew 
the National Guard was defending a clase de pocos 
[class of few] who wanted to defend a regime of 
exploitation •••• you see, there was exploitation by 
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one person against the people; the dictatorship 
was alone, even the burgues1a criolla [referring 
to the opposition bourgeoisie] had become apart 
from it because Somoza was not allowing them any 
more to interfere in his concerns." 
"We all wanted Somoza to leave the country, but 
we had to prepare ourselves for that fight. He 
would not go just like that ••• we had to prepare 
the population in all senses. As you know, the 
Frente was divided into three groups: the in-
surrectional or the so-called terceristas, the 
GPP and the Proletarios; I first belonged to the 
GPP but moved to the terceristas. The GPP mainly 
concentrated on political and organizative work 
while the terceristas were concerned that el pueblo 
se fogueara, se defendiera con las armas en la 
mana y no solo con las manos [the people were trained 
so that they could defend themselves with arms in 
their hands and not just with their bare hands]. 
Most of the people in Esteli were GPP but as long 
as there was a need to defend themselves in other 
ways, the GPP realized the importance of taking 
up arms (de tamar las armas); thus, during the 
insurrections we all worked jointly. .Discussions 
between the GPP and the terceristas were few [there 
was no FSL:N-proletarios] because we all realized 
that protest marches distributing papeletas (anti-
dictatorial propaganda) and burning tyres did not 
stop the enemy, did not stop the guard from killing. 
The people of Esteli ••••• were organized and wanted 
arms to face the genocida. We wanted to enter in 
combat against them." 
"My participation at the beginning was with 
students in the FER. We used to do political work 
in El Cal varia and coordinate our operations vJi th 
propaganda activities; later on, I went underground 
to the montana and lived with peasants. That was a 
great e:xper1ence because we learned things v1e did 
not know before; they gave us shelter, food and 
helped us to survive. In turn, we talked to them 
about the country's condition and the need for 
change, we made attempts to teach reading and writing 
but it was difficult under those conditions. Anyway, 
our relationship with peasants was very close, we 
saw their involvement in the struggle in sharing 
with us lo poco que tenia [what little they hadJ 
and observed thei~ progressive participation within 
the process." 
From different interviews and conversations with women 
it is possible to see their participation in the liberation 
movement. JVIaria Antoni eta ( 7), one of the founding members 
of the women's organization in Esteli, gave us the following 
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account: 
said: 
"AI1l?ROlTAC was formed here at the end of '1977 when 
a group of companeras saw with interest the formation 
of AHPRONAC in Managua two months before (September; 
as a result of the growth of the Comite de Madres 
de Reos Politicos (Mothers of Political Prisoners' 
Committee). We had been very concerned about the 
terrible repression in Esteli and invited one of 
the women's leaders from ]'-1anagua to come and give 
us guidance. A]'-1PRONAC-Esteli, then, ~~as formed 1vi th 
some 30 women, all committed to carrying on ·with 
denunciations, raising consciousness and organizative 
tasks. A few weeks later, our organization had 
grown remarkably ••••• housewives, female students, 
female tobacco workers, etc. women from all sectors, 
were enthusiastic in becoming organized; we formed 
different teams and, in coordination ~nth other 
groups, displayed our propaganda throughout the city. 
A]'-1PRONAC worked very closely with the student organiza-
tions as well as with the Parents' Association. r1any 
mothers supported and participated in their Bons 1 
activities." 
"Between February and September '1978, the organized 
women (la mujer organizada) intensively denounced, 
agitated and organized ••••• we made huge efforts to 
form the CDCs which Jose Benito Escobar began to 
promote before his death and we helped to make leaf-
lets about first aid, grain storage, sewing (roji 
negra) flags (the red and black colours of the Sandin-
istas), giving first aid training, etc •••• we were 
preparing women and the population in general for a 
war which was coming ••••• " 
Dona Petronila (8), a well-known woman from El Calvaria, 
"Our barrio had always been the most active [she seemed 
very proud]; my family and I have worked for the 
Frente for a long time ••••• women here were better 
organized than in other barrios and perhaps we can say 
that this barrio was nearly always the first in every-
thing •.•• the Christian cursillos and the barrio 
committees originated in this place ••••• During the 
insurrections the co man do s (headquarters) of the 
muchachos were based here, and the guard was always 
afraid of coming in. We were steadfast in helping 
the guerrillas. You know, when people gathered, 1-ve 
used to talk about the muchachos, of what real 
Christians they were because they were sacrificing 
their lives for us. All agreed it was a commitment 
supporting them." 
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"We collected money, food and organized first 
aid boxes in each block for assisting the injlu~ed 
and the ill •••• as mothers, we thought if our 
sons come back, who will cook for them? Thus we 
were resolved to stay to work hard and b.e ready 
for them at any moment ••••• in this barrio, doors 
were open during the night until the small hours 
of the morning for the muchachos. So, if they 
were pursued, they could enter any house and 
escape through the solares [back yard], because 
these were connected with other solares. We were 
very organized, when the guard was searching for 
the muchachos in a street or in a house, they were 
already at the other side of the block ••••• they 
disappeared in front of the guard's eyes ••••• ". 
How the CDCs were organized 
Interviewing several persons who were members (4, 10, 23) 
of the highest bodies of the CDCs at city level, we obtained 
the following information: 
"I was organizing in El Cal vario, the place 1vhere 
prehaps repression was harsher •••• On the assassina-
tion of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro the barrio committees 
were organized in the city; besides looking for 
social-economic improvements, we were mainly guiding 
them towards the role of defence for the civilian 
population. Hence, these committees were shortly 
after named the CDCs." 
"For the first strike in February 1978,. the one 
promoted by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 
people stopped working but not from pursuing their 
own interests (no hac·erles el juego). We had our 
own criteria and reasons: we aimed to take advantage 
of the strike for strengthening our power through 
organizing and popular mobilization. The general 
pattern for organizing the base organizations was: 
from each side of a block, there would be one person 
responsible for watching his side [detecting who 
were somocistas, the movements they made, whether 
the guards were coming there, etc.]o They formed 
the block's committee (i.e. the block's CDC]; from 
each four blocks, the zone's CDC was formed (see 4)." 
"Each four zones constituted one sector [in 
Esteli there were 35 sectors] and, in turn, they 
elected a representative to the Central Committee 
which gave the direction to the city's CDCs. This 
structure was highly effective because mobilization 
was incredible. You see, if a compafiero was cap-
tured, or, for instance, when Vladimir Hidalgo [a 
worker] was killed, within one house the whole town 
was informed and organized in groups prepared to 
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march against the local authorities ••• • vre did 
not need to come to each house; we were all 
ready and waiting and any news was passed in 
such a way that the responsible person of a 
sector communicated with the appropriate blocks 
and within a short space of time the barrios 
and the town knew what step to follow. Our 
communication was interesting. We used the 
solares and made openings among them in such 
a way that those responsible did not need to 
go outside and make obvious their meetings. 
Communication between blocks was also quick. 
We sent children with messages to the person 
in charge, and from there we were guaranteed 
that information would reach a block (23~." 
An informant, who was a member of the Central Committee 
of the CDC's, gave us more details about them: 
"The members of the CDC's formed different working 
teams to distribute tasks, incorporating in this 
way, more people into the activities. I was 
responsible mainly for first-aid. We received 
general courses with the collaboration of 
doctors keen on helping us; in turn we had to 
train our companeros and they trained others. 
These courses included how to make portable 
stretchers (camillas), different kinds of bandages 
using common materials, how to carry injured 
people, how to temporarily set fractures, 
different types of fractures and so on. On the 
other hand, we had to select the best locations 
for our secret store-rooms which were to store 
not only grains and food but medicines, propaganda 
materials, weapons and so forth ••••• This information 
was known only by the members responsible ·for them." 
. "The ·CDC's were· coordinated with all the organi zo.-
tions in Esteli in participating in actividades 
relampagos (impromptu activities), like meetingf'~, 
sociodramas, songs, etc. which lasted a few minutes. 
You know, it was dangerous to remain in one place 
for a long time, guards came capturing or killing 
you. We had to create new ways of agitation because 
it was urgent to raise the people's consciousness." ('10). 
Comments 
The worsening economic and political conditions in 
Nicaragua during '1977-78 led to a marked increase in confronta-
tions between FSLN and the National Guard. National events 
such as the FSLlT(i) attacks in 0ct0ber '1977 and the assassination 
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of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro j_ntertwined -vvi th local happenings 
(such as the assassination of Wilfredo Valenzuela, and the 
killings of Jose Benito Escobar and Vladimir ~hdalgo' to 
generate increased interest in group mobilization. 
Organization, then, emerged as a major need of the 
people of Esteli. There was a need for shaping and canalis-
ing mass discontent. Repression by_local somocista eleme~ts 
who represented the "authorities" - ~oms reflect eel at all 
levels: in the work centres, by the sacking of employees 
and the killing of union leaders; in the schools, by restrict-
ing teachers from referring to the current political situation, 
and awarding student leaders low marks (see 21); and among the 
general population, by reprisals against sandinista sympathi-
zers. It is interesting to see how different social groups 
in Esteli (the women, youth and adult men) converged in a 
common front and common purpose. It was an implicit desire 
for change; nevertheless, as one informant put it, "sometimefJ 
people did not take up radical or decisive attitudes, perhaps 
because of fear, not because of a lack of understanding the 
issues". There were groups which, although aiming at change, 
did not know the means by which to materialize their desire. 
It is in this context that the Christian cursillos played an 
important role, gradually motivating sympathizers towards 
more concrete actions. On the other hand, individual fear 
was also an expression of insecurity itself: to face the 
enemy alone and without the means by which to confront the 
repression was not the same as doing it collectively with the 
political support and military protection of an organization 
at the lead. 
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The absence of forces other than the FSLI~ ivi th the 
necessary political and military strength to combat the 
Hational Guard, drove people to see it as the only viable 
political alternative and as the only organisation that 
could lead to a process of structural change. Therefore, 
the :B'SLN appeared to many individuals as a symbol for trans-
forming reality, and one which did not conflict \vi th their 
religious ideology or populist aspirations. 
Within the anti-dictatorial front, strong horizontal 
relationships among individuals from different social group,s 
emerged, thus overriding divisions existing because of 
possible conflicting class interests. Thus, as was shown 
in the case material, persons of different social status 
(workers, students and middle class professionals) collabora-
ted in the struggle, and various organizations such as the 
Church, trade unions, and parent-teacher associations 
involved themselves in supporting the FSLiT by creating a 
grassroots organization (the CDC's) which assisted in mobiliz-
ing people and later, serving the guerrilla army. 
During 1978 there was an intense interchange of experi-
ences in Esteli: the realization that distinct ways of life -
the montana and city - were but part of one reality; the 
uniting of strikingly different social groups - the revolution-
ary workers, the anti-somoci sta middle class, the university 
students, and the peasants - the coordination among different 
revolutionary actions (the :B'SLN(i) and FSLH-GPP>; the inter-
play of dif:forent ideologies - Sandini sta and Christian; the 
learning of different methods of operating legal and clandes-
tine; tho developing solidarity among the population with 
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the muchachos. All these facts contributed to an ir-
reversible commitment to the struggle to overthroH the · 
regime. 
The high dynamic of events drove the people of Esteli to 
organize themselves in unique ways broadening their political 
perspectives. The comites de barrio departed from their formal 
goals upon which they were originally built (i.e. comunality 
development-projects) and instead became organised around the 
task of defending the local barrio population. rlany of the 
participants of these committees became members of the CDC's 
and began to work with different methods. The CDC's had 
a clandestine character and a more specific structure (based 
on blocks, zones, sectors and a Central Committee). Their 
task was essentially to support and link up with the organiza-
tions, such as FER, AMPRONAC, COR's, and their members under-
took political and military work (e.g. writing and printing 
documents, organized medical training etc.) oriented towards 
the preparation of the population in emergency circumstances. 
b. The insurrection 
Uprisings in Esteli occurred on three occasions: Sept-
ember '1978, and April and June '1979. Some of the people's 
accounts of the three events will be given, together with some 
stories illustrating parts of these to keep the dynamic of the 
whole period and to highlight particular aspects. 
Soon after the seizure of the i'Jational Palaeo by the 
FSLN(i) on the 22nd of August '1978, and the general ntrike 
that followed it, the first insurrection at a national level 
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took place. This was precipitated by a series of happenings 
which occurred during the year throughout the country, such 
as the assassination of political leaders, r~onimbo' s insurrec-
tion in February, an out-burst of strikes, generalized pro-
tests, and armed harrassment by the FSLlT all over the terri-
tory. Matagalpa was the first city to show signs of uprising 
on the 26th of August. However, figQ.ts, building of barri-
cades, and armed clashes appeared similarly in barrios of the 
main cities of Managua, Chinandega, Leon, T'lasaya, Diriamba, 
and in other towns. 
Est eli 
Accardi ng to Pedro ( 1 >, shortly before the insurrection 
there, 
" ••.• we were restless,with ea.ch meeting we had 
[i.e. the CDC's Central Committee] our restless-
ness grew; we had control over nearly everything; 
we controlled, for instance, infiltration [into 
the CDCs]. All of the Central Oommi ttee members 
had a secret emblem, a coloured button, as we were 
many (about 40) and needed strict control. We 
had settled and organized the staple grain storage 
for each sector; we had people trained in first-
aid, we knew the city well; we had planned where 
to make barricades, we were more or less prepared ••• ". 
Dona Maria describes the night if all happened, 
"At midnight on the 9th of September, everybody 
was knocking on doors saying that the muchachos 
had entered •••• Yes, people were knockirig and saying: 
wake up, wake up, the muchachos are here! And then, 
everybody got up, opened the botiguines (first-aid 
boxes), started preparing food and coffee, ••.•• all 
the pueblo got up and started diggingup adoquines 
(paving stones) to build the barricades, men, 
chavalos, women, everybody was helping.· We had 
[referring to the sector] our grain store ready. 
It was full of beans, maize, cooking oil, oats, 
and barley, etc •.••• full 0f everything! •••.•• 
everybody had resp0nded by giving money to buy 
food, even gente de dinero [the better-off indivi-
duals] had contributed with money to buy our food. 
Here we had no hunger." 
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"The muchachos could not take over the city 
completely but almost totally controlled it. 
The muchachos compas [referring to armed and 
trained members of the FSLN] that entered the 
city were few, most of them were students ••.•. 
but we, the people, participated and were in 
the majority. The people living in the centre 
had left, leaving overall the people from the 
barrins." 
"The worst bombing days were around the 'i4th 
to the 18the ••• during those days we felt dis-
pirited; you see, we could see that the guard 
was fixed on exterminating us •••• When the 
muchachos retreated from the city around the 
22nd, the Operaci6n Limpieza (cleaning up operation) 
began. It was horrible, the guard vms killing 
hundreds of people." 
For the April uprising, she related that, 
" •. the muchachos came on Palm Sunday, the 8th of 
April ••• we had already been warned ••.• There 
were less days of combat than in September; but 
we were in despair, the noise of the bombs left 
us nearly deaf ••••• We, the women, were looking how 
to help the muchachos. We gave them fresh food, 
sips of coffee, anything to keep them going. But 
there were many guards everywhere and more came 
from Managua, so the muchachos had to retreat. 
That was Good Friday, the 13th •.•• we were impressed 
to see the number of guards that came ••••. there 
were thousands spread in every corner. When the 
muchachos decided to retreat, we had not enough 
arms, the bombing had again been terrible, the 
"Shermans" (tanks) had caused a lot of destruction, 
many people had died. We could not continue like 
that ••••• " 
"La retirada [retreat] was amazing •••.• the 
muchachos started the retreat in the afternoon and 
were followed by thousands of people including 
children, old people, women, men, whole families •.•• 
why?, because we knew that after the muchachos 
were gone, we would have the cleaning~up operation 
again. We knew then what it was like. So, many 
people decided to follow the muchachos. They did 
not want to remain here; they did not want to die 
here at the hands of the ~enocida. The next day, 
the guard's chief said:the sandinistas must be 
witches (brujos), because who knows how they 
managed to get out of the city •.•. ' You know, the 
muchachos and the immense lines of people after 
them, were able to withdraw amid thousands, but 
thousands, of guards everywhere ....• 
"I\J uxl~ clay, the .14th, the guard came with relish 
to clno.n up. 'J~hey machine gunned the housN~ ..•. it 
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was horrible ••••• I stayed in the town all the 
time until our liberation in July •••. ". (9) 
Don Chepe, a trader of the town, said, 
"I was in the CDCs. We prepared the population 
for the war~ •••• for September, v.re had few armas 
patentes [referring to powerful arms like automatic 
guns]. We had to back the muchachos morally by 
building the barricades, feeding them, bringing 
messages, giving information etc., because it was 
a people's war ••••• I think we could have won and 
liberated Esteli, but the other cities could not 
sustain the battle long enough and therefore, 
when we were still fighting, Somoza sent here all 
the aeroplanes, 'Shermans', helicopters, everything 
to execute us •••• so, when the muchachos saw all that 
amount of weaponry concentrated here, they decided 
to retreat. I remained here; I have a smallholder 
farm in this municipality and I go there regularly •• 
thus, I helped my sons and other cornpaneros, about 
15, by lodging them there. We worked in that 
little house; we gave the guerrillas food when 
they carne in and stored anything they asked us." 
"For the April insurrection I travelled often 
to my smallholding, acting as a go-between for 
the rnuchachos; I carried messages for them hidden 
in my underpants held with a pin, or here, inside 
my faja [belt]." 
"Before April we had un en~afio [a spy operation] 
carried out by the so-called Cherry'. He had been 
working with the guerrillas but then went over to 
the guard. He knew nearly all the carnparnentos and 
had many contacts. He told everything and as a 
result many, yes many, people died. We had to warn 
everybody that "el Cherry" was an oreja [a traitor]. 
The news of him even reached Honduras. He was killed 
after the final uprising." 
"The insurrection in April lasted about five days. 
I had gone to the market and on corning back heard 
the gunfire. The muchachos were here. There were 
guards everywhere. I heard a clash near my small-
holding. I thought of my sons and the muchachos. 
I thought they had died and thus, I thought if they 
have died fighting for freedom, why should I not 
die fighting as well •••• I asked my wife to leave the 
city and go to any other safe place, but she replied, 
'If I go, if we go, then who will care for the 
muchachos? •••• that encouraged me and I tried to keep 
calm ••••. " 
"Days passed, fierce fighting ••.• we were in despair 
and felt discouraged because we expected other cities 
to rise-up .••. but we had been the only one •••. so the 
army had c0ncentrated here. When the rnuch,achos saw 
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the situation they decided to retreat •••• I told 
them it was not fair while we were fighting and 
people dying, others, in the c0untry, were enjoy-
ing Hr1ly Week •••• We felt frustrated •••• Neverthe-
less, days after la retirada [the retreat]. 1ve 
heard through Rad1o Sandino [Sandinista Radio] 
that in other regions people were fighting and a 
lot of ambushes of the guard were taking place 
all over the territory •••• our m0rale rose and 
then we recivered strength again. A communique 
from the Frente stated that the next move would 
be the decisive, the definitive fight; the 
muchachos were preparing themselves again. We 
~that they had better arms, and just looking 
at their enthusiasm and confidence, that gave us 
great courage ••••• " 
"More people went away from the city. The end. 
of May came and we felt eager to finish with the 
enemy at once. The expected day came! I was 
here well-armed checking the barricades all over, 
bringing and taking messages, food, information, 
you know, getting everything ready for the final 
batter •••• Thus, the last war was just one thing; 
the people against the enemy -the guard •.••• 
The people who stayed were to help and fight 
together with the muchachos; that was the only 
choice for those wlio decided to remain. The 
muchachos came from everywhere, some were already 
liere, better prepared than previously. The guard 
was discouraged, they knew they had no support 
from anyone in this town, the ~uerra psicol6gica 
[psychological war] was effect1ve. They felt de-
moralized •••• while we were full of hope, ·of trust, 
of valour •••• The bombing and attacks started; it 
was a totally well-defined war: the Frente against 
the Genocida •••• The latter were uncontrolled, in 
chaos. When we saw the planes, the tanks, the 
helicopters, the "supers-5nicos" coming we could see 
that they were failing when shooting; they were 
not effective any more. By then we knew the move-
ments of these machines and hence, knew where and. 
how to avoid their actions. We fought for nearly 
40 days, the city which resisted the most. The city 
was in the ha~ds of the muchachos, the guard was 
concentrated in its headquarters. If they wanted 
to hurt us it had to be by air bombing or by shooting 
los morteros from their headquarters. On the 15th 
of July it was planned to seize the headquarters but 
we failed, so it was moved to the next day. All 
night we kept fighting •••• At the hours of dawn 
(madrugada) an aircraft organised by the muchachos 
to bomb the headquarters, appeared, but the two 
rockets which it fired it just the. headquarter's 
tower, so it failed because the idea was to provoke 
enough damage to make the guards come out and face 
us outside. We were waiting for them •••• About 
11.0 a.m. the muchachos·were to give them half an 
hour to surrender. They had p:r·epared a tractor with 
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a Si\li tched-on engine which \vas to run in the 
direction of the headquarter's wall to knock 
it down which would be follo1ved by combatants 
to fight the guard. The guard did not surrender. 
The· muchachos let the tractor go and vrhen the 
guards heard the noise of the tractor coming 
they thought it was full of bombs and started 
running away. The muchachos defeated them 
The chief commander, Vicente Zuniga, called 
"La Sombra" attempted to escape finding refuge 
in the village called Los Ninos [a place ~iliere 
orphaned children live] but the compas were 
already waiting for him •••• ~Jhen we all heard 
that Zuniga had died •••• we launched into the 
streets with joy. We went to the garrison and 
saw piles of rifles, food, weapons, etc. They 
had everything to live for months. That is why 
we said that in spite of the guards' military 
resources, we could defeat them because we had 
courage and were all united •••• " 
Manuel (5), a student, gave an account of his participa-
tion in the uprisings: 
"Before the September insurrection I had gone to the 
montana. For the first insurrection, between mid-
night and dawn 21 compafieros entered Esteli. The 
first places we took over were the barrios El 
Calvario and Oscar Gamez ••••• We had nearly total 
control over the city, and the guard concentrated 
in the comando. However, as we were gaining con-
trol, the other insurrected cities could not 
resist the genocida's attacks and they were in 
disarray •••. thus, the genocida army began to con-
centrate their actions on Esteli. We did not 
have enough weapons to arm the people and so we 
().ecided to retreat. We fought intensively for 
1 3 days ••.• " 
"We retreated but we could not say that it was 
a defeat because we had achieved our aims basically: 
to wear down the guard, to increase the people's 
combative experience and to strengthen our organiza-
tion ••• From the 21 compafieros who came into the 
city, hundreds joined them, taking up arms. 
Politically the people had been w0n over, but we 
still lacked sufficient military power •••• Thus, 
after the insurrection, part of las masas (the 
masses) who had participated, began to prepare 
themselves clandestinely for political and military 
action. There was a scarcity of weapons capable 
of facing a war; most of the people had only 
hunting arms and that helped little. So we had to 
capture more arms from the guard by means of 
ambushes, harrassments, military action ••..• These 
actions also served as a military training. The 
people who joined the guerrillas had to carry on 
~~ \}":: 'Z . 
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the revolutionary task of concientization among 
the peasants. We needed to expand and consolidate 
our net1vork of collaborators and linked it 1\Tith 
the city; this was a fundamental commitment. 
It was a struggle in which both countryside and 
city were directly involved. Hence, the Frente 
had to focus on this aspect." 
"Between September and April we analysed 1:Th:i.ch 
the specific tasks we needed to carry out; •:re 
analysed iPThich individuals could still vrork 
legally in the city and planned to send them 
back; it was necessary to reorganize the orientate 
urban organization for coordinating our actions. 
You know, the surroundings of Esteli was saturated 
by escuadras de combatientes and therefore we 
needed urban-montana contact and support •••• " 
Alberto (15) another student, told us: 
"After the September uprising I went to the montana 
with lots of companeros. The guerrilla movement 
expanded and we recovered arms from the guard. 
In December we saw the need to reinforce and re-
organize again the urban structure. So, the 
'Tupamaro group' was formed with the purpose of 
investigating and carrying out actions to under-
mine the guard. They undertook ambushes, raids 
on Banks, and extended the military training among 
the urban population. Students, women, workers, 
were given training in houses, school buildings, 
any place camuflacheado [camouflaged] ••• here in 
the montana, we also provided military training, 
political preparation and basic knowledge of 
guerrilla tactics." 
"For April, the guerrilla column 'Fi1emon Rivera' 
entered the city. Other battles took place around 
the city, such as in Condega with the Facundo 
Picado column and in the villages nearby; neverthe-
less, it was only in Est eli where the actual 
population fought. The Frente had planned to carry 
on coordinated actions throughout the country •••• 
it had been planned to harrass Est eli. just for a 
few days and then to retreat, but once we wer~ 
here, ••• the people mobilized los compas and asked 
us to stay and to protect them •••• nonetheless' 
los compas had to retreat. It had been the only 
city that rose up and again, the guard had concen-
trated here. We suffered great losses, such as 
the coml?anero Juan Alberto Blandon who was the 
chief (Jefe) of the guerrilla column, and other 
corripaneros. We decided to pull back •••• the people 
were crying, begging us not to go, but we had to. 
The guard were surrounding us." 
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"How we organized La retirada: the guard 
held us in two military rings; one around the 
city, and the other covering the outside areas 
including diverse roads and tracks leading to 
the mountains and nearby villages. There were 
about 2,500 well armed guards •••• se canto la 
retirada [they called the retreat] and the 
Vanguard - the FSLN - organized its best armed 
and military combatants going at the head, 
there went about '130-"140 companeros •••. but the 
most striking thing was that a crowd of more . 
than 3,000 persons was also preparing to follow 
us. You could see JOUng people, old persons 
with bardon (sticks), children, women, chickens, 
dogs, people carrying small belongings, with 
small carts. We had a great responsibility. 
We were astonished but had to find a solution 
amid these difficulties •••• " 
Pepe ('17) another guerrilla fighter, told us: 
"It was about 6. 30 p.m., the people decided to 
follow us, they knew what the Operaci6n Limpieza 
was. We had the responsibility to take them ~uth 
us out of the city. We started walking •••• in 
silence crossing El Calvario, Alfredo Lazo, in 
the direction to El Limon [South West from 
Esteli] •••• about 3 to 4 hours later we had 
broken the first ring [surrounding the city]; 
the guard thought we would continue towards El 
Limon, but, instead, we turned towards La Quebrada 
looking towards the Panamerican Road •• the guard 
did not shoot at us because they thought the 
people were well armed when they saw the first 
combatants carrying the fales [automatic rifJ.es] ••• 
we crossed the Panamerican Road and walked towards 
La Quiatilla in the South East •.•• burlamos ala 
guardia! [we fooled the guards!] •••• They thought 
we would continue towards the S1uth West, but we 
turned to the South East around the Cerro Tomabus •• 
We took two nights to reach the Cerro ••• then, 
because of the ~ge number of people, we formed 
another column called Juan Alberto Blandon. We 
had carried with us the injured as well. We 
talked to the people, explaining the whole situation 
to them; no food, injured, old people, children, 
not enough arms, the danger of armed clashes. The 
injured were to remain in the Filemon Rivera's 
column and part of the people decided 0o return 
or stayed in nearby villages. The injured were 
shortly afterwards located in places for medical 
attention. We continued in el monte (the hills) 
all April and May, harrassing the guard in areas 
of Esteli and Jinotega. We received food from the 
peasants." 
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Don Guayo (4) described how: 
" •• after La retirada, very few people stayed 
in the city [about 350 families only], I did. 
There was not too much to do, we had had two 
experiences and knew how to behave before the 
enemy. Following the retreat each cuadra 
(block) spontaneously organised to sweep away 
the rubble and to generally clean up the 
streets. We knew how to organize ourselves, 
we knew hovv- to vmi t for the final battle." 
Don Juan (3) gave us a fuller picture of the difficulties 
faced by those who remained in the city: 
"In April, we did not expect the ;J.arrassment 
to last long •••• we were not fully prepared. 
Those were hard days, water ran out from the 
first day, then electricity and food began to 
be scarce. However, a number of people had 
foreseen the need to have emergency supplies 
of food and we all shared it." 
"Those who remained in the city had to work 
under extremely difficult conditions. Our 
work then consisted of collecting clandestine 
funds to send to los muchachos in the montanas 
through messengers. Just about 10% of the 
population stayed; the streets were lonely, 
dark and silent. However, we continued to do 
our best. We improved our knowledge of cland-
estine work and all those who stayed in the 
town cooperated indeed." 
"Between April and June, the houses of 
se~ridad were still functioning. These were 
to play an important role; los muchachos used 
to come, work on maps, teach us personal defence 
and plan the final war ••• By the end of May, 
more people had left the city, we were then 
just about 5%- On the 9th of June, los muchachos 
returned with more people to help build the . 
barricades. It was a feeling of emotion, of 
excitement, each one brought their own gun, 
20-30 •••• and our houses were left open to facili-
tate the passage of los muchachos through the 
so.lares and cuadras• 
"I had to leave the city because I had three 
sons and one is handicapped. All together, with 
my wife and niece, we left about 5.0 a.m. and 
took shelter in a nearby farm. 11 
"While staying in the farm, I used to often 
visit the city. I ·did not mind risking my life; 
I used to make cuajada. (cheese_,, prepare tortillas, 
elotes (corn cobs), hornados (bread), cigarretes 
and bring them to l()S rnuchacho$; many people did 
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the same. We spent all days like that, 
supporting the Frente, carrying messages, 
feeding them, up until the ~6th of July 
when the seizure of the comando took place. 
Orlando ( '1) formerly a tailor and no1v holding a high rank 
in the Army, explained: 
11 Esteli achieved its victory fighting 
together with its own people; each place, 
each town, each village recruited fighters 
and also sent men to serve in other fronts, 
such as the South Front, Benjamin Zeledon. 
Our front was the North Front, Carlos Fonseca 
Amador •••• The participation of women was 
fundamental. They played a central role 
indeed. Women were present both among the 
military columns as well as in the urban 
areas preparing and backing the insurrections. 
Several times women showed more courage than 
men combatants; women displayed valour in 
armed confrontation and were brave enough for 
any task and responsibility. The Frente 
assigned young women to right in the first 
lines just as any male combatant. Our shared 
experience when we lived in el monte, and our 
close collaboration here in the clty, was of 
great value; we learned a great deal from the 
character of women, and we discovered many 
aspects previously we had ignored ••• 
Maria Antonieta ('1'1) made some additional points about 
the insurrectional period: 
"After the September insurrection, many·people 
went underground and the structures of the 
Frente in the city weakened with their absence. 
Later on, however, when some companeros returned 
we began working hard again. It was lucky that 
many of the guards in Esteli were replaced by 
new ones who did not know our faces well; it 
was an advantage! 11 
11 During the insurrectlons, but overall in 
the first and second ones, we saw soldiers from 
Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and even from 
Vietnam. We could distinguish them by their 
way of talking and because they carried foreign 
cigarettes and had foreign currency. Repression 
was very hard that even young mothers decided to 
retire from the city and went to the monte. 
Many of them returned to the city later and 
helped with rebuilding the infraestructura 
(infrastructure) of the Frente. Nevertheless, 
after the April insurrection, women devoted 
themselves fully to the guerrilla struggle; 
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a lot of young couples became completely 
involved in the armed fight and some left 
their children under their parents' care." 
• 
"The commercial activities of the city 
were nearly paralysed after the September 
insurrection; a great deal of the merchants 
left Esteli, leaving only those with small 
shops and ~ulperias (very small corner shops 
and stalls~. The city looked lonely and 
quiet: we were practically in a state of 
siege. At the end of May, the South Front 
started fighting, followed by Leon, Matagalpa 
and Esteli. By the 9th of June, the date 
when the Frente commenced battle here once 
again, there was already a general strike 
throughout the whole country •••. In Esteli 
all the people fought. We were the most 
resistent city against the genocida action." 
Demoraliza~ion among the National Guard 
An agriculturist, Samuel (12) stressed the growing 
pessimism of the guard: 
"The guard was always afraid of us. They 
knew that the whole of Esteli was pro-Frente. 
They were forced to fight against us, they 
were(d3snoralizada) demoralized. During the 
September insurrection the guard had a shock 
when they saw the widespread support which the 
Frente had. They were surprised by how the 
whole city was participating in every task •• 
they felt alone." 
"One night, during the Operaci6n Limpieza 
of September, the guard came searching my 
house. I told them: come in, we are just an 
honest family cooking our beans: some of them 
were nervous, looking angry and aggressive. 
A guardia approached me and said to the others: 
leave them, I know this man •••• and went away. 
At that time I did not recognise that man. 
His face was swollen twice as normal. Never-
theless, a few days later I met him again in 
the road and he said: now, can you recognise 
me this time? and I said, yes, I think I have 
given you some raids ['rides' , a Nicaraguan 
expression for lifts] in my car before. 'Yes', 
the guardia said. 'But the other night when we 
came to your house you did not recognise me, 
did you not?' Well, actually I did not, I 
replied. 'You know', said the guard, 'we do 
not know what we eat or what we drink; who 
knows with what they - the guards' authorities -
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feed us that i:ve get swollen'. 11 
The ps~rchological pressure experienced by the guard was 
also referred to by Samuel ( 12~': 
"You know, the guards were always drunk and 
they used to tell people that their water 
bottles were filled of trago [alcohol], and 
they carried tranquillizers (calmantes,. 
If they refused to take these, then drugs 
were mixed in their food. That is why we 
think the guard felt discouraged: they also 
had to face the people's hatred for the 
dictatorship and the National Guard. Demoral-
ization among the guard was important for us 
[referring to the Frente]. we knew about 
their isolation and several times se rajaron 
[they backed down] •••• so' we took advantage 
of this factor." 
"One day, when I enrolled in the guerrilla 
army, I was sitting at the bottom of a hill 
waiting for another com~afiero who had gone 
to search the area near y, had my gun in my 
hands, when suddenly •••• about ten guard.s 
appeared coming towards me. I rapidly threv.J 
myself on the ground pointing my gun at them, 
ready to fire. Do you know what happened •.•• 
los hijue de putas [the sons of bitches] came 
walking in front of me and passed by quietly; 
they carried their guns in their left hands 
without any intention of fighting ••. se hicieron 
los l0cos [i.e. appearing stupid]. They perhaps 
thought we were hundredssurrounding them and 
with their attitude of doing nothing were saying: 
let us go, we do not wish to fight." 
"During the final insurrection the guard 
was obviously demoralized. They had seen that 
in Esteli they had no support at all and thus 
on many occasions they ran away when seeing 
the muchachos wearing the roji-negra handke~­
chieves." 
Manuel explained the contribution of children to the 
demoralizati_on of the guard: 
"
1rhe psychological factor was very important 
in our victory. we knew the guard feared ur:.; 
and we had to increase such fear in order to 
break them. For instance, during the uprising 
los chavalos [schoolchildren] used to burn 
triguitracas [home-made rockets] in front of 
amplifiers so as to scare the guard. Of course 
at the beginning such a noise would frighten 
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everyone, but soon we learnt that it was to 
frigh·t;en the enemy. l'Iany times, the guard 
ran away when they heard the sound." 
Cbmments 
The uprisings in Esteli were the outcome of a generalized 
growing dissatisfaction deriving from both local and extra,.. 
local events. As we observed earlier, local happenings such 
as the assassination of a boy (Wilfreda Valenzuela) and the 
continual arrests and killings of individuals from different 
social groups (e.g. Vladimir Hidalgo from the working class 
and the daughter and son of Don Felipe (27)) increased common 
understanding between the different social strata. These 
local occurrences, combined with national developments, such 
as the assassination at the beginning of ~978 of Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro, a known members of the Conservative Party, who came 
from a wealthy family. This had the effect of bringing to-
gether for reasons of security groups that might otherwise 
have been opposed. 
Another important factor was the failure of the attempts 
made by groups of the bourgeoisie opposed to the regime to 
negotiate a peaceful and stable solution. The result of their 
efforts was always a harshening of repressive measures, lead-
ing to the development of a broad coalition between the various 
social groups, bringing together both the more conservative 
and radical elements. 
The uprisings intensified the existing interaction between 
and among social groups giving individuals new perspectiveD on 
their life situation. For example (as Don Juan, Alberto and 
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Pepe emphasized> rural and urban elements became more 
closer integrated in the effort to support the guerrilla 
army. There was an interchange of experiences between 
peasants and urban dwellers giving a broader understanding 
of each others social reality. The same was true of the 
relationship between men apd women, between Christians and 
non-Christians, and bet\veen the better-off and lower 
income social categories. 
The liberation war also introduced new forms of 
expression reflected in use of a new vocabulary of an 
explicit military and political character. For example, we 
find t~at most people were familiar with the names of 
weaponry (e.g. fales, Shermans, bomba de contacto) and a 
specialized set of terms was developed associated with various 
activities entailed by the military and political struggle 
(e.g. casa de seguridad, buzones, infraestructura poll.tica, 
frente de combate). They also acquired a more elaborated 
political vocabulary when describingthe existing social 
order and conditions and when characterising the types of 
social change they were fighting. Fr:>r example, the terms 
compafiero and her~ became generalized to all those support-
ing the struggle and those against were classified as £Q~­
revolucionario or somocista. They also emphasized the anti-
imperialista nature of the war and distinguished between ~ 
burguesia s~mocista and la bure;uesia de oposicion or burguesl.a 
criolla that had accepted the neces.c:i ty of some change in 
Nicaraguan society, getting rid of the Somoza ruling group 
but not (except for a few exceptions) participating directly 
in the· struggle. It is important to r:>tre[::r::; that this vocabu-
iiO 
lary emerged out of direct personal experience and by :means 
of the conscientization process conducted by the political 
cadres that spread the liberation ideology among the organized 
sectors (i.e. trade unions, student and women organizations 
and the CDCs). 
The changes experienced by individuals and groups 
during the liberation period laid the foundations for the 
process of social adaptation in the post-liberation situation. 
As I have tried to show, these changes were both behavioural 
and ideological. The next chapter focuses on the social and 
economic problems of the post-liberation phase, describing 
the various f)rrns of social and political participation that 
developed. 
Chapter IV 
Participation of the People of Esteli in the 
Process of Social Reconstruction 
Nicaragua after the Sandini sta I'ri umph 
This chapter provides an account of the main events 1vhich 
followed Somoza's departure from Nicaragua, stressing the part-
icular efforts and changes carried out by the new government, 
commonly called the JGRN - Junta de Gobierno de Reconstruccion 
Hacional. The new government is attempting to build a new 
society with new perspectives while still struggling against 
economic dependence and political forces adverse to the anti-
imperialist, anti-capitalist and popular ideology of the FSLN. 
The main aim of the chapter, then, is to analyse the economic 
and political implications of the Sandinista government after 
little more than a year in power. I will also discuss the role 
played by mass organizations in Esteli in rebuilding the city. 
Reconstructing the Nation and the city, much of which was 
in ruins, constitutes a hard and long-term task that needs 
each individual's understa:}ding of the manifold social and 
physical problems and his or her active participation in all 
aspects of the reconstruction. In continuing the methodology 
used for an inside view of Esteli, I make use of people's 
perception2 of their town's condition and their expectations 
of life now, under different demands, which are in no way 
easier than previously. The situation represented a new set 
of difficulties and the number of variables entering into play 
were numerous and varied. At the time of fieldwork, the people 
of Esteli showed a particular grasp of the country's actual 
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conditions as well as the problems faced by their city. 
Individuals still had to confront urgent local economic 
problems which affected popular participation and required 
considerable assistance fr~m the central government. 
1. General background of the country after the Liberation War 
nn the '19th of July, the FSLH troops assembled in Hanagua, 
welcomed by all the Nicaraguan people; everybody was joyful, 
shouting slogans of victory, raising up roji-negra flags; 
friends and parents looked for their companeros and sons among 
the crowds, and thousands of groups gathered to celebrate their 
happiness with so-qssof triumph. The anthem of the FSLN could 
be loudly heard and an ambience of freedom was in the air. 
Nonetheless, amid the general celebrations, people in 
Managua, Esteli and the other libera~ed cities were also con-
cerned with where and how to start picking up all the threads 
to take the country forward. A new challenge had been imposed 
on the new leaders and on the suffering yet victorious people: 
to reconstruct their society in the face of deep structural 
hindrances and newly derived political and economic contradic-
tions resulting from recent developments. 
The new JGRliJ 
The new Junta had to face the problems presented by a 
devastated country and an economy left in total bankruptcy. 
The JGRN had been formed weeks before the July triumph, by the 
need to represent the broad mass of people who had rebelled 
against the dictatorial regime. The new JGill~ was composed of 
elements representing the diverse sectors who participated in 
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overthrowing Somoza's regime and, despite the FSllJ's role 
in directing the liberation movement, they recognised the 
participation of members of the anti-somocista bourgeoisie 
and gave them a place within the new administration. The 
Junta was made up of two Sandinista professionals, a member 
of the National Directorate of the FSLH, and t1vo figures 
from the bourgeoisie, Violeta v. de Chamorro and Alfonso 
Robelo, both known for their political roles in the PCD and 
l"JDN respectively. These last two persons resigned their 
offices between r1arch and April of '1980 and were replaced by 
other leading professionals from among the bourgeoisie. The 
resignations, however, particularly that of the industrialist, 
Alfonso Robelo, were due to their incompatibility with the 
Sandinista members who maintained a revolutionary position 
centered on promoting socialist policies, and Robelo' s rigid 
position which represented the most conservative view of the 
dominant economic groups of the country. 
Private enterprise centred around COSEP (Consejo Superior 
de la Empresa Privada) and the most conservative factions felt 
their economic interests were being undermined and complained 
that they had been relegated to second place for political 
reasons. They wanted higher economic assistance and the 
preferential support of State policies in aiding small producers, 
small entrepreneurs and the working class population in general. 
IIowever, the FSLN maintained its representation in the JGRN and, 
together with organizations like the PSN, PLI and Christian 
organizations, had managed by December '1979 to set up institu-
tions to further the interests of the poorer sectors: hence 
Ninistries of S0cial Welfare, Agrarian Reform, Planning and 
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Education were established. 
During the first year, the JGRN carried out important 
I 
changes at all levels of the State institutions, passed 
important decrees concerning National property, made revisions 
of the tax system, elaborated an agrarian reform policy, 
nationalized the financial system and enacted a series of 
regulations pr,ducing substantial m0difications in the social 
relations of producti0n in the country. As most of the 
changes were intended to relieve exploitation and to benefit 
the masses, it is not surprising that many groups from private 
enterprises were discontented and gradually organized a series 
of actions to hinder State operations which, according to the 
bourgeoisie, affected their accustomed profits. 
The inherited economic bankru21£l 
When the new JGillf took office, the country faced major 
economic problems due to the accumulation of external debts 
contracted by Somoza which had gone to increase his ovm fortune 
and favour his private business as well as to enrich relatives 
and friends. The burden of external debt left by Somoza had 
been made heavier by a series of international loans received 
in the final years of his regime in order to purchase weapons 
for fighting the revolutionaries. By the middle of 1979, the 
external debt had reached US$ 1,530 million (see Datos Basicos 
Sobre Nicaragua, 1980 : 30: and represented much more than the 
annual FIB of the country for 1979, which was only US $ 1 ,299 
million (see Ibid. : 13). In addition, there were US $ 700 
million owing in interests and expiring credits 1-vhich were 
scheduled for repayment at the end of 1979 (see Gilly, A., 1979). 
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This also represented much more than the total amount of foreign 
currency received from the cnuntry's export products for ~979 
which amounted to US S 598 million (Datos Basicos, ~980 : 27~. 
To the external debt one must add all the financial aid 
the country now needed for reconstruction and to start running 
enterprises destroyed or partially destroyed by the vJar. The 
country's capacity for production in the field of industry and 
agriculture decreased catastrophically for the year ~979. 
According to the report on Nicaragua by the United lJations 
Economic Commission for Latin America, production levels had 
fallen to those of ~962 (see Black, G., ~981 : 200) and the 
flight of capital before the victory had also been large. When 
the JGRN started work it founc_ just US S 3· 5 million in the 
country's reserves, Somoza having sacked all he could before 
his departure. Thus, faced with this scene, the government, 
together with the National Directorate of the FSLN agreed to 
set up an Economic Programme of Reactivation, whose purpose was 
to reactivate the existing productive enterprises in parallel 
to preparing the grounds for a future transformation in the 
economic system. This programme proposed a progressive economic 
recovery that hoped to reach in ~980 the production levels of 
~ 978, and in ~ 9'8~ the levels of 1977, as this was considered 
aE3 a "normal" year (see Programa de Reacti vacion Economica 
~ 980 : 17). 
Reaccomodation of the political forces 
The composition of the JGRN was a reflection of the 
economic and political reality of the country, firstly because 
the presence of bourgeois elements in it was a recognition of 
their participation during the anti-dictatorial movement, and 
secondly because, despite nationalization of some enterprises 
and the confiscation of Somoza's properties, the bolrrgeoisie 
still controlled important sectors of the economy and because 
of this had certain political influence especially among the 
petty bourgeois groups who in their turn still heavily con-
trolled the country's commercial and supply network. Private 
enterprise also dominated the main means of communication 
(e.g. press and broadcasting). Thus, the bourgeois groups 
and private entrepreneurial sector could to some extent 
exercise influence among the middle class population, providing 
one of the existing contradictions in the political framework 
where political hegemoney was headed by an anti-imperialist, 
anti-capitalist and popular organization. 
Although the FSLN represe~~ted the major political force 
and its positions were the most influential of the State 
apparatus, the State's economic capacity was not yet able to 
control the main productive sectors on which the country's 
economy was based, i.e. agro-export production. AccorQLng to 
a report of one of the Junta's members, Sergio Ramirez to the 
CEPAL in October 1979, approximately 55% of the arable land 
had come under State control; however, with regard to produc-
tion, the State only controlled 15% of coffee cultivation, ~3-3% 
of cotton, 300;0 of sugar cane production and 12% of cattle 
raising (Dat_£~~sicos, '1980 : 23), which meant that most of 
the main agricultural export capacity was still in private 
hands. Moreover, the new State-owned resources ~·Jere in worse 
shape than those of the bourgeoisie, given that Somoza's firms 
had been run by a highly corrupt administration. IJ:'hus, although 
politically the private businer3s group was not dominant, 
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economically it had started in better condition than the 
State, and had taken advantage of this situation to acquire 
some political influence. ~:)J the time of fieldwork, the 
bourgeoisie and non-Sandinista private enterprise had COSEP 
as their representative in the State's Council, La Prensa 
as their main written means of communication, had some private 
broadcasting and had Alfonso Robelo, one of the most dynamic 
'right-wing' leaders, as their spokesman. 
The composition of the Council had been outlined in June 
~979 when the JGID~ was formed and originally included the 
participation of 23 organizations: FSLN; National Patriotic 
Front - FPN - which was made up of MPU, PLI, Los '12, PPSC, 
CTN, FO and the Union of Radio Journalists; the Broad Opposi-
tion Front - FAO - which was formed by the PCD, PSC, MDH, 
l'1LC, PSN, the trade unions CGT(i) and CUS; the COSEP composed 
of INDE, CADIH, UPANIC, CONAPRO and the Chamber of Construc-
tion; the National Autonomous University - UHAH - and the 
National Association of Clergy - AITCLEH (see Black, G., ~ 98"1 
245). 
However, at that time, none of the base organizations had 
representation in the new-born Council, in spite of their 
important participation during the uprising. This led to its 
restructuring at the end of '1979 for they could not be left 
aside, being of fundamental importance to the country in the 
reconstruction phase. While the Council was in the process of 
restructuring, the FSLFf, together with Sandinista organizations, 
dedicated themselves to an intensive reorganization of grass-
roots organization, taking as a point of departure the already-
formed base groups which had contributed F:o effectively to the 
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liberation movement: the CDCs, AMPROlTAC, A'rC and the COR. 
Eventually, the Co~ncil of State achieved its formal con-
stitution on the 4th of May '1980, ~,vi th the participation of 
the former organizations and broadened by mass organizations, 
other trade unions, an ethnic organization of the Atlantic 
Coast and the new Sandinista Armed Forces, making up around 
53 seats which represented all the diverse graups. The Council' f.J 
composition reflected the combination of forces of the country 
which included: 
~. The Sandinista organizations: the FSLN, CDS (previously 
the CDCs), ATC, the Sandinista Workers' Federation- CST-
AI'JNLAE (previously AI'TI?RONAC >, the Sandini sta Youth - JS - the 
Armed Forces - EPS -, the Revolutionary Patriotic Front - FPR -
(previously the FPN) which in turn was comprised of the alliance 
of the PLI, PSN and PPSC. This block accounted for 27 represent-
atives. 
2. The anti-FSllJ block: consisting of private enterprise, 
COSEP which was composed of the INDE, CADIN, CCC, CHA1'1BER OF 
CONSTRUCTION, UPANIC and CONAPRO. To this block were allied 
the right-wing political parties and some right-wing oriented 
trade unions: the PCD, PSC, MDN and the CTN and CUS, account-
ing for a further '17 seats. 
3. The Bloc of the Independent Organizations: represented by 
organizations which had given support to the FSLH during the 
insurrection and which continued to back the revolutionary 
process, such as the CGT(i), CAUS (Communist Union), the 
National Journalists' Union- tiPl'T -, the Health v!orkers' Fed-
eration - FErl'SALUD - , the Teachers' Union - AlTDEH -, T1ISUHASNrA 
(comprising the Sumos, Ramas and lliskitos ethnic groups of the 
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Atlantic Coast), the National Association of Clergy -
ANCLEN and the Higher Education Cmmcil - CNES -, in all 
making up nine representatives of the Council (see Black, G., 
'1981 : 246). 
The present Council of State clearly shov;rs the character 
of the revolutionary process; never before had the people 
been given the opportunity t') participate in the country's 
decision-making, as well as to express their ideas and to 
criticize constructively national policies. "The Council of 
State is the most concrete way to demonstrate the democratic 
vocation, the participative essence of this process", said 
Sergio Ramirez at the installation of the Council (Mensaje 
de la JGRN, '1980 : 8), .and actually this event was interpreted 
by the bulk of the population as a major achievement. 
Formally, therefore, at the political level, the broad 
mass of the people had achieved a considerable degree of partici-
pation in government. This was an issue which worried some 
sectors of the bourgeoisie who found their influence affected. 
In consequence, the most reactionary groups of private enter-
prise started a campaign directed at creating confusion based 
on speculation of consumer goods, propagating fear about the 
"ghost of communism", making malicious criticisms and attacks 
on the mistakes made by the Sandinistas owing to their in-
experience, distributing propaganda against Sandinista organ-
izations and so on, with the ultimate intention of provoking 
political destabilization, while the government was fighting 
to create conditions that would favour increases in production. 
Politically, the bourgeoisie and private entrepreneurs were 
aware of their limitations: class consciousness had been 
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increased among the exploited and these p.Jorer groups 
would protect their own interest when threatened. 
Mass organizations 
The establishment of a Council of State 1vi th the parti ci-
pation of different sectors of the people meant a victory for 
them, and a set-back for the bourgeoisie; the working class, 
the peasantry, women and youth were represented through their 
respective organizations: CST, ATC, Al'1NLAE and the JS, but 
overall by the CDS which, although they were not directly 
linked to specific areas of production, embraced practically 
all the organized population. Due to their broad character, 
the CDSs have been increasingly used to defend and control 
threats to the revolution, for they are found at every corner 
of the cities, t0wns, villages and coun~ryside. The CDSs 
were considered as key organizations in executing government 
policies, in increasing participation to achiev~ better out-
comes, as well as pursuing a role of unmasking counter-revolu-
tionary forces which could endanger the gains already made by 
the present government and the FSLI:T. 
The importance of mass organizations in the revolutionary 
process is fundamentai, not only because they allow the people 
to exercise power at the level of decision-making, but also in 
their capacity to implement such decisions •. In practice, mass 
organizations act like a motor generating energy and developing 
individuals' faculties for carrying out political and economic 
tasks. l"'oreover, these groups contribute to the promotion of 
and participation in the Popular Militias - l"IPS - another form 
of preparing them against enemy threats and for popular defence. 
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Because of all this, the reactionary groups of the bourgeoisie 
have centered their propaganda :Jn discrediting such organiza-
tions, particularly the CDSs, which have proved so efficient 
in pointing out and denouncing the tricks private enterprise 
has used in order to further their ovm ends (eo g. the artifi-
cial scarcity of basic goods resulting from merchants having 
monopoly and storing them). 
Mass organizations, however, have undergone a process of 
restructuring. Their origin and functioning before the 
Sandinista triumph was quite different from what it is now. 
'rhere were difficulties in delineating each organization's 
role, especially that of the CDSsn Being the broadest based, 
they sometimes overlapped with others more specifically 
related to production centres, sex or age, but they seem 
gradually to have overcome these problems and have consolidated 
their importance, as will be seen later on in the case of 
Est eli. 
Another characteristic of mass organizations is their 
capacity to mobilize the population in an ordered way, as was 
seen during the First National Anniversary meeting in JI'Ianagua 
and the mobilization required by the Nadonal Literacy Crusade 
to educate and train people for collective responsibilities 
given the hard conditions of t~e country. rrhe FSLIT National 
Directorate aims, through mass organizations, to enable people 
to make popular power a fact, and to achieve the transformation 
of the State, intermediary bodies and production centres them-
selves. Mass organizations have, then, the role to defend the 
revolutionary process politically, militarily and economically. 
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On the other hand, though Sand~nista mass organization 
nowadays embraces the largest part of the population, top 
leaders recognise the existence of internal limitations 
which create difficulties in accomplishing the demanding 
tasks of the revolution. There are, for instance, limitation2 
corresponding to t~e level of the organizations' development. 
Not all have the same level of experience. Some organizations 
emerged and their cadres were trained before and during the 
insurrec0ional period, but it must be remembered that others 
are totally new and/or have been transformed from tiny cells -
which had worked clandestinely and in response to different 
views - to mass organizations acting openly and on a new basis. 
It was after the Liberation that organizations were able to 
come together, aspiring to become the real vehicles for popular 
expression at a national level, as well as to represent the 
interests of specific social sectors (see Nunez, C., 1980~. 
Among other hindrances mass organizations have to face 
are the lack of humand and material resources at their disposal. 
Sandinista organizations have grown remarkably since the 
Triumph and there are neither enough cadres to organize 
effectively the population involved, nor sufficient resources 
to cover material needs which could realise people's political 
aspirations. Moreover, the country's poor social and economic 
circumstances have set constraints on organizations that are 
trying to hasten the satisfaction of popular aspirations. This 
has led to some conflicts between more politicized and less 
politicized members of the organizations. Nevertheless, limita-
tions have, in turn, led to the need to work out new strategies 
and to convert mistakes due to experience, into useful lessons 
for making progress amid a complex reality. 
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Thus, the FSLN has focused intensively on preparing 
political cadres at all levels of mass organizations for 
confronting the actions of the bourgeoisie and petty bour-
geoisie,·aimed at destabilizing the country economically and 
politically. The FSLN National Directorate is well a1vare of 
the people's lack of technical knowledge and educational 
levels for directing the country's development. Big efforts 
have therefore been made to transform and improve the quality 
of mass organizations in order to guarantee the successful 
course of the revolution (see Arce, B., 1980)~ 
USA's policy towards Nicaragua and the bourgeoisie 
It is worthwhile to mention that since the triumph of the 
San§Anistas, revolutionary left-wing movements in the Central 
American region have encouraged and have increased their actions 
to the extent of converting the isthmus into an arena of 
political struggle which worries the White House. The north 
Americans fear that countries which traditionally have been 
dominated and influenced by them may move towards other political 
ideologies, thereby threatening their economic and political 
interests. Their flexibility towards the international aid 
of the Nicaraguan Junta and the friendly relationship of the 
FSLN with socialist countries are seen by the State Department ar:; 
contributing to the expansion of anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist thinking over the Central American zone, especially 
in El Salvador and Guatemala whose revolutionary guerrillas are 
making gains and strengthening their popular support. In con-
sequence, the North Americans have followed a policy aimed at 
isolating Nicaragua, putting pressure upon the international 
press to underplay the achievements of the revolution, as vJell 
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as obstructing economic aid. Furthermore, the USA have 
adopted a strategy of bringing together the extreme right-
wing military forces of the area (e.g. Honduras, Guatemala 
and El Salvador) to threaten armed intervention in lTicaragua 
using the pretext of protecting the region against "communism" & 
Apart from the economic and political pressure, the 
continual accusation of the Reagan administration that Cuba 
and Nicaragua are supporting the Marxist guerrillas has 
eroded diplomatic relationships within the Nicaraguan JGRN 
and reinforced the USA's links with the bourgeoisie, who in 
turn, have also launched a propaganda campaign against the 
presence of Cuban teachers and techn~_cians, attributing to 
them false charges intended to create distrust among the popula-
tion: "the Cubans are taking our children out for brain wash-
ing". The reactionary positions of the North Americans and of 
the bourgeoisie have converged_ to stimulate ex-Somocista 
guards to make armed incursions along the borders between 
Nicaragua and Honduras. They count on the support of the 
right-wing military forces of the surrounding countries, and 
at the same time they are financing anti-Sandinista armed 
gangs to carry out actions to infuse terror in the countryside. 
The incapacity of the North Americans and the pro-imperial-
ist bourgeoisie to influence to their satisfaction the decision-
making of the JGRN; the::i_r incapacity to diminish sympathy among 
the Central American peoples for the FSLH; the fear by the 
dominant economic groups of losing their economic interests, 
and their ambition to recover political hegemoney in Nicaragua; 
and the USA's concern for losing control over the isthmus, have 
led them to a closer alliance in an attempt to bring about 
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political and economic destabilization of the Revolution. 
At present, both National bourge')isie and USA are aware of 
their own economic strength and the country's need for a 
"mixed economy"; and it is therefore in this area that they 
have placed their efforts to undermine the FSLl:T' s dominant 
influence. 1'1oreover, though the FSLN successfully destroyed 
the Somocista military which served to enforce reactionary 
interests, the Sandinistas and the FSLN leaders are mindful 
of the seriousness of the current strife, not only in defend-
ing the Revolution but also for the limitations this sets on 
socio-economic progress. 
Esteli in the Reconstruction Process 
In this section a general view is presented of how the 
city of Esteli was left after the Liberation War, so one can 
better grasp the urgent need of the population to focus on re-
construction. Reconstruction meant more than restoring build-
ings: the high level of destruction reduced to rubble many 
centres of work affecting sharply the local economy at all 
levels. It has been estimated that it will take several years 
to recover the levels of ec0nomic activity, as losses were so 
high. 
During my stay in Esteli, though a lot had been done to 
restore the city, the scars of war were still very much in 
evidence: large empty spaces, former buildings in ruins, 
numerous dwellings with signs of tank shots, traces of fire, 
damaged roofs, windows and doors which had not yet been repaired. 
The damage could also be estimated through observing the nevv 
patches on walls and visible parts of buildings, besides the 
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lack of furniture and the state of the interiors of houses 
(see map III). Physically, there was no doubt about the scale 
of the destruction. The scope of the effects left by such 
destruction were even more overwhelming when the ta2k of re-
construction was set in the light of the country's and 
Esteli's economic bankruptcy. 
In addition, there were the political commitments of the 
Revolution which the people of Esteli were keen to accomplish 
not only because of their extraordinary participation during 
the uprisings but because of their known Sandini sta militancy. 
Their political path will be elucidated later by illustrations 
of popular participation in local events, whether as part of 
national projects or locally organized ones. 
One of the purposes of this section is to expose the 
evolving process of reconstruction embedded in a revolutionary 
framework with its political and economic implications. I 
have chosen mass organizations to illustrate how people partici-
pate in the rebuilding of their town and of their.country, high-
lighting the role and significance of the CDS. 
2. Genera~ backgroun~ of Esteli after the Liberation War 
By the afternoon of the ~6th of July '1979, people.living 
near to Esteli gathered in the city to cheer the Sandinista 
combatants, to learn the whereabouts 6f their sons and friends, 
and to await anxiously for news of Somoza 1s flight, and to see 
what was left of their houses and belongings. The liberation 
of towns, cities and of the country frof!l one of the most cruel 
dictatorshipfJ in Latin America provoked a mixture of feelings. 
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.Map III : Areas ":d Devastati')n _during the 
Liberation W~r. A979. 
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They had achieved freedom but also accepted the challenge of 
constructing the foundations of a new society under calamitous 
economic circumstances and complex political conditions. 
"All kinds of thoughts and questions came to our mind", 
expressed various inhabitants of Est eli. "We wondered about 
the countless things we had to do, to run our country, to run 
our city ••••• ". r-Io st of the persons of Est eli remembered the 
happiness of knowing their city was liberated but also felt 
discouraged when they went strolling among the ruined streets. 
Immediately after the news that Esteli had been libsrated, 
those who had returned began clearing up all the waste spread 
in every corner. Some did not know the significance of material 
destruction but progressively each one came to know its full 
implications. 
Deep cracks in the econo~y of Esteli 
The damage caused to the commercial, agro-industrial and 
manufacturing sectors brought a complete break-down in the 
economy of the city. Commerce, for instance, had not returned 
to its normal pace of workweeks later, for it was decapitalized 
' 
and many buildings could not offer the conditions necessary for 
proper functioning, and as a consequence, unemployment was crea-
ted. The largest shops and enterprises had been the rna st 
affected and were the firms which had provided the most employ-
ment. 
The tobacco industry which constituted a very important 
source of hired labour,.had als0 been decapitalizec1 by the former 
Somocista owners when in their flight from ~9?8-on had. carried 
all the raw materials and machinery with them. rJ:'hi s added to 
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the damage of physical structures and the destruction of the 
factories. Frrnn four enterprises which were the most produc-
tive, only tw) were left: Hicaragua-Cigars and Cuba-!:hca. 
'rhe first was almost totally destroyed and belonged jointly 
to Somoza and to the Cubans (anti-castristas'. It passed to 
State care at the Liberation. It had always been the largest 
firm producing cigars and tobacco leaves (raw material. for 
export. Cuba-Nica had always been and still was in private 
hands, embracing cultivation, the curing process and the 
making of cigars for export, though it did not export tobacco 
leaves. The production of Nicaragua Cigars used to be in the 
region of 10 million cigars and Cuba-Hica up to five million 
units annually, but after the war, their production decreased 
considerably. The other two firms: Victor Tabaco S.A. and 
Garlido Cigars functioned until September 1978 and were then 
de~troyed. The same thing happened to the Robacasa firm, 
which though it processed tobacco did not manufacture cigars. 
An informant working in Nicaragua Cigars (19~ said that 
in normal times, the enterprise used to produce approximately 
40,000 cigars daily; 0ne year later, h0wever, they were still 
producing only 26,000 (in 1980) due to lack of machinery and 
raw material. Similarly, the manager of Cuba-Hica said that 
before the war, the firm could produce up to 22,000-25,000 
units daily and despite the fact that the buildings had no 
major damage, afterwards they were still producing just '15,000. 
The absence of tobacco cultivation and collection in 1978-79, 
plus the inadequate conditions for the process of curing, 
resulted in the low production of cigars, which in turn affected 
the country's economy as tobacco ranked seventh or eighth place 
130 
among the major products for export. I'breover, both 
informants agreed that Esteli was the major tobacco producer, 
the only place which pr0duced cigars for export and had the 
most skilled w0rkers in the manufacturing of the product. 
With regard to unemployment, in the major agro-industrial 
and manufacturing enterprises, besides the two tobacco firms 
mentioned, there was one furniture making and one garment-
making workshops which together used to employ ~10 people. 
However, these were destroyed and their workers were .left with-
out jobs. The possibilities for getting underway at the end 
of 1979 were remote as most of the necessary equipment needed 
to be imported and there were no resources to acquire it in a 
short time. It was estimated in September 1979, that of the 
695 employed formerly in the tobacco, furniture anc1 garment 
firms, only 277 had a job. What is more, it was calculated 
that in the construction and crafts field, the number of un-
employed was approximately 438, being further evidence of the 
acute state in which the local economy was left (see table I 
Appendix III). 
Another index of Esteli's economic collapse can be seen 
by looking at the Town Council's monthly income, which before 
the war, in September 1978, was between 0 220-250 thousand 
I 
cordobas. By August and September 1979 it was only 0 32,600 
cordobas, having as a result, a large deficit. It was unaple 
tO' afford the urgent investments needed t·? ensure its normal 
functioning. The building had been burnt and all the files, 
furniture, etc. had gone (see I''IUNAH, 1979. : 5;. 
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Concerning the commercial sect0r, data show that there 
were 4"1'1 establishments, of which 64 were classified as big 
businesses and 347 as middle and minor ones. By September/ 
October '1979, just '12 of the first group were functioning, 
but at under 50%, and only 8'1 of the second group, i.e. 1 C)~,~ 
and 23% respectively (see table II, Appendi.x III and riTl.TV AH, 
'1979 : 34). According to the data, 98 shops located in the 
centre and surrounding areas had been affected and their 
losses (embracing construction, cash, furniture, goods) reached 
0 51.2 million cbrdobas (US$ 5.1 million; (see table III, 
Appendix III). 
Also within the tertiary sector services such as hotels, 
restaurants, cafeterias, etc. were badly affected. Comparing 
the number of businesses that existed before to those that 
rernai ned after the war at the end of ~ 9?9, there were just 15 
as against 94, a difference 0f 79. The hardest hit were garages, 
barbershops and body repair workshops (see table IV, Appendix III). 
It is worth adding that the market for the commercial 
sector contracted seriously with the loss of purchasing power 
among the population which of course affected the demand for 
manufactured goods and transport. The conditions for an economic 
recovery in the tertiary sector seemed slow to emerge. Even 
after more than a year, at the end of 1980 - beginning of '1981, 
an informant of the Chamber of Commerc.e admitted that all 
services remained at 30-5~~ of their former capacity. For 
example, there were the same number of ironmong~rs (7) as 
before, but they were not providing good,s ·of the same range 
or quantity. There had been ~3 chemists, but by '198'1 there 
were 5; of 6 electrical appliance shops, only 3 remained, but 
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at a very low capacity; there were 3 restaurants, out of 10; 
hotels with restaurants had been 6 and of these just 1 was 
providing a full service. The slow pace of recovery vvas due 
to several factors, one of the most important being the general 
economic situation of the country. With the new programme for 
economic reactivation launched by the ~overnment, the available 
resources had to be centered in prr1ducti ve fields like agri-
culture and industry and though it contemplated financial aid 
for the tertiary sector, this was to be restricted with control 
on the imports of non-basic or superfluous commodities. 
Restrictions on imports and the State's call for economic 
austerity and investment in the more important productive areas 
were not welcomed by the merchants of Esteli. This represented 
one of their main conflicts with the government. The policy 
of price control on basic consumption goods like eggs, cheese, 
cream, meat and staple grains, also gave dissatisfaction to 
many merchants who previously could determine their own selling 
prices. They therefore shr)wed reluctance to invest in their 
shops. Also the State had established State shops (Expendios 
Nacionales de Abastecimiento - ENABAS) which were considered 
as rival enterprises, not only because they served as price 
regulating institutions but also because they were spread 
throughout the city and countryside t) prevent the merchants 
exploiting the population settled in distant areas. Therefore, 
private enterprise in the commercial sector regarded the State 
as competition which constrained them by keeping down prices 
for the benefit of the population (at least with respect to 
daily consumption goods). 
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Concerning the housing affected by the war, although 
all the barrios of the city were harmed, the central ones 
were the most damaged. Counting only the houses with signifi-
cant damage, the total number of damaged dwellings in the 
city reached 547, of which 239 were completely destroyed, '18"1 
E-~uffered major damage and '127 had minor damage (see l'·:::C:\TA:i-1, 
1979 : 43). The problem of housing becomes sharper ~ilien one 
adds the deficit that existed before the war, 1.-rhich according 
to the CDS amounted to some 769 houses (see table V, Appendix 
III). Adding the previous deficit to the destroyed houses 
during '1979, i.e. 239, the deficit amounted to ": ,008 houses. 
The educational,bealth and public services also suffered. 
Of the 14 educational centres most were seriously damaged in 
their physical structure and in their c0ntents, such as 
libraries, workshops, laboratories. The economic losses for 
the ten State schools were estimated at 0 '10.5 million c6rdobas 
(see MINVAH, '1979 : 50). The health system was affected by the 
almost total destruction of the city's· National Hospital, which 
was reduced from a capacity of '1'10 beds to 30 within a period 
of three months. Apart from this the local Health Centre was 
totally destroyed. The local authorities were forced to use a 
private clinic that had minor damage and which had to receive 
three times its former number of patients, i.e. from ten beds 
to thirty. 
Many buildings providing public services were burnt or 
destroyed; among them were the Fire Brigade 1 s headquarters, 
the army's headquarters, the Sncial Club and the '-f_lnvm Hall 
building. Within the latter was situated the officer; of Hent 
Administrati.Jn, Civil Registrati0n, the Post, Water, Tribunal 
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and so on. All of them lost their files. 
To ennumerate the range and the extent of damage in Esteli 
would take too long to elaborate here. However, different 
sources agree that Esteli was the most destrqyed and affected 
city of the country and that its losses are difficult to measure. 
Despite all the efforts to increase tobacco production, give 
more aid to construction, assist with more finance for commer-
cial activity, and fill the gaps for basic services, much more 
emphasis will be· required if the economy is to generate suffici-
ent employment and contribute more effectively to meet the 
country 1 s present-day economic and social needs. 
Reactivating the economy and increasing production 
The programme of economic reactivation was particularly 
important for the rural areas due to the production losses 
suffered because of the war. In the countryside of Esteli, 
the State came to administer some 50,065.~5 manzanas, known as 
APP (Area de Propiedad de Pueblo) and were organized into units 
of production (UPES) focused mainly on coffee, cattle, staple 
grains and tobacco. The;J J?resent State agricultural lands con-
stitute approximately '16% of the total area' the largest part 
remaining in the hands of small and middle size producers and 
another por\tion being controlled by larger landlords. 
The government institutions (e.g. Pro-campo) centered on 
providing technical aid and·financial facilities for small .and 
. middle producers, and although there wei'e some .fB,ilures in 
. raising production, the rural popu~ation became aware of the 
. . . ~ 
State 1 s efforts to support their. demands. During '19E39 for 
e:xa.mple, the harvest of beans ·(which is .tQ.e most impqrt;apt o,f 
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the staple crops) was nearly lost due to heavy rains and a 
plague of slugs. However, the State provided credit and aug-
mented its technical assistance for raising production for 
the following farming year. This matter was very important 
as the Department of Esteli is one of the largest producer 
of beans and grains. 
The economic reactivation in the countryside had conse-
quences for stimulating other economic activities located in 
the city, as was the case with the tobacco industry. Apart 
from restoring tobacco enterprises by repairing the buildings, 
Nicaragua Cigars (State property~ were expected.to raise the 
manufacture of cigars to about 60,000 units daily and the 
export of tobacco leaves to more than 20,000 guintales 
('1 quintal= '100lbs. Moreover, it was hoped that availability 
of jobs could be doubled from 300 to 600 in the field of cigar 
production as well as increasing the number of jobs in the 
cultivation of tobacco. By the end of '1.980, it was .estimated 
that 4,600 per.sons (which is about the. number employed in the 
mid--1970's) were involved in the agricultural and industrial 
activities of this product in the Department, offering permanent 
work to those labourers who had worked only seasonally, by 
extending the area of cultivation and cropping twice instead 
of once a yc;ar (information supplied by a manager of the enter-
prise). The private tobacco enterprise, Cuba-Nica, adopted the 
same strategy: to increase production of cigars by extending 
the area of tobacco cultivation. 
It is interesting to see that witp. the Revolution new forms 
of social organization in production were introduced in the city. 
There were four enterprises called Colectivos producing shoes, 
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garments, bricks and vegetables, that consisted of groups of 
individuals who were organised to work under the guidance of 
the State (l'1ini ;.:;try) and relevant mass organization. The 
formation of Colectivos belongs to a State programme through 
the l'1inistry of Social Welfare called CEP (State Production 
Collectives) which is responsible for setting up workchop:c. 
Their purpose was to produce goods at favourable prices 
and hence to prevent price speculation by the merchants who 
might sell the same products in the market. For example, 
the Colectivo of Shoemakers "Rulfo l"Iarin", i:n Esteli, was 
founded in April '1980 after technicians from the :ninistry of 
Social Welfare and trade unionists of the CST studied the. 
feasibility of forming such a Colectivo. Both parties presented 
their project to the bank and obtained the required economic 
aid, as the government was interested in supporting the develop-
ment of the small enterprises. The Colectivo began functioning 
with 34 persons who earned according to the number of items 
they produced. It was calculated that each one earned between 
)i 60.00 to 090.00 daily (i.e. $ 6.00 to $ 9.oo>, being paid 
)i 30.00 cordobas a pair of shoes. .Those who cut ,and prepared 
the soles (montadores) earned )i '15.00 for each paid, and it was 
calculated that they cou.ld cut six pairs a day, i.e. )i 90.00. 
The administrator and the work coordinator (a kind of foreman) 
were the only ones who received fixed salaries. 
At the time of visiting Est eli, the profits from the Shoe-
makers' Colecti vo, were i,nvested iri improving the working con-
ditions (as they needed much more equipment and wished to restore 
the damaged building). It was run under a system of workers' 
control. In this case, the w~rkers had assistance from the CST 
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in the establishment of work f·")rms and rules and administrative 
guidance from the Ministry of Social Welfare. 'I'he principal 
aim of the Colectivos is to be self-financed, .to train workers 
in ad~inistering the·enterprise and to create more sources of 
labour. 
According to one union leader in Esteli, the Shoemakers 
was the best Colectivo with regard to productive efficiency and 
internal relations. The other three were having problems: .for 
example, the garment workers were discontented 1Ni th the low 
wages. As the trade unionist explained: "the main problem is 
to raise consciousness of producing not for individual benefit 
but for the people". As a result, some workers were thinking 
of withdrawing and working on their own. 
The regulations for selling the products varied depending 
on the type of Colectivo. For instance, the Shoemakers were 
allowed to sell to the public only in very small quantities 
not in bulk. This was designed to prevent the monopolization 
of products and the reselling at higher prices by middle-men; 
the garment Colectivo sold only on a large-scale to the State. 
All the Colectivos held general meetings, involving both 
workers and administrators, every week to discuss production, 
economic returns, and they also met to study political materials 
relating to the country's actual situation. The workers of each 
Colectivo were affiliated to a specific union and assisted by 
particular mass organisations (e.g. the vegetable Colectivo is 
supported by the ATC, and the garment, shoemaking and brick-
making Colectivos by the CST) and by the Ministry of Social 
Welfare. 
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within the tertiary sector, the task of reconstruction 
started with the restoratirm of buildings. The T-'!lmicipal 
Reconstruction Junta - J"RI'1 - launched various projects to 
ensure a more efficient service and to provide sources of 
labour, among which were the building of a new regional 
hospital, the construction of a market in one of the peripheral 
barrios, the amplification of the 1'-'Iunicipal T"Iarket, the con-
struction of eight health centres and a kindergarden, the 
restoration of the Fire Brigade station, the city's hospital 
and many others. In spite of the lack of economic resources 
and technical expertise, and some organizative problems, the 
reconstruction task was enthusiastically initiated; people 
worked on Saturdays and Sundays and organized special volunteer 
work parties in order to hasten the process. 
The Church in Esteli 
The alliance between the revolutionary Christian leaders 
of the Church and the FSLN became consolidated. Leaders of both 
sides agreed that they should not allow any contradiction in 
their ideological posit1ons to develop when pursuing common 
goals. Practice itself had imposed on them a clear position 
on behalf of the exploited sectors, and the recognition of the 
role of the proletariat in alliance with other social sectors. 
They also both defined the issues in terms of an anti-imperialist 
and anti-capitalist stand (see IHCA, 1980). 
Former dualities and theoretical contradictions between 
Christian religion and I'1ar:xist ideology among revolutionaries 
in Nicaragua appeared to become masked by the need to develop 
joint action in response to the actual situation. A priest born 
in Esteli pointed out that (2~: 
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" •• the theology of Liberation had draV'm from 
Marxism, which is a science, many theoretical 
viewpoints that helped to analyse reality and 
which in turn constituted the means of making 
an evangelical relation ••.• we are in favour of 
a struggle based upon reality •••. the main goal 
is not to question whether or not God exists 
but to feed a whole people ••••• we have in 
Nicaragua an identification between r;arxi sm and 
Christianity where the former has come to re-
inforce even more Christianity and where 
endeavours to overcome dognatism and pragmatism 
are strong." 
At the grassroots level in Estel.i, Christians expressed 
no·conflict between their religious ideas and the aims of the 
Sandinista Revolution; even more, they stressed the existence 
of bad Christians who were interested mostly in their individual 
welfare and did not shoulder as they should the political and 
economic responsibilities that the process demanded (e.g. 
active participation in mass organizations, working more 
efficiently on production). There was a general moral viewpoint 
held by Christians and their religious leaders in Est eli. In 
July '1980, for instance, the Nicaraguan Archbishop, Miguel 
Obando y Bravo, made unfavourable declarations concerning the 
participation of priests in political affairs - specifically 
those identified with the FSLN - besides criticising the Frente' s 
position, which affected bourgeois and reactionary interests. 
Local religious authorities objected to the Archbishop's declara-
tions and the majority of Christians in Esteli supported them. 
As one Sandinista leader said: "there is consciousness among 
our people between who are their local religious leaders and 
who are the representatives of the Chur.ch at a national level." 
The above, however, does not mean that there was not a 
confusion among some Christians who were influenced by anti-
communist propaganda which spread fear that Marxists within 
the Frente intended taking away from them their God and were 
promoting "hate between classes" (as expressed by leaders of 
the Catholic hierarchy). There was the case for example of 
a well-known woman who, though recognized as a Sandinista 
supporter for many years, was reluctant about teaching 
"materialism" to youngsters: "I do not agree that chavalos 
should be sent to study in materialist countries, as a 
Christian I would not like my children to return distanced 
from our God •••• if they go very young, they risk losing their 
religious ideas for they have not been formed fully as 
Christians." On the other hand, she accepted that "we could 
take all the goods from Marxism, but not in a dogmatic way as 
some do who consider Marx as a God ••• ". Other Christians who 
listened to her, objected to her arguments and tried to explain 
that there were no contradictions between practicing Christianity 
and receiving Marxist study, as well as highlighting that part-
icipation of priests in politics was a commitment of all good 
and revolutionary Christians. At the end of the discussion she 
remained unconvinced of what some elements of the Church's 
hierarchy believed and from what lo.cal religious authorities 
sustained. 
Comments 
Through the media which they controlled, the bourgeoisie 
made propaganda out of the declarations pronounced by the head 
of the Church in Nicaragua. Their manipulations were vri.de-
spread and provoked some controver$y. Nonetheless, these were 
considered as transitory for the Christians had to sort out the 
contradictions expressed by, the deeper Catholic authorities, 
which had been taking place within the Church before the triumph. 
In other ·words, Christians were in a process of analysing 
their religious leaders' attitudes throughout the dictatorial 
times, during the insurrectional and revolutionary stages, 
and from there, to determine who were on the right track. 
Most Christians of Esteli knew, without any doubt, that 
overall the priest from the church of El Calvaria had acquired 
a moral authority - due to his commitment to the revolutionary 
cause since he began working in Esteli - and had shared the 
same experiences with the people under the dictatorship. 
Hence, such a deep link between religious leader and Christian 
community constituted a strong tie which could not be easily 
weakened by the position taken by extra-local religious leaders 
who, although ranked higher in ·formal terms, had sh0wn hesitation 
and conciliatory positions with Somoza and the bourgeois groups 
in general during their careers, such as Obando Bravo. Christ-
ians in Esteli considered some present-day dilemmas as sur-
mountable but nevertheless of importance, and they organized 
meetings of study and discussions of documents disclosing the 
role of the Church in the Revolution, and of the leadership in 
the Church, Frente and Government. Indeed, the diocese of 
Esteli was considered by many as one of the most progressive 
in the country 
3. The FSLN and Mass Organizations in Esteli 
After the overthrow of Somoza, organizations which had been 
clandestine came out into the 0pen and dev~loped a mass-organiza-
tion orientation. TheY were guided by 'the FSLN National Committee 
in order to broaden thei~ participation in the political and 
economic life of the country. Where possible, mass organizations 
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were to exercise a c0llective leadership at each level of 
their structure and collective discussion of issues as well 
as individual respor"si bili ty were encauraged (see r·Ietodos de 
Flanificaci6n, ~gsa·. 
In Est eli revolutionary organizati·}ns, :::;uch as AT·:Fn.J·_.AC, 
CDCs, CORs, FER, were reorganized in response to the ne\\i needs 
of the city and country. 
Reorganization of the CDCs 
The process of reorganization was influenced by the 
immediate impact of local and national affairs. One such event 
at a national level was described by Rene (6), a member of the 
CDS National Commission: 
"After the '19th of July, there was euphoria, every-
body wanted to become organized in the CDCs. People 
had experienced their effectiveness during the in-
surrections. As a result, all kinds of individual 
came in, even ex-somocista guards and somocistas 
who stayed in the country. Each barrio decided to 
form its own CDC according to its own criteria; 
some were of five persons, others of ten. They 
decided what was right or wrong •.•• The ·former CDC 
members and leaders were not sufficient for cover-
ing the needs of that moment. This situation 
happened in the countryside and in the cities." 
"About a month later, the FSLH National Cnmm-L ttee 
announced that the CDCs were to be calle:d CDSs and 
resolved that as a first step these were to be com-
posed of persons who had been active for the 
Revolution •.• There started then a process of 
struggle (de colador) among those who claimed to 
be CDS members; it was a hard job. Everybody argued 
to have supported the FSLN, and although for many 
this was true, there were also individuals who became 
attached to us when they saw there was no alternative 
to preserving privileges after the overthrow. We 
started by calling meetings with former known 
cedecistas and with those who had in fact proved-
their loyali ty. Then, we assigned revolutionary 
tasks which the reactionary elements did not -vrant to 
carry out, thereby denouncing themselves. 11 
"During the first five months after the triumph, 
the CDS represented a kind of law among the population: 
to go outside the country, to move from house 
or barrio, to find or change a job, the people 
needed a reference and a recommendation letter 
signed by their respective CDS. However, the 
FSLN leaders [Hational Directorate] resolved 
to change their role and to integrate them into 
government pr0jects." 
"Nowadays, in each Department there are 
Executive Committees [of CDS] made up of various 
committees such as administration, education, 
propaganda, health, defence of the economy, 
communal development, culture and sports. Each 
CDS has a general secretary and a vice-secretary." 
with regard to some local events that influenced the 
CDC's reorganization at the beginning, a top Sandinista leader 
of Esteli said: 
"The Cirst mass organizations which emerged after 
the triumph were the CDSs. There was a lot of 
enthusiasm for them. However, some more conserva-
tive elements infiltrated the Central Executive 
Commission and gave the CDSs an entreprenurial , 
character. For example, they wanted to negotiate 
along the available resources they had or the 
resources they were offered. One of the reasons 
for this kind of deviation was that, shortly 
after the triumph, the majority of Estelian cadres 
apd known Sandini stas were still in the army' and 
hence these elements had assigned themselves for 
the top offices (autonombraron). Moreover, from 
July to November 1979, the FSLN in Esteli was not 
well organized. what functioned then was a 
Political Commission where people gathered to 
discuss but without a party base; overall, these 
were self-chosen people from mass organizations. 
There was also a compafiero [the general res.ponsible 
for the Political Commission], a good military 
leader but who politically was not clear enough 
on how to define the role af Sandinistas at the 
local and Departmental level, and how to cirganize 
the population at that moment ••.• this fact did not 
help •.•• Nevertheless, by Hovember, in agreement 
with the National Direction of the FSLN, the 
Departmental Direction Commission - CDD - was 
established. So old militants of the Frente met 
and began working to create party bases which were 
called Sandinista Base Committees- CBS •. These 
CBS comprised a political offlcer, a Secretary of 
political education· and an organizer of finances. 
we were aware of the scarcity of well-trained 
political cadres, and so we had to train them." 
\ 
Jn spite of political confusion among some CDS and 
Sandinista leaders, these bodies at the beginning, seemed to 
have displayed a significant role in organizing the population, 
in clearing up the city as well as in setting out the urgent 
need for reconstruction: 
"When international organizations started appearing 
in Esteli, we had already made a list of our need.s. 
We had outlined some kinds of projects and were 
prepared to propose them to the government and to 
foreign institutions •••• with the listing of 
destroyed buildings, damaged enterprises, houses 
and so on, we saved time instead of waiting for 
r)ut side teams to come and study our situation. 
In each barrio, the CDS had gathered all the 
necessary data for identifying its needs ••• 
Because of our efforts, the project called "Esteli, 
Three Times Martyr" was approved and got financial 
aid from ADVENIA and MISEREJR [European Foundations]. 
We were anxious to get support to reconstruct our 
city. You know, the JGRN had not visited·· us and 
we were all in distress •••. when Omar Torrijos and 
Tomas Borge came, the whole people of· Esteli 
organized a mass meeting and expressed ou.r wishes ••• 
we continued working hard and held discussions with 
representatives of the BIRF, CELA, the European 
Economic Council. We met and worked day and night, 
every day. In September, the day before representa-
tives of the JGlli\f came, we gathered in El Cal vario 
and agreed that we would speak to them. We would 
not let them talk before listening to us .•.. Then, 
after meeting each or our committees went separately 
with the six ministers and presented all our informa--
tion •••• the government representatives were impressed 
by our agility and our degree of organization." (4) 
"After the triumph, I was the first in opening 
the office of the CDS. There were two sections: 
the rural and the urban CDSs •••. I attended the rural 
but together with urban groups we formed an 
Emergency Tribunal to solve immediate problems 
dealing with work, wages, housing and tenancy. By 
February ~980 when the Tribunal ended its work, we 
had done a great job, we had carried out a census 
of the population, made inquiries at centres of 
work, checked the destruction.and many other things 
of concern to us •••.• ". (1) 
At the time of visiting Est~li, reorganization of the CDSs 
. ·, 
was taking place in the form of cuadras (i.e. sides of blocks) 
within the barrios. These cuadras were made up of the facing 
sides of each block. The general coordinators of each CDS 
of a cuadra formed the Council of the CDSs of the barrio and 
elected the members of the Executive Committee Hho, together 
with the general coordinator formed part of the Municipal 
Council of the CDSs (see graph I, Appendix IV.!. 
According to the opinion of a team that came from the 
Central CDS of l'1anagua, the level of organization in Est eli 
was much better than in other places of the country. They 
had based this statement on the reports sent periodically by 
each Departmental CDS and by the visits they made to many of 
the barrios of the city. On the other hands, when participat-
ing in barrio meetings, one could observe the hard work put in 
by the cadres. in explaining to the neighbourhood the new 
manner of organizing the CDS into cuadras. 
The process of restructuring the CDS in Esteli took the 
greater part of '1980. The leadership had so many commitments 
that for some weeks the restructuring had to take second place. 
r.rhe Literacy Campaign, for instance, was a project that greatly 
absorbed not only the attention of mass organizations but also 
took away to the countryside a large part of the youth, thus 
overloading those who remained in the city. However, although 
the Campaign monopolized many or the organization's efforts, 
by the end of the year the outcome of the CDSs had been highly 
satisfactory and had pr)Ved their efficiency in participating 
in all the activiti~s set out by the Stat~ and the FSLN. After 
having restructured nearly all the CDS ~nto cuadras in each 
.> 
barrio, the next step was to sustain local participation in 
order to accomplish the role as "the eyes and ears of the 
people'' (i.e. watching and controlling any action which could 
affect the goals of the Revolution, such as preventing 
energy waste, denouncing hoarders, etc.). 
Other Mass Organizations 
rrhe CST, whose antecedents had been to .a large part in 
the CORs, also played a fundamental role in reactivating the 
city's economy. On the 20th of July '1979, "i:JOrkers of Nicaragua 
Cigars held their first assembly to form their Union. Many of 
the Sandinistas had gone with the guerrillasbut on returning 
began to discuss what they could do to get the enterprise 
running again as soon as possible. A month later, Nicaragua 
Cigars, and similarly Cuba-Nica, had begun production, although 
the workers were not earning wages. Such commitment was con-
sidered a model (data from Nicaragua Cigar's workers, and of 
the Ministry of Work). 
The ATC began its reorganization in Esteli at the beginn-
ing of August, soon after the ~9th of July triumph. There were 
peasants who had seized the lands which formerly had belonged 
to Somoza or his friends and resisted giving them over to the 
State: "they looked at the INRA as if it were' a new landlord". 
However, meetings were held between peasants and Sandinista 
leaders to explain the situation of the country, the aims of 
the new revolutionary government and the new criteria for 
carrying on with the Revolution. Although conflicts arose, 
both parties formed an agreement and the peasantry began to 
organize. After a time, the rural workers on the .State farms 
formed their own unions and the small-scale producers were 
organized into cooperatives'(e.g. Cooperatives of Credit and 
Services - CCS, and the Sandinista Agricultural Cooperatives -
CAS) (based on interview with Ricardo (13). ~ 
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The women of Est eli, who had sho1vn high participation, 
decided to reorganize too, and so, between August and September, 
a committee travelled to Managua and by Jcto ber they began 
holding meetings in all the barrios in order to form the base 
committees which were to follow the FSLIT model. Vlomen of 
Ar·TtTLAE also contributed significantly in identifying those 
women who, at the beginning of the Revolution, had undemocrati-
cally assumed leadership among the CDSs of the barrio::-~ and 
who lacked political orientation. In some cases, ex-guards' 
wives had taken such positions. Leaders of Ar1NLAE met and 
agreed to speak to known revolutionary women, explaining that 
they should carry on the work of concientization so as to re-
shape and change the attitudes of the non-Sandinista) female 
population. The Revolution should be generous vrith those who 
would like to change, and should incorporate them within the 
process. In other words, AMFfLAE women believed that one should 
give the opportunity of changing their minds to those who per-
haps had not had the chance to think in other terms. (7, 14) 
The youth reorganized their former organisations and 
started forming committees of Sandinista Youth in the barrios 
as well as in educational centres. They, were composed of 
youth between 14 to 18 years of age and were aimed at develop-
ing a party organization in order to prepare future Sandinista 
militants of the FSLN party. (29) 
Comments 
The restructuring of mass organizations seems to have 
taken place very fast in Esteli ,' perhaps due to the high partici-
pation of the population in the earlier organizations 1 which \ 
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provided s~me faundation f0r the changes. Jften these mass 
organizations have been considered as new because fundamental 
internal modifications were made to the older.pattern, and 
because they came under centralized control made up of a 
National Committee unified under the FSLE. It is T·mrthuhile 
remembering that, though unification had taken place among the 
three groups of the FSLN (GPP, Terceristas and Proletarians: 
prior to the liberation, afterwards it acquired a broader 
dimension incorporating all the supporting groups. 
4. Mass Organizations - CDS - and their Role in T1obilization 
and Education in Esteli 
As the new State in Nicaragua aimed at bringing about a 
remarkable re-orientation of the people, it is not difficult to 
see the reason for the existence of mass organizations and their 
role within the reconstruction process. To make possible the 
crystallization of mass aspirations it was of basic importance 
to maintain and increase their participation in the country's 
affairs which would lead to a progressive participation in· 
government at all its levels. 
We have stated before that the Council of State included 
the representatives of mass organizations and through this 
assured the'popular' character of the new State. Nevertheless, 
it is of importance to point out that, at this stage, popular 
power still remained in the full sense of the word, a goal, 
and the conditions needed to convert it to a reality still 
needed developing. We must bear in mind th~t 1Ticaragua lacked 
a democratic tradition and the people kn~w no other "democracy" 
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but that imposed by the dictatorship and the alleged 
"democracy" claimed by the bourgeoisie. Hence, the discussion 
of new forms of democracy raised the need for parallel politi-
cal preparation. 
If many of the offices and politically responsible 
positions in government bodies and in the leadersbip of the 
Frente's organizations were made by appointment, not election, 
it was partly because of the urgency of allocating proved 
revolutionaries in the absence of a consolidat~d and defined 
infrastructure of popular organizations when s.tructuring the 
new State immediately after the overthrow. It wa.s also partly 
because the e:xi stence of problems of mass illiteracy and low 
educational levels prevented ordinary people from immediately 
assuming responsibility in the management of. state and non-
State institutions. 
Thus, there was a need to consolidate the organizative 
infrastructure to prepare people f1r further major responsibili-
ties. Their tasks were delineated by the Frente as follows: 
to bring together at their core all the social sectors; to 
reiterate the Frente's position to the various political, 
economic and social sectors; to achieve basic economic goals; 
to put more emphasis on the task of creating militias; to 
,raise consciousness with regard to the content of the movement's 
ideology in its fight against the Revolution' rJ encmi o:-~, and to 
make a comrni tment to the fundamental i r:>sue s of rai ~c:ing production; 
to participate actively in the literacy ~ampaign; and to raise 
the levels of consciousness and. political education of their 
affiliated members (see Nunez, C., '1980 : 12:. 
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The mass organizations in Esteli focused on acconwlishing 
these functions in all the activities they organized. Some 
examples which I observed will be given to illustrate this, 
showing the limitations they worked under. 
Meeting the neighbours of El Calvaria 
The members of the Department's Executive Committee of the 
CDS had organised a meeting with the neighbours of El Calvaria 
to exchange opinions and to learn what concerned them as a 
decrease in participation had been noticed. Attenti·on was 
brought to this by the Frente's members, as the population of 
that barrio had demonstrated great courage in the pre-liberation 
period and had been one of the most outstanding in every sense 
(organizationally, politically and in enthusiasm). It was a 
few weeks before celebrating the first Anniversary of the 
Sandinista Liberation. 
We started gathering around the front door of the church 
at 6.20 p.m. A priest was still conducting Mass. 'After ten 
minutes, Mass ended and people came out, some of them staying 
with the rest of their neighbours who had already joined the 
group. The meeting was supposed to be held in the communal 
room of the church but the door was closed. Suddenly, the 
lights of the church and most of the houses went off, leaving 
all in darkness. More persons arrived and to our surprise, we 
received a message from the woman living opposite inviting the 
group to meet in her house. We ali walked across the street 
and entered a room, 5 meters by 3 meters. It was short of 
furniture (2-3 chairs) and it was obvious that restoration was 
being carried out. The woman, with three children, very kindly 
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asked us to come in while bringing stuff which could serve 
as seating. As more people were dropping in, other neigh-
bours from the surrounding houses offered chair~. We were 
then about 27-30 persons. Half of us were women and of 
varied ages. 
a. Starting the meeting 
Jne of the representatives of the Department's Executive 
Committee of the CDS began the session saying: 
"We have invited you following the criteria that 
you are known as old and enthusiastic collaborators ••. 
the purpose of this meeting is to let you know that 
mass organizations have arranged many activities to 
celebrate the first anniversary of the Sandinista 
Revolution (19th of July) and the liberation of 
Est eli (16th of July). Everybody knows the revolu-
tionary hi story of this barrio, and we are theL·e--
fore worried when observing-the poor participation 
of this barrio in these activities. Also, we have 
noticed that restructuring of the CDS has gone very 
slowly, affecting as a result, the mobilization of 
sufficient cedecistas to carry on the immediate jobs. 
We want to falk with you and we appeal to you to 
express your feelings and ideas of what you think 
are the causes of the barrio's decline ••.. " 
There were a few minutes of silence and then, a person of 
respons~bility in the CDCs said: 
"I have been away from the city during. the last 
weeks - due to work - and now I have returned. 
It is true, I have noticed an "enfriamiento" 
(cooling do'Wtl) regarding the CDS 1 s dynamic when 
compared to that during the insurrectional period ••• 
I know CDSs are being restructured but I do not 
know the way nor the orientation to do it ••••. other 
neighbours have found themselves in a similar 
situation." 
b. The people's concerns 
Once someone had talked, there were a lot of interventions 
exposing various issues which can be c>~mmarir:Jed as follows: 
some objected to the way some cedecistas had come to 
take responsibility~ They had been appointed and not elected. 
some complained of the lack of information and orientation 
of restructuring of the CDSs. 
others made reference to the locale chosen for the meet-
ings; it was not the communal room but another uhich was not 
big enough. 
others said that although the current general coordinator 
of the CDS of the barrio had called for meetings, people had 
not turned up and thus, information could not get through to 
the bases [the general coordinator was not present at the meet-
ing]. 
some questioned the participation of individuals in the 
CDS who, despite doing the requested tasks, were considered as. 
somoci stas and therefore some people were thinking, "if that 
person is there •• ;f:;hen I will not go." 
The discussion went one, and many of the assistantr> partici-
pated repeatedly. There was a rich interchange of opinion and 
comments between the CDS leaders and the invited. The above 
issues were discussed and the answers from the CDS leaders can 
be summarised as follows: 
According to the opinions relating to the way some cedecistas 
had taken responsibilities by appointment, it was observed that 
most of the statements had concerned the general coordinator. 
People were obviously dissatisfied and, hence, attributed to 
him the lack of organization of the bar:rio •. · rPhe GDf) leaderf> 
.....-------,-
responded that they were n ei thor -Ln.· favou:r· nor at~n.i_ nr;t l;ho 
general coordinator, saying, "you must reflect th0,L i :[' the ()lJf:) 
of the barrio [referring to the executive committee] has found 
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difficulties in organizing and transmitting information it 
has also been because you have n0t supp0rted them". Further-
more, the CDS leaders agreed that "if in the course of time 
you find the person responsible f.)r the CDS unsuitable, then 
the barrio could proceed in electing another." 
In relation to the lack of information about CDS re-
structuring, the leaders explained to them the new form by 
cuadras, and soon after commissions were set up to visit houses 
to organize them. With regard to the location for meetings, 
they all agreed that the communal room was better for it was 
bigger and everybody knew it well. 
Concerning people's objections to the participation of 
former Somocistas in the CDS, the leaders agreed that it was a 
matter which needed deeper thought. It was on the one hand, 
understandable that the cedecistas should resist accepting 
individuals who previously had had negative attitudes, but on 
the other hand, 0ne had to understand the new situation and try 
to give opportunities to these persons and integrate them into 
the Revolution. 
c. Conscientization Tasks 
The leaders of the CDS made reference to br0ader issues 
that involved controlling the behaviour of cedecistas. Opening 
hours for pubs and off-licences were established; compan~ 
of the EPS were not to drink during working hour? and compas 
not in uniform, since "that uniform cost .the lives of thousands". 
They also stressed the responsibility of p~ople to participate 
in the various production tasks; the need to grasp that in the 
year of the Revolution it was impo~sible to solve all the 
1tl4 
economic problems; the importance of overcoming personal di ::.'-
cord and keeping brotherly relationships v.rhen doing work for 
the Revolution. 
Throughout the meeting people intervened and seemed pleased 
to have the opportunity of voicing their worries. The meeting 
ended after two hours. The chairs were returned and people 
went back to their homes chatting in small groups. 
Comments 
The decline of participation in this barrio needs to take 
account of several aspects. It had been one of the most damaged 
areas and, although neighbours had received aid to restore their 
houses, the town's economic situation had seriously affected the 
whole population, and reconstruction could not advance at the 
same pace as the people desired. The leadership of the CDS 
demanded more effort and sacrifice at a point when many had 
expected that all their needs would be satisfied. 
An additional factor in relation to the dissatisfaction 
over the general coordinator, apart'from the problem that he 
had been appointed, not elected, was that, as one of the partici-
pants said, "he is not a Catholic [he was actually a Protestant]". 
The way he changed the meeting place was resented: "why change 
the place when the communal room was always· our meeting place? 
You know, during the wars it was the working rendezvous of the 
Frente ••.• ". 
The participation 'of non-Sandinista elements in the CDS 
----·--
was in fact a situation'which hindered participation of revolu-
tionary cedecistas. As the CDS leader-. said: "we must try to 
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incorporate everyone into the process". This constituted a 
sort of challenge everywhere. In the meeting one could observe 
the interest shown by the Frente in keeping close relation-
ships with the people. 'J:lhis kind of meeting served to explain 
to the people the different and multiple problems of the country 
and to stress the need for everybody t.o participate actively 
through their respective organizations. The meeting broadly 
accomplished these goals, oriented people to canalise their 
demands in an organised way through their own CDf:~s ("we - tho 
CDS leaders - cannot keel? coming every week, every time~",~, 
helped to explain the content of revolutionary work and assisted 
in forming teams concerned with the restructuring process. 
CDS : the eyes and ears of the people 
In a meeting where the members of the Executive Committee 
of CDS-B (CDS of barrio) were to take formal office, we could 
observe one of the many ways in which the process of political 
education was taking place. 
We met in the house of a cedecista of the barrio Jaime 
Ubeda, at about 6.00 p.m. All the members of the Department's 
Executive Committee - ED - and six of the seven persons who were 
to form the Executive Committee at barrio level - EB. ':the pur-
pose was, besides the formal taking of office of the EB, to re-
inforce the teaching on each secretary's duties and then to 
transmit it to the CDS of the cuadras - CDS-C. ~'he general sec-
retary of the ED gave first a general background of the CDB and 
I, 
how it was r::tructured at a national level.·· 'rhen the Vice-General 
secretary, the secretary of organization, education-culture and 
sports, defence of the economy, etc. intervened and stressed 
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their specific obligations. 
With each interjection, the secretaries emphasized the need 
to raise the political educati..on of the cedecistas as well as to 
broaden people's knowledge regarding culture, health and educa-
tion in general. The Secretary of Defence of the Economy stresseC. 
the cedecistas' role as the "eyes and ears" of the people in con-
trolling the prices of staple grains, controlling the persons who 
were buying much more than they needed (especially beans and 
sugar), bearing in mind that the country had to import grains: 
"We must try to stop spending wildly •••• many 
persons are buying more than they need and 
according to our experience, we have discovered 
people who store all the grains while others 
cannot find those products in the market •••• we 
need to make efforts to lead an austere iife. 
These suggestions are given because during the 
war cropping and harvesting were below normal 
and, therefrom, we have scarcity of some grains. 
We need to save and spend our resources wisely 
because due to our economic condition and all 
the losses we had from the war, our government 
has had to ask for loans and has been forced 
to buy grains from other countries and sell 
them cheaper than what they actually bought them 
for ..... ". 
Then the Secretary of Defence of the Economy continued: 
''we must explain to othE?r c0mpafieros the reasr:ms 
for stopping spending wildly s1 that what we have 
now in the cr:n.lntry can reach the whole population. 
Also, we must try to save energy and water. For 
example, if one notices that a bulb is on during the 
day, ask the owner in a friendly manner to turn off 
the light ••.• if one notices State vehicles ,parked· 
in front of restaurants or pubs late in the night, 
we must try to take note of it and communicate it 
to those responsible; we must take care of the 
State's resources as these belong ,to and. should 
serve, the people; any misuse Qf State resources 
should be notified to the ED." 
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Comments 
All these explanations and information were to be trans-
mitted to the cedeci stas. It was interesting to see while stay-
ing in Esteli, how people were informed of and came to under-
stand the need to save and spend rationally all kinds of 
resources. These kinds of meetings were carried on several times 
and in different barrios. It motivated the cedecistas as they 
could observe the interest of the ED in kee:Ping close links vii th 
the people of the barrios. At the sa·me time, watching State and 
community resources, taking notice of misuses and deviations 
seemed to have had good results. Many State employees for 
in stance, became more careful in using vehicles and not wasting 
petrol. Also owners of shops who stocked grains became more 
careful to sell the products according to the recommended prices 
published by the government. In watching and controlling actions 
which could damage popular interests, the CDS proved their 
efficiency, and this helped to give them the training and experi--
ence which the Frente were aware was needed for future responsibili-
ties. 
Some Forms of Mobilization 
Mobilization to defend the Revolution could be observed in 
Esteli at two levels: first at the level of the Sandinista 
militants (i.e. members of the Frente) and second, at the level 
of the masses. The first kind implied the mobilization of sandin-
ista .cadres who were organized in Sandinista Base Committees -
CBS (as members of the Frente or as candidates for membership) to 
carry out political tasks among the population. "The second type 
implied the mobilization of larger groups oriented and organized 
1 tiS 
by mass organizations. 
a. An example of mobilization of Sandinista cadres 
Before August 1980 the bourgeoisie of the country and other 
groups who sympathised with them, launched a campaign demanding 
"free elections'' in a short time. Though these groups knevr they 
had no popular base with which to win any kind of election, they 
pursued the idea, emphasizing their bourgeois definition of demo-
cracy among the population and trying to take advantage of the 
people's lack of experience on the issue. As a consequence, the 
Frente of Esteli called all the members and followers of the CBS 
organized them into groups according to the barrios (see l'1ap IV) 
of the city and urged all the cadres to visit each house with 
the aim of informing and explaining to the people the reasons 
why the JGRH had decided to postpone elections until ":985 and 
what the Frente's position was with regard to democracy and 
elections. They took this opportunity also to inform the people 
about the resignation of the Local Municipal Junta - JR1'1 - and 
to invite them to assist in electing the new Junt0. People were 
also invited to participate in a further demonstration of support 
for the Frente. 
Thus, high mobilization of Sandinista cadres took place 
during the last days of Augu::-;t and throughout September. Visits 
to families were carried out on a house-to-house basis, usually 
in groups of two: 
" ••• we come on behalf of the Frente to inform you 
that the JR1'1 has resigned and there will be meetings 
(comprising 3 barrios) to elect two candidates for 
the future Junta. The other thing we want to inform 
you about is that in the speech given by Cdte. Humberto 
Ortega during the BriBadistas' campaign [i.e. the 
countrywide Literacyampaign,which ended in August], 
he announced the decision of the JG~lT to withhold 
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elections until 1985. The reasons for such a 
decision lies on the fact that the Frente, which 
is our Vanguard, considers that now is not the 
time for carrying out elections but for focusing 
on the reconstruction of our country. We support 
the Frente's criteria because as its leaders have 
already demonstrated, they were with us then, and 
they are with us now. We also think that democracy 
is not only a matter of having elections or voting 
in the way we did before, but it must have the 
people's participation •••• we want, therefore, to 
know your worries and we will be grateful if you 
could point out our mistakes and deficiencies 
because, as you know, not everything is perfect 
and we are all learning ••••• ". 
Some individuals replied: 
"Well, it must be like that, elections should not 
be held until 1985 because the Frente has always 
been 1vi th the Revolution ••••• not only during the 
Liberation War but also in the war against ignorance 
[referring to the Literacy Campaign] •••• and also . 
because the former parties promised a lot of things 
before the election, but thereafter never did a 
thing. Yes, voting with papers was always a deceit ..• ". 
Two individuals running a shop in the barrio expressed a 
different view: 
"I will tell you what I think: the Frente promised 
elections, right, so these must be held as soon as 
possible. 
The Sandinista cadre tried to explain to them the reasons 
and after a while they responded, 
said: 
"I agree the country was left in a very bad condition 
but I hope the Frente will accomplish it's.promise 
that we will have electirms ••••• ". 
Pointing out the deficiencies of the Frente, one person 
"I agree elections should be held later on, but what 
I want to point out is that, for example,· the CDS 
must organize the barrio more effectively, sometimes 
those responsible meet and do not i'nvite us. Thus, 
we do not know what is going on.' •••• ". 
Another opinion, 
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"What we want is to live in peace. It is alright 
if elections are postponed but we need to have a 
better health service. You see, sometimes 1He do 
not find enough medicines for our children ••.. 
yes, I know the Frente is trying to do a lot, 
the Literacy Campaign has done a great deal for 
all of us, but as I said, we, the poor, ne~d 
medicines and work ••.•• 11 • 
More opinionB were: 
"I agree the important thing now is reconstruction. 
I back the Frente because they struggled on our 
behalf and now they are struggling against those 
bur ueses vende atrias [referring to the reactionary 
bourgeo1sie an we do not want to return to the 
situation of former times •••• 11 ; 
"I want you to ask some people of the barrio to stop 
calling us contra revoluci onarios (counter-revolution-
aries) •••• you know, some of the people with respons-
ibility in the CDS call us that because we do not 
attend the meetings regularly. But sometimes it is 
impossible for us, you see, we have to take care of 
our children. Not going to the meetings does not 
imply we are contra-revoluci0narios"; 
"In my opinion elect1ons are not necessary. If.the 
proletariado (proletariat) want elections, so let us 
have it, but if not, I agree to leave it for later 
on. I do not want to return to former times. You 
know here in Esteli, not one rich man was left ••• 
What people are asking is that food prices decrease."· 
Comments 
Each visit lasted approximately 20 minutes. Sornetim'es 
women from neighbouring houses carne to gather :ln one house so 
that the Sandinista cadre could talk t,; several families atthe 
same time. 
These kinds of visits to the barrios, especially those to 
the poorer ones, offered a great experiepce to the Sandinista 
cR.dres. They could grasp people's ne.eds, people 1 s thinking about 
the ongoing process, the organiza~ional problems within the 
barrio regarding mass organizations arid the aspects which poli ti-
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cally needed more attention. For instance, .Sandini sta cadres 
became aware of the need to orientate other cadres, cedecist~, 
about using the term "contra-revolucionario" as it should not 
be used superficially. It demanded more accuracy when using 
it. Also, Sandini sta _cadreq saw the need to clarify the nature 
of 'communism' because some individuals showed confusion. 
According to the anti-communist propaganda, it was something 
to fear, but according to the Frente's criteria people should 
not be afraid. Collecting people's opinions meant learning 
more about the reality of the country and exchanging information 
helped to keep closer links between leaders and the grassroots. 
As one neighbour said: "No party before was interested in talk-
ing with us here in our houses •••• ". 
In terms of political work, these visits had a lot of sig-
nificance. Parallel to learning what people thought, they were 
able to educate the population regarding the distortions which 
came from the bourgeois press or derived from the ideological 
penetration exerted under the dictatorship. The Frente in 
Esteli was conscious of the diverse political views among the 
people and realized that keeping close dirE;ct contact with the 
masses was the most effective way of maintaining its legitimacy 
as an organization which responded to the needs of the exploited. 
During these visits one could observe that shopowners saw 
their interests affected by the control of prices and import 
restrictions, and they saw the Frente ap the author ot these 
limitations~ They had to compete with State stores whose prices 
actecl.'as a regulator f0r the rest. _There were also individuals 
who knew about the r0le of the mas·s. org?-nization, but were so 
pre,1ccupied with their 0wn W"lrries that they did not perceive 
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the importance of becoming involved in them. 
Nonetheless, in spite of people's av1arenes::: of the limi ta-
tions they were experiencing, and of the deficiencies of the 
government and the Frente in meeting satisfact~rily their 
political and economic demands, many recognised they were making 
efforts to improve their welfare. The Literacy Campaign, for 
instance, had been an event which reached the whole population 
and from which they enjoyed the benefits. As one of the persons 
visited said: "I am happy now, I lived in darkness for a long 
time but now that I know how to read, I feel I have more courage •• 
We must go forward no matter if we go step by step (poco a poguito~". 
Thus, as long as people could see efforts being made to help them 
and as long as the Frente could preserve its identification with 
the people as it; had during the Liberation War, the masse.s would 
continue to offer their support. 
b. An example of mass mobilization 
Given the campaign conducted by the reactionary sectors to 
deprecate mass organizations and hence, the Frente, the Sandinis-
tas set up demonstrations on the '19th November '1980 in all the 
cities and towns of the country to prove to their critics their 
capacity for mobilization and the degree of support the Frente 
had from the people. The day prior to the meetings all the mass 
organizations had been active in advertizing and rallying the 
people in the barrios, and w0rk centres. The whole city knew 
about the demonstrations. 
About 4 p.m. - 4.30 p.m. crowds began to gather in the 
central park""called the '16th of July"and. 9-round the main porch 
of the Church. At every moment, lots of groups were arriving. 
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Each carried banners identifying which institution, barrio or 
mass organization they represented, and a great number of 
banners appeared. About 5.0 p.m. _cadres of the CDS, of the 
CDD, A~~LAE, CST, ATC, State Institutions informed the diverse 
delegations where to meet. All followed the indications orderly. 
By then, the whole area of the park (Hhich embraces a block\ 
and the surrounding streets were full of crowds, all ordered 
according to the barrio and organization. A Sandinista leader 
with a megaphone initiated the activity by singing the i.~ational 
Anthem. Thereafter, a musical group from Hungary participated 
and a representative of the Ministry of Culture spoke emphasizing 
the importance of unity and of internationalism. 
During pauses, more delegations arrived and these were 
received by the crowd amid claps and reolutionary slogans. 
Then, the march through the city began. It was headed by members 
of the JRM and leaders of the CDD-:t:'rente. Behind all the dele-
gations followed. The crowds in the march took up more than 
eight blocks. They walked south towards the offices of the 
CDD-Frente; people were shouting slogans, waving banners and 
singing. The streets were too small to hold the crowds. The 
Frente had planned to make a stop and give aspeech outside the 
offices, but given the large n).lmber of people, they decided to 
returi to the park. Along the way back, the people continued 
to shout their political support for the Frente. 
Concentrated again in the park, the President of the local 
Municipal Junta, and Sandinis~a leaders'spoke~ All of them 
pointed to the maneouvres of priyate enterprise - COSEP, the 
political party MDN and the.burguesia vendepatria (referring to 
the "bourgeois sell-outs") to destabilize the country; the 
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importance of maintaining. social unity; ·the need to increase 
production; t1 fight against wild spending, stressing that to 
be revolutionary was not only to participate in demonstrations 
but to work hard and efficiently all the time •. At the end, the 
FSLN anthem was sung. 
Comments 
The manifestation in:Esteli, as well as in most places of 
the couotry, was successful. The Sandinista·cadres were satis-
fied. The strength showed by the massive .mobilization gave, in 
turn, more enthusiasm to the population for participating in the 
rest of the activities which the government·and the Frente were 
promoting (e.g. volunteer brigades for the coffee harvest at the 
end of the year, for weeding gardens, for clearing building areas, 
painting communal service centres, etc.). 
In the political field, the Frente maintained supremacy and 
could count on broad support. :)ne of the mainproblems, however, 
remained: the strategies for satisfying the pebple's demands, 
together with facing c0unter-revolutionary actions amid serious 
economic obstacles. 
The People of Esteli,, Electing its own Local Municipal J~nta 
The description of the follovring events attempts to show 
the correlation of political forces· in Est eli'. together m th the 
degree of political consciousness people had deyeloped through 
' ,• 
their participation and links with ·mass· org,anizations. Attention. 
,. 
is also drawn to some of the fact's which underlay the process of 
learning how to put into practice differ!3nt forms of participation; 
one of whose immediate aims is to tra,in the peop+e t; exercise 
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progressively popular power. 
a. Background to the first ,JRM. 
The first JRJ.VI of Esteli was formed during the first two 
weeks of August ~979 when the city was still clearing up ita 
rubble. Given the circumstances and the urgent need to form a 
new town council to advise the population on their reconstruction 
tasks. The Frente, which at that moment was the only political 
force capable of giving guidance, made a list of about '17 candi-
dates to form the local Junta. The list was passed to the CDSs 
of the barrios for their approval. Later on; a cabildo abierto 
(popular consultation) was organized. Five people were presented 
before the crowd and the Frente asked them to show their agree-
ment by clapping. The five individuals were two professionals, 
one of whom was an active Sandinista, an ex-guerrilla fighter and 
active participator of the CDCs of proletarian origins and two 
women who had collaborated closely with the Frente. 
The task for the members of the first JRJ.VI demanded a great 
deal of courage: 
11 We did not know where to start. There was pot even 
a drop of salt ••.•. there was nothing for starting •. 
You should have seen how we began. Someone lent us 
a typewriter, another gave us a table, chairs gradu-
ally appeared ••• Everything was dirty, full of dust, 
and we had. no place to work in. So you see, we 
started from nothing •••• 11 • · 
With these severe conditions, and despite the fact that the 
members of the Junta did not earn wages for several months, they 
worked tirelessly in coordinating. the admi:t;listrati ve'. planning 
and reconstruction acti viti es in ·collaboration with State insti-
tutions. The JRI'1 realised that establishing a new municipal 
administration to deal with the devastated city demanded i mmen.:;;e 
efforts not only from their members of the·Junta, but also from 
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the Estelian community as a vlhole. 
In August '1980, however, the JRr1 resigned their offices 
and called the people to elect a new Junta. Whatever the.Lr 
technical or administrative failures, the first JR~; did its 
best and its efforts were br0adly recognized among the popula-
tion. If there were grievances in some s>cial groups, thie 1·.'as 
primarily due to the severe ec0D'Jmic conditions of the country 
which hindered the rapid restoration of Esteli's social and 
economic structure. ":')nee the war was over, people thought we 
could arrange everything easily and quickly ••.. "· r1oreover, 
the absorbing work of the Junta during '1979-80 seemed to have 
led to it becoming isola ted from the people: "they had worked all 
right and in an honest way, but seldom came to talk with us". 
So, aware of their achievements but also of their deficiencies, 
and of the people's right to elect their authorities under 
better conditions than had existed that first time, the Junta 
resigned of its own volition. 
b. Preparing and organizing for the Elections 
Similar to the first occasion, the major political force 
capable of mobilizing and bringing together the population was 
the Frente. As far as one could observe, there was n·o political 
organization which could be. considered as a significant rival. 
There were in Esteli, individuals identified.with other parties 
(e.g. of the :MDN) but they had no broad·popular support. There 
were some groups that belonged to the P~I, and given this party 
had been previously against Somoza, they had formed part of the 
National Patriotic Front - FPN (nowadays the FPR). rrhe Frente 
of Esteli asked them to participate in the JRr1. The PLI accep-
ted and met to elect one of their members 'to. represent them in 
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the new Junta. 
The :H'rente, on the other hand, had to devi ~'e a :tratcgy for 
electing the other four members. For this, meetings were hal~ 
with Sandinista cadres and it was finally decided that each 
mass organization (CDS, CST, ATC and AIJ:~LAE\ \'iould elect a 
representative to the Junta in such a way that all the organized 
sectors of the city would be represented. To elect a represent-
ative for each mass organization, however, implied a r>eries of 
assemblies and mobilizations on the part of the Sandin~ 
cadres as well as the participants in general. Each mass 
organization used its own method for nominating its repre.senta-
ti ve, because at that time there was no established s;ystem for 
electing local Municipal Juntas. 
c. The CDS and AMNLAE 
These two mass organizations arranged their activities by 
dividing the 27 barrios of the city into nine zone('; compNcccl of 
three barrios each. They set out a calendar indicating the 
dates, times and places for popular assemblies in each zone. 
Members of the Frente and mass organization cadres were to be 
present during the assemblies and helped to org0nize them. 
The first barrio meetings were to give general information 
t) the residents which included the Frente's recognition of good 
work done by the departing Junta, a broad explanation of what 
"democracy" was according to the bourgeoisie, what "democracy" 
was according to the Frente and how tho, curr·ent municipal elec-
tions conrJtitutcd a way of practicing in revolutionary democracy 
aimed at achieving direct and popular participation. Later on, 
the Frente' s cadres explained the. strategy to fDllow in electing 
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their candidates. With regard to the CDS, the purpose 1vas to 
elect '18 candidates (two from each zone). From these '18, one 
had to be elected to the Junta by an electoral tribunal com-
posed of the barrio's CDS's general coordinators, two elected 
representatives from each barrio, the seven members of the EC 
of the Department's CDS, a representative of the FSLN and by 
the same candidates for the local Junta. 
The '18 candidates to the Junta of the CDS, resulted from 
the election of two by each zone, which in turn had resulted 
from the election of two pre-candidates representing each 
barrio, 
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'1. Each of three barrios (forming a 
zone) elected two pre~candidates. 
The persons did not necessarily have 
to live in the barrio). 
2. From the six pre-candidates of one 
zone, the two persons who received 
the largest number of votes were to 
be the two candidates representing 
the zone. 
3- From the '18 candidates of the nine 
zones, one had to be elected to rep-
resent the CDS in the new Junta. 
The women's organization, An~LAE, followed a similar 
pattern; but because they had fewer members they elected only 
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one pre-candidate from each barrio, one from each zone and one 
from the nine representing the z0nes: 
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'1. Each of the three barrios forming a 
zone, elected one woman pre-candidate 
(She could be a 1voman who may or may 
not live in the barrio.! 
2. From the three pre-candidates, women 
were to elect one to represent the 
zone. 
3. From the nine candidates of the nine 
zones, one woman had to be elected to 
represent AffiTLAE in the new Junta. 
The electoral tribunal for AMNLAE was made up of a woman rep-
resenting each barrio who might be the AHFfLAE' s coordinator), the 
members of the EC of the organization at Department level, a rep-
resentative of the Frente and the candidates. 
Assembly to Elect the Z~ne's Candidates 
The following account will describe the elections to the 
Junta of the two candidates from the CDS of Zone Three. The 
zone was composed of the barrios Ell.as Moncada, Jaime Ubeda and 
Paula Ubeda. 
The meeting took place in the auditorium of the San Fran-
cisco School on the 8th of September (1980) at about 6.0 p.m. 
Crowds arrived at the auditorium and after a few minutes there 
was not enough room to lodge all the people. They then moved 
to the main yard of the school. About 400 individuals were 
present, including children, women, youth, adults) who remained 
standing throughout the meeting. Sandinista leader.s asked the 
crowd to form four lines as the elections required order. They 
did so in an orderly way. Then, a board was pl,aced in the front 
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part of the yard in such a way that everybody could see it, 
with the names of the elected pre-candidates of the three 
barrios written on it. One of the Sandinista cadres opened 
the Assembly singing the National Anthem and, shortly aftenv-ardR, 
the three general coordinators of the barrios were requested 
to come to the front in order to identify the voters from their 
barrios. Soon after, the pre-candidates v.rere presented to the 
crowd and the voting began by passing the board to each person 
who placed a stick, with a piece of chalk, at one side of the 
name of their choice of candidate. The pre-candidates were 
five. Of these, two were old popular workers' leaders (shoe-
makers), one was a technician working for the State, one was a 
housewife and one a teacher of known political participation. 
The support of the residents for the shoemakers was well 
known not only because of their participation in former times 
in the trade union movement, but also because up to the present, 
they had continued being involved largely in the reconstruction 
process. The person who had almost no support at all was the 
housewife. It seems she was not a well-known person. 
Voting took about an hour and meanwhilepeople looked 
excited and anxious to see which candidate was leading. Often 
people moved from their assigned places to those who had voted 
in order to have a glimpse of the blackboard. In spite of the 
curiosity and anxiety shown, the process took place in a well-
behaved way. There were just two observable ·incidents: the 
first, when a chavalita (teenager) came to vote and the A1'1NLAE 
women who were at the front asked her how old she was because 
she looked very young. The girl was o~der than her appearance 
and so the people in control allowed her to vote. The second 
)' 
172 
incident was when an old lady came to vote for a second time 
and was recognised by a person in the front. The old lady 
said she did not know exactly whether she had to vote only 
once, and thus she was sent away fr0m the voting lines. 
At the end, a cadre of the Frente count~d the votes of 
the candidates which totalled 249. The two well-kno\vn persons 
of revolutionary standing won (one of the shoemakers.from the 
barrio El{as Moncada and the technician from Paula Ubeda). 
They had taken 57% of the votes. The two to follow them took 
38% and the last, the housewife, received 5%~ The Sandinista 
leader asked the crowd'whether they were satisfied and the 
largest part shouted "yes". They all seemed q:W. te satisfied. 
To close the .Assembly, people sang the FSLN anthem. 
AnotheJ;' similar Assembly was also attended. It was next 
day and it corresponded to zone. seven, compo>sed of the barrios 
J.VIilenia Hernandez, Igor Ubeda and Oscar Benavidez. 
It was about 6.30 p.m. and the meeting took place in the 
corridors of the r.chool called. "la Anexa". ·Chairs had been 
];)laced along the corridor, but some people also· moved to sit · 
.in the yard in order to hear .better the individuals who would 
' talk at the front. The Assembly, like the others, started with 
the singing of the National Anthem. Soon after, the pre-candi':"" 
dates of each .barrio were introduced and general re!erences 
were presented on their persons to inform the neighbo:urs who they 
. . . 
were. Individuals who wished to· add details on· the candidate's ·· 
careers were welcome to do sq. . The candidates were ·six; all of . · · 
whom were males. Three were workers wi,th outstanding political 
participation, one a, teacll.§r, PI1€l a, middle~ Eli ze :farmer.. TJ;le 
-. • . ' - - .!.! ./ '- . 
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sixth candidate was not present and no details were given. 
The candidates with the most votes were the two workers 
and the teacher, 67, 50 and 58 votes respectively, but as just 
two were to represent the zone, one of the workers and the 
teacher were elected. The difference between these three and 
the rest of the candidates was big as together the other three 
totalled just five votes. There was, therefore, a large 
support for the workers from the residents. 
Before proceeding to vote, a Frente representative inter-
vened and made a speech to the public to stress the contrast 
of former kinds of elections with the current ones. The Sandin-
ista leader also made reference to the lives which the Revolu-
tion had cost to achieve the conditions for building a new 
democracy, and appealed to voters to elect the most adequate 
persons independently of whether or not the candidate belonged 
to their own barrio: "we must elect the most capable, honest 
and devoted person ••• to prevent voting in blocks •..• we must 
try to preserve the unity ••••• ". 
The names of the candidates were written on the board at : 
the front of the corridor, and from their seats, each incli vidual 
indicated loudly his choice, which was recorded by a teller. 
Thus, voting was carried out in an environment of high order. 
At the end the winners had received 69% of the total, (180 
votes), the next two 29%, and. the rest 1%" The results were 
to the public's satisfaction. Here, as in the previous case, 
throughout the voting people loo~ed nervous and excited. 
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The final Assembly to elect the CDS representative to 
the Junta was on the 25th of September in the auditorium of 
the CST building, at 6.0 p.m. 
When we arrived, the saloon was totally full (approx. 
400-500 persons;. The members of the electoral tribunal were 
sitting on the extreme right~ the candidates at the front on 
the extreme left, the guest members of the PLI, the Frente, 
and a member of the outg1ing Junta wer.e at the front on the 
right and the public in the rest of the saloon. After singing 
the National Anthem, a Frente leader presented to the audience 
all the candidates. There were '17 as Barrio Sandino did not 
present their candidate. He pointed out that one of the candi-
dates would retire because he had been elected to represent the 
Junta on behalf of the CST. He was substituted by a third 
person with the next largest number of votes from the respective 
zone. 
Later on, a cadre of the Frente checked the list of the 
electoral tribunal's representatives to see whether there was 
a majority (taken as half plus one). Some were·absent but had 
sent either their substitute or their excuse. 
One of the top leaders of the Frente directed some words to 
the public emphasizing the courage of the people of Esteli 
during the war and the circumstances in which the first Junta 
was chosen. Nevertheless, the Sandinista leader added that now 
that a year had passed and the CDSs had been reorganized, they 
had the capacity to elect under better crmdi tions. A contrast 
was also made between elections during Somoza·' s time and the 
current ones. 
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The above was followed by the reading of each candidate's 
curriculum and though it took a long time, people listened 
anxiously. There was clapping on behalf of particular people. 
Shortly after, an envelope with each person's name eligible to 
vote was distributed, including the candidates, and inside 
there was a card with the Frente stamp and the signature of the 
political secretary of the Frente-Esteli. It was explained 
that inside, each voter would write the name of the candidate 
they wished to elect. These ballots were to be deposited in 
a ballot box which was at the front covered with the national 
flag and had been previously examined by all candidates and 
guests. Once voters had delivered their votes, the PLI repre-
sentative and a member of the outgoing Junta read aloud the 
results. Names were on the board and sticks were placed. The 
winner was "Pinedita", a clerk of working class origin, with a 
long revolutionary history, who had been in jail several times. 
He had large popular support. He won with 6~,;6 of the votes 
and was ardently acclaimed by the audience. His great support 
was unquestionable: "he has always been a humble person ••• "; 
"despite being poor, he is very intelligent •••• "; "he has always 
been with the poor •••• ". 
Before closing the Assembly, amid the joy, the Sandinista 
leader stressed the kind of elections currently carried out, 
saying that "although they were not elaborate, without extrava-
ganzas or superfluous propaganda, there had been full participa-
tion of the people ••• and this is the most important point." 
Finally, the newly-elected spoke, prOmising to devote themselves 
to do the best they can in their ·forthcoming duties. It was 
also remarked that the adult generation ··should make sacrifices 
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so the young may benefit. Although personal details about all 
the CDS's candidates cannot be given, I could observe that from 
the '17 presented to the auditorium, a considerable number ·vrere 
workers, followed by teachers and tec't.nicians. The support for 
the workers was large, perhaps for the most well-known one. 
During the ballots, those teachers who had once had support in 
their barrios had very low support as against that for the work-
ing class candidates. 
d. The new Junta 
The new Junta was composed of the representatives of four 
mass organizations and the PLI member. AMNLAE elected an adult 
woman who, although not known for her revolutionary career, had 
done a good job of work amnng the women. 
The CST also organized a series of meetings among the 
unions(in the municipio of Esteli). It had elected pre-candi-
dates representing the most active unions (SCAAS, tobacco, shoe-
makers, garment makers, tailors and domestic workers), taken 
charge of the electoral procedures (one voting person from each 
20 affiliated members of each union), and had el:ected a working 
class leader with an outstanding revolutionary contribution who 
was from the shoemakers' trade union. Conversing with workers, 
everybody had come out entirely satisfied with the results. 
The ATC promoted meetings in the peasant communities in 
cooperation with the Frente, and nad offered transport for bring-
ing the peasants to the town on the 28th of September. That day 
they met in the buildings of a school, totalling about 700 
peasants. There the ATC proposed to the audience three candi-
dates (who had been chosen carefully from amongthe most dis-
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tingui shed revolutionary .cadres~ and appealed for other nomina-
tions from the audience. Just one name was proposed. The 
winner received 52% of the votes, followed by the next with 
33%, 14% and 1% respectively. More than 500 peasants had voted 
and, according to my interviews, they had been favourably 
impressed, as this type of electi0n they had never experienced 
before. 
Weeks later, the Central G0vernment ratified the new Esteli 
Junta and confirmed the CDS member as its president. 
Comments 
The activity displayed by mass organizations to elect the 
JRM was one, among others, that showed the large and popular 
support of the town for the FSLN. Similar to the period shortly 
after the war, a year later, the Frente had appeared as the 
most capable political force f;r· reorganizing so.cial groups, 
whatever the deficiencies one observed. Furthermore, the broad 
support for the Frente, enabled them to request that the PLI 
participate in the Junta, which could be interpreted as the 
Sandinistas' intention to practice pluralist political participa-
tion. 
Until that moment, other political parties like the MDN 
(which at national level represented the main opposition party 
to the Frente and the Central Government) had not managed to 
organize themselves as political parties in Esteli. "There 
might be emedenistas here (l'IDH sympathisers) but the masses 
do not support them" •••• "Mos.t of Esteli is. With the Frente", 
were frequent comments. The people of Esteli' often saw the 
MDN and other associations like COSEP, as organizations linked 
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to the rich or the burgues{a vendepatria, i.e. reactionary 
sectors, which in turn were connected 1:Ji th counte:r-revolutionary 
actions, such as assassinations, harrassments to the volunteers 
working for the Literacy Campaign, and support for ex-Somocista 
guards' incursions from across the Honduras border. 
Another fact which came to light during the elections and 
which in some way contributed to the affirmation of the Frente's 
popularity was the modesty and si~plicity with which their 
cadres or their f)llowers addressed the people. It was common 
to apologise when not being able to explain, for example, the 
mechanics of the elections nr in admitting their ignorance of 
specific issues nf a barrio, and they asked the crowds for their 
help: "Look compafieros, there are many things which are new for 
us as well as for you like for instance, in carrying out this 
election, so excuse us if we make some mistakes. . •• that is why 
we ask you to give us your opinions and suggestions, in order 
to solve the difficulties and problems we all have ••••. "· This 
point is made because it is necessary to indicate that although 
the Frente and their cadres delineated the strategy for the 
elections, there were practical difficulties that were not fore-
seen as the electoral process went along. 
Electing the new Junta thus, was considered an event that 
came not only to enrich experience for the local population in a 
changing process but also brought into play the character and 
part of the role of mass organizations. It also served as a way 
of getting more acquainted with the fundamen·tal need for popular 
organizations, to develop their ties with the population, and 
thereby preserve popular suppnrt. 'If this can be maintained, the 
Frente will continue to be the leading political force of the town. 
Chapter V 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I shall try to summarise the main points 
in the foregoing argument and stress some of the features of 
the J'hcaraguan liberation movement in order to compare it with 
other revolutionary movements of a similar kind. 'l'he eli scusr~ion 
will be organized in three parts: an analysis of the historical 
circumstances of the country and of the conditions Hhich pre-
cipitated the uprising; an identification of the main features 
of the organization of the insurrection and finally the prob-
lems of social reconstruction immediately after the downfall of 
the Somoza regime. 
Political and Socio-economic Factors 
Like all the Latin American countries l<fi caragua has a 
colonial past. Given the circumstances in which its economy 
was left after the Spanish administration it developed a grow-
ing dependency on the outside world. The dependent character 
of the country's economy was determined by its position .as a 
" 
supplier to the international market, which was donnnated by 
the more powerful capitalist countries. In com:pari r:>on to other 
countries of Latin America its degree of clependency appears to 
have been especially high, partly because of historical factors 
and partly because of the way in which Nicaraguan political and 
economic forces organized their internal and ext.ernal linkages. 
In colonial times the Central American region was not as 
important economically to the "metr0pqlis" as countries like 
l'-1exico or Peru. Epain' s main economic interest in Latin America . 
. , 
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vms the extraction of precious metals (silver and gold: and 
since these metals were fairly scarce in Central Americs the 
local and internal market and external ~-rade relationships 
developed little. Therefore, at the end of colonial rule, 
local productive forces remained backward. In combination 
with the weakness of the politically and economically dominant 
groups, this fact0r enabled these countries t'J be relatively 
easily manipulated fr0m rmtside. r·Joreover, as the Central 
American countries became more involved in the international 
market, their economies came to reply i~creasingly on the 
export of raw materials and on foreign investment. 
In spite of the dependent character of the economy, the 
dominant economic groups were able to accumulate capital 
according to "traditional" models of capitalist accumulation, 
although these were adapted to and modified by the particular 
social and economic characteristics of the country. Hence 
the largest proportion of capital resources was concentrated 
among a small group of individuals who controlle.d the most 
productive sectors of the economy, the local bourgeoisie. 
One of the characteristics of the Nicaraguan.bourgeoisie was 
that since the beginning of this century their economic interests 
had become closely linked t0 those of North American investors, 
and given the country's reliance on foreign aid, the USA's in-
terference in its political and ec0n0mic affairs increased con-
siderably. Furthermore,. the internal political conflicts 
which the country had experienced since the ~9th century and 
the consequent lack of a strong government permitted the USA 
to interfere more directly, partly because of its increasing 
geopolitical interests and also as a further area for investment. 
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The combination of the increased geopolitical and economic 
interests of the USA in Nicaragua with the absence of a ntrong 
government, and of a weak economy, are the principal historical 
factors which have shaped the country's economic and political 
structure in the course of this century. The desire for 
"political ·stability" to protect their investments led the 
North Americans to support institutions lik~ .the ~~ational Guard 
and .back individuals who would serve their purposes. This 
resulted in the gradual institutionalisation of the dictatorial 
regime. However, the problems arising from a dependent economy,. 
a situation of unresolved political conflict and the long rule · 
of a single family, were to create further contradictions whos.e 
accumulation procluced a movement seeking changes on a variety 
of different levels. 
In contrast to the situation in the other Central American 
countries, establishment of the dictatorship· in.Hicaragua in 
the 1930's was a crucial factor in the eventual formation of a. 
broad opposition movement which could unite around a common 
goal. The existence of a privileged group which had special 
access to the appropriatirm of res1urces, which was more advant-
ageously placed than the other dominant groups and which could 
use State institutions to monopolise economic and political 
power brought conflicts between it and other less favoured 
groups whose goals were similar to its own. 
The longevity of a regime which waf.l in fact the rule of 
a s~ngle family created a series of contradictions that led 
to its isolation from other groups whioh had supported them 
at various times. The isolation of~ dic~atorial regime can 
be partial or almost. total depending on the strategies it 
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applies to neutralise pressures for change from other ~-;ocial 
groups. The dictatorship gave various economic concession:::' 
to other bourgeois groups until this tactic became insufficient 
to satisfy the latter's expanding economic and political 
interests. This was also com:<ected with the effects of inter-
nal economic contractions which derived in their turn from the 
fall in both the demand and the price of the country's agri-
cultural exports which constitute the mainstay of the economy. 
Moreover, the accumulated dissatisfaction of the less well-
off sections of the population, augmented by cyclical economic 
depressions, created conditions for the emergence of organiza-
tion which began to question the exL sting social order. Al-
though such conditions are present in other countries whose 
economies are similar to Nicaragua's, particular internal ,con-
junctures combine to hasten or delay the formation of success-
ful movements of opposition to the status quo. In Nicaragua, 
for instance, the 1972 earthquake precipitated an increase in 
economic activities, mainly in construction sector, which 
caused a brief relaxation of the economic depression which the 
country was experiencing at the beginning of the 1970's. How-
ever, once this "flourishing period" was over, it was followed 
by the fraudulent presidential elections and the establishment 
of the state of emergency at the end of 1974. Popular dis-
satisfaction was channelled into a campaign to lift the state 
of emergency which succeeded at the end ~f ~977. The accumula-
tion of discontent on the part rd ·the lower classes and the 
local bourgeoir.-::ie at the dictat0rship' s arbitrary action after 
the earthquake and during the state of· emergency, together 
with the already existing internal cris:Ls, largely, determined 
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the strength of the growing movement against the dictatorship. 
Another catalyst was the assassination of a leading member 
of the local bourgeoisie at the beginning of ~978. In conse-
quence some factions of the local bourgeoisie took a more 
radical attitude towards the regime, which was accentuated b;y 
the economic pressures Somoza had imposed on them because of 
their opposition to him. 
Thus, as well as more general factors there are specific 
internal circumstances which affect the course of a particular 
country's political and economic dynamics. Each country has 
inherent features which may not appear important at an isolated 
moment, but whose importance may develop over a longer term, 
and gradually precipitate major events. 
As with Jose Marti in Cuba, Nicaragua has an historical 
tradition with Sandi no, which contributed to the foundation of 
an ideological platform. This was particularly significant in 
that it has contributed (and still contributes) to the rallying 
of a number of different social groups, and their identification 
with a set of ideas wliich were and are compatible with the 
changes which are taking place. Although a revolutionary tradi-
tion is not a fundamental or determining factor in promoting 
social consciousness and the formation of a revolutionary move-
ment, it has in this case certainly come to play a unifying role. 
One of the unique features of the movement which aimed to 
seize power in Nicaragua was the very widespread urban upri ;;ing~; 
which preceded the downfall of the regime~ Although other move-
ments which had been successful in takipg power, as in Guatemala 
in 1944 or Zapata's movement in ~910, were also preceded by 
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large scale popular mobilization in towns and cities, and 
by armed confr~ntation, they c0uld not, given the circumstances 
of the time, use the general uprising as the main method of 
achieving their aims. In Nicaragua, however, the use of 
popular insurrection as a politico-military process to comple-
ment mass mobilization (mainly during ~ 978) was vJidely and 
successfully developed. 
The creation of a movement which would be certain to 
succeed in achieving its immediate goal, the overthrow of the 
regime, required much more than the existence of acute socio-
economic and political tensions. Even an almost total economic 
crisis affecting all sectors of the population, combined with 
a political crisis in which neither Somoza nor the dominant 
classes could continue ruling, together with the increasing 
internal and international isolation of the dictatorship, 
could not by themselves give rise to the movement. This re-
quired existence of organizations which could comprehend the 
potentiality of the situation and initiate a series of activi-
ties which would bring about increasing popular mobilization 
and irreversible agitation. 
The FSLN in Nicaragua was able to come to the head of 
the movement because it carried out specific activities in 
order to create and accelerate the process of insurrection. 
For instance the seizure of the National Palace in August '1978 
immediately precipitated c;t series of urban uprisings in the 
main ci ti e.s of the country'. These events in their turn 
heightened the political crisis and raisedne:yv possibilities 
for change in people's minds. Hence the process leading to an 
uprising requires not only the interaction of political and 
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economic crisis, the existence of organizations aiming to 
bring about radical change and a popular movement, but also 
' positive action to complement these factors in order to achi~ve 
the necessary conditions for a widespread uprising. 
Features of the insurrection 
Although a broad popular movement implies the presence 
and participation of a wide spectrum of social groups, it is 
necessary to stress the outstanding role played by particular 
groups in Nicaragua at all levels in the organizational struc-
tures as well as during insurrection itself. 
'I'he participation of the Catholic Church proved of great 
significance in the anti-dictatorial movement. This fact is 
related to the process of renewal within the Latin American 
Church which followed the Second Vatican Council and especially 
the Council of Latin American Bishops at Medellin in 1968. 
These events encouraged many of the clergy to establish links 
with left-wing groups and/or to study Marxist writings more 
closely. In Nicaragua the alliance between Marxist elements 
and the Catholic religious (priests and nuns) ·during the in-
surrectional movement was not accidental, but \vas the result 
of earlier links forged for a common purpose. Furthermore, 
the work carried out by religious leaders among different social 
and economic groups was vital in assuring their eventual deci-
sion to support the FSLN. The outstanding participation of 
the Catholic Church is a feature which distingu1r-;hes the 
Nicaraguan situation fr,)m that of revolutionary movemcmt,r:; :Ln 
other Latin American countries. It needs to be related to 
internal processes of change within the structure .of the Church 
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as a whole in the last decade. Priests working in nicaragua 
1.vere also influenced by examples of priests in other countries 
(e.g. Camilo Torres) who combined religious and political acti-
vi ties. 
The identification of the Christians and their leaders 
with the anti-dictatorial movement was manifested in their 
commitment to support the struggle and the FSLIT cadres. Local 
churches and religious schools in cities and towns acted as 
lodging places, hospitals, FSLN headquarters and even jails. 
The Nicaraguan case was the first successful revolutionary move-
ment in Latin America in which the Gonvergence between Christ-
ianity and Marxism materialised at an ideological and practical 
level, although there is evidence of the same phenomenon in 
other Marxist-led movements seeking structural changes in 
Central America, such as El Salvador and Guatemala. 
The participation of women, especially in the armed· 
struggle, was another special feature of the insurrectional 
movement. Although there are earlier cases of women participat-
ing in guerrilla warfare (such as in the Cuban, Bolivian and 
Colombian movements) their large scale pr·ebence at all leV·81s 
was of particular significance in Nicaragua. The leading role 
of a female guerrilla in the FSLN capture of the ITational Palace 
in 1978 was a new event for Nicaraguan society. Moreover, the 
broad participation of women in the insurrection can also be 
explained as being part of the same internal dynamic of the 
development of productive forces. With the changes which had 
taken place in the social relations of production, new sectors 
I 
of the population have become inv1lved in the process. In con-
sequence women have become pr0gressi vely inc0rporated into wage 
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labour and other economic activities to meet family needs 
(e. g. in coffee plantation.s, in the tobacco industry, and 
"informal" economic acti viti es). Thus, the wider participation 
of women in the economic and S!Cial order in Nicaragua at the 
end of the 1970's, in the context of the political conjuncture, 
permitted them to express their commitment more openly. I'he 
insurrectional movement also made men m0re aware of the physical 
and mental capacity of women t0 deal with situations in the 
same way as men. In other words, the insurrectional experience:: 
promoted a certain "re-conceptualization" of the role of vmrnen 
in the society. 
Again, the combination of mountain and urban guerrilla war-
fare during the anti-dictatorship war produced a closer inter-
action between the urban and rural populations. For a long time 
the urban areas had served as supply centres for the guerrillas. 
However, during the uprising. the countryside and the mountains 
provided shelter for a large number of urban groups which were 
forced to leave the citie:, and in many cases during the war the 
countryside provided food to sustain· the struggle which war:; tak-
ing place in the cities. The peasant and mountain populations, 
which had always supported the guerrillas from a distance, now 
became more involved during the il'Jsurrection not only as part 
of a supporting network but also as direct participants in the 
armed struggle. 
·rhe emergence of the Civil Defence Committees - CDCs - and 
the experience acquired by their members in ·a situation of 
intense conflict provided the foundations upon which the prer:ont 
broad mass organizations were constructed. T0-ey alr:o promoted 
and trained the cadre;-.:: who were intended to take; high re;;pons-
' '· 
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ibilities in the new hist0rical phase which was emerging. Like 
the Cuban Committees for the Defence of the Revolution - CDRs -
the CDSs (Sandinista Defence Committees: have now been trans-
ferred into organizations with special responsibility for monitor-
ing activities likely to have a negative effect upon the achieve-
ments of the Revolution and also for ensuring that the govern-
ment's policies are actually being carried out. 
It is important to point out here that many of the unique 
features of the Nicaraguan liberation movement are also to some 
extent the product of experiences learnt from similar movements 
applied to the country's own circumstances. The popular move-
ment of Chile, the Cuban revolution, the guerrilla war in Viet-
nam and the various African liberation movements have provided 
and still provide lessons of importance and value to those en-
gaged in attempting to bring ab0ut majnr s0cial change and re-
c0nstruction. 
Contradic-::;ions within the Process of Social Reconstruction 
Social reconstruction is the long term goal of the Nicara-
guan Revolution. However, in order to achieve this, the organiza-
ti on in power, the FSLH, and the government have had to face the 
economic and social contradictions left by the Somoza regime 
and also those arising from the new circumstances. 
rrhe alliance of the non-somoci sta local bourgeoi .si e with 
the FSLN to nverthrow the dictatorship wa~: in reality a tactical 
step on both sides which would facilitate l1he achievement of 
their immediate common goal •. B0th parties expected to make 
changes later for their own benefit. nevertheless, once the 
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regime's downfall had been brought about, they attempted to 
influence the restructuring of political and economic forces 
in terms of their own class interests. The FSLlJ leadership, 
which follows a socialist-Marxist ideology, envisages changes 
which will generally benefit the less well off, while the local 
bourgeoisie (gathered around their former organizations like 
the COSEP, l'1DN, PCA) also looks for changes in accordance with 
its interests as a class. 
Participation in the government and its institutions by 
members of both the local bourge~isie and other groups represent-
ing private enterprise and FSLl\f members, reflects the pluralist 
class character of the State, but also the existence of economic 
and political conflicts. The resignation from the Junta of 
two well-known members of the local bourgeoisie before the first 
anniversary of the Revolution was a manifestation of the contra-
dictions between those who actually have political power and 
those groups which still control a considerable proportion of 
the most productive sectors of the economy. 
Although Somoza's properties have been nationalised, they 
were not sufficiently extensive to have permitted the State to 
make a major impact on the process of social reconstruction, 
or to -satisfy short te.rm popular demands. Moreover, in order 
to improve the economic situation in the aftermath of the war, 
the government has had to tackle some of the contradictions 
arising from the country's economic dependency, as well as to 
try to counter the efforts of the local bourgeoisie to protect 
their own interestF:, and t0 try to make th~ kind:::l of changes 
which will fulfill its political commitments to the majority. 
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In order to be able to begin the process of social re-
construction the government has had to ask for aid and techno-
logical assistance from countries like West Germany, Holland, 
Sweden and Belgium. Of course, this increases the country's 
external debt and its reliance on foreign technology to keep 
the economy running. Although serious attempts have been made 
to broaden the sources of foreign aid to try to reduce Ficara-
gua Is dependence on the United States' the coun·~ry is still 
largely dependent on the capitalist world, since diplomatic 
and economic relations with the socialist countries have only 
recently been opened. However, it is essential.that even within 
the present framework of econ0mic dependency the government 
should at least begin the process of implementing some of the 
reforms which are urgently required at all levels. In particu-
lar, it must attempt a more just distribution of the surplus 
and carry out a more rational and productive investment policy. 
The construction of a socialist economy is considered the best 
method of overcoming existing economic difficulties in the long 
term, and as the best means of counteracting the expansion of 
capitalist forms of production. 
In consequence the government, under the guidance of the 
FSLN directorate, have outlined a series of projects which are 
intended to provide the foundations for an irreversible advance 
towards socialism. One of the main aims of the programme is 
to strengthen the ec0nomic power 0f the State by maximising 
production in State enterprises and by encouraging the exploita-
tion of national resrmrces. H0wever, this kind of social and 
economic rec0nstruction generaliy oriented towards socialism 
implies eventual confrontation with the country's dominant 
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private enterprise groups which naturally feel their o1m 
interests threatened. At present the local bourgeoisie and 
the government need each other t0 0vercome the economic 
depression which accompanied the war, but each side has con-
flicting strategies to achieve economic stabilisation for its 
own future purposes. Thus the local bourgeoisie has begun a 
campaign of political and economic destabilisation in the 
national and international press and has also reduced its 
investments in the country. For its part the FSLN and the 
government has called for greater efforts to increase public 
sector production and has generally attempted to reinforce its 
political influence. 
Furthermore, in Nicaragua, as in many similar countries 
the commercial sector is largely in the hands of small and 
medium entrepreneurs. The government has set out a number of 
policies to support small-scale industry and commerce in 
another attempt to counteract the might of the larger entre-
preneurs. Nevertheless, this policy is ultimately in contra~ 
dicti0n with the long term aim 0f socialising the production 
and distribution of goods under the c!ntrol of the State and 
, 
will eventually provoke c0nflicts between these smaller entre-
preneurs and the government. This situation further hinders 
the strengthening of State control over the commercial and 
industrial sectors, and slows down the pace of social recon-
struction on socialist lines, but any attempt to force the pace 
faster may well risk the government losing, the political ::mpport 
of these groups. 
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The FSLN's position as the most influential political 
organization in the country is surrounded by a series of 
obstacles confronting its efforts to meet the immeo_iate and 
widely held political and economic aspirations of the vast 
majority of the population. The call to all groups to part-
icipate in the process of social reconstruction through the 
mass organizations is intended to show everyone what the 
actual difficulties are, and to involve them in talting respons-
ibilities for the process. ·Here the government and the FSLN 
have made significant advances. People have experienced new 
forms of organization, new ways of participating in decision 
making and generally rec0gnise the efforts which the govern-
ment is making to implement meaningful social change. 
Barrio 
Colaborador(a:J 
Compafieros 
Compa 
Cordoba 
Cuajada 
Cursilli sta 
Chavalos 
Ganaderos 
Genocida 
Gusano 
Hacendado 
Hacienda 
Manzana 
Glossary of Spanish terms 
Quarter in towns and cities. Usually of loHer 
social and economic groups. 
Collaborator; often of the FSLH. 
Friends, comrades. 
Abbreviation of companero, commonly applied 
to individuals in the Sandini sta Army. · 
National currency; equivalent to US o.~o cents. 
Fresh cheese. 
Member of the · Cursilli sta r~Iovement. 
Children. Usually of primary school age. 
Cattle ranchers. 
Genocide; commonly used as a nickname for 
the National Guard. 
Worm; applied to anti-C13,stro Cubans in exile. 
Owner of a latifundium. 
Large farm. 
An urban block; also a measurement of land 
area- ~-72 acres. 
Movimi en to Cursilli sta Catholic Movement; its memberf; focus 
on the study of religious materials, reinter-
preting them in the context of the present 
situation. 
Muchachos 
Operarios 
Oreja 
Patronos 
Reales 
Rojinegra 
Somoci sta 
'l'ortillcra 
'rortilla 
Kids, boys; it is also applied to Sandinista 
youth and guerrilla fighters of the FSLN. 
Employees of workshops. 
Ear; a word referring to Somocista informers. 
A kind of civil spy. 
r')wn ers of eri t erpri se s. 
Money 
Red and black :B'SLN flag. 
Sympath:Lser of flomoza. 
1Jun1on who makes hoc living rnakLng ~ortilla:;. 
\ 
l'1ai ze pancake. '{'radi t:Lonal meal in llicaragua. 
Al'11'\fLAE 
Glossary of Abbreviations of Organizations 
Asociaci6n de Mujeres Nicaraguenses 'Luisa Amanda 
Espinoza' 
Nicaraguan Women's Assoqiation 'Luisa Amanda Espinoza' 
AMPRONAC Asociacion de Mujeres Ante la Problematica Nacional 
Association of Women Confronting the National Problem 
AN OLEN 
AND EN 
Asociaci6n del Clero Nicaraguense 
National Association of Nicaraguan Clergy 
Asociaci6n Nacional de Educadores Nicaraguenses 
National Association of Nicaraguan Teachers 
APP Area de Propiedad del Pueblo 
Area of Public Ownership 
ATC Asociaci6n de Trabajadors del Campo 
CAD IN 
Rural Workers' Association 
Camara de Industrias de Nicaragua 
Nicaraguan Chamber of Industries 
CAS Cooperati va Agrl.cola · Sandinista 
Sandinista Agricultural Committee 
CADS Central de Acci6n y Unidad Sindical 
Federation of Trade Union Action and Unity (Communist) 
CBS (a) Comite de Barrio Sandinista 
Sandinista Barrio Committee 
CBS (b) Comite de Base Sandinista 
Sandinista Base Committee 
,, 
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CCC Confederaci6n de Camaras de Comercio 
Confederation of Chambers of Commerce 
COS Cooperativa de Credito y Servicios 
Credit and Service Cooperative 
CDC Comite de Defensa Civil 
Civil Defence Committee 
ODD Comite de Direcci6n Departamental 
Departmental Leadership Committee 
CDS Comite de Defensa Sandinista 
Sandinista Defence Committee 
CE-CDS 
CGT (i) 
CONAPRO 
CONDECA 
CUR 
COSEP 
Comite Ejecutivo de los CDS 
Executive Committee of the CDS 
Confederaci6n General de Trabajo (independiente) 
General Confederation of Labour (independent) 
Consejo Nacional de Profesionales 
Confederation of Professional Association 
Consejo de Defensa Centroamericana 
Central American Defence Council 
Comitd Obrero Revolucionario 
Revolutionary Wormers' Committee 
Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada 
Higher Council of Private Enterprise 
CST Central Sandinista de Trabajadores 
Sandinista Workers' Federation 
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CUS Consejo de Unificacion Sindical 
Council of Trade Union Unification 
EDSN Ej~rcito Defensor de la Soberan{a Nacional 
Army for the Defence of National Sovereignty (Sandino) 
ENABAS Empresa Nicaraguense de Alimentos Basicos 
Nicaraguan Enterprise of Basic Foodstuffs 
EPS Ejercito Popular Sandinista 
Sandinista People's Army 
FAO Frente Amplio Opositor 
Broad Opposition Front 
FER Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario 
Revolutionary Students' Front 
FES Frente Estudiantil de Secundaria 
Secondary School Students' Front 
FETSALUD Federaci6n de Trabajadores de la Sal~d 
Health Workers' Federation 
FPN Frente Patriotico Nacional 
National Patriotic Front 
EPR Frente Patri6tico de la Revoluci6n 
Patriotic Front of the Revolution 
FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional 
Sandini sta National Liberation Front 
FSLN (i) Frente Sandini sta de Li beraci6n lTacional, tendcncia 
·insurreccional o tercerista ' 
Sandinista National Liberation Front: Insurrectional 
or Tercerista tendency 
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FSLN (gpp) Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Hacional, tendencia 
Guerra Popular Prolongada 
Sandini sta National Liberation Front, Prolonged 
Popular War Tendency 
FSLl'if ( tp) Frente Sandini sta de Li beraci6n Na.cional, tendencia 
proletaria 
INDE 
Sandinista National Liberation Front, Proletarian 
Tendency 
·Institute de Desarrollo Nicaraguense· 
Nicaraguan Development.Institution 
INRA Institute Nicaraguense de Reforma. Agraria 
Nicaraguan Agrarian Ref0rm Institute 
JGRN Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucci6n Nacional 
Government Junta for National Reconstruction 
JRM Junta de Reconstruccion Municipal 
Municipality Junta for Reconstruction 
MLC Movimiento Liberal Constituc:Lonalista 
Constitutionalist Liberal Movement 
MCCA. Mercado Comun Centroamericano 
Central American Common l".la.rket 
MDN Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguense 
Nicaraguan Democratic Movement 
J.VIISURASATA J.Vf.iskito, Sumo, Rania, Sandinista,' Asla Takanka 
J.Vf.i ski to, Sumo, Rama, Sandin'J. sta, All Together 
MPS J.Vf.ilicias Populares Sandinistas · 
Sandinista People's Militias 
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MPU Movimiento Pueblo Unido 
GN 
United People's M·1Vement 
Guardia Nacional (Somoza) 
National Guard (Somoza) 
OEA Organizaci6n de Estados Americanos 
Organization of American States 
POD Partido Conservador Dem6crata 
PC de N 
Democratic Conservative Party 
Partido Comunista de Nicaragua 
Nicaraguan Communist Party 
PLI Partido Liberal Independiente 
Independent Liberal Party 
PLN Partido Liberal Nacionalista 
Nationalist Liberal Party (Somoza) 
PPSC Partido Popular Social Cristiano 
People's Social Christian Party 
PSC Partido Social Cristiano 
Social Christian Party 
PSN Partido Socialista Nicaraguense 
Nicaraguan Socialist Party 
SCAAS 
SEl'ifAPEP 
Sindicato de Carpinteros, Albafiiles, Armadores y Similares 
Union of Carpenters, Bricklayers; Assembly Workers and 
Allied Trades 
Secretar:La Nacional 'de Propaganda y Educaci6n Politica 
(del FSLH) 
National Propaganda and Political Education Secretariat 
UDEL 
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Union Democratica de Liberacion 
Democratic Union of Liberation 
UPE Unidad de Producci6n Estatal 
States Production Unit 
UPANIC Union de Productores Agrl.colas de Nicaragua 
Union of Agricultural Producers of Nicaragua 
UPN Union Nacional de Periodistas 
National Journalists' Union 
APPENDIX I : DEr10GRAPHIC AND 
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Table I Estimated Total of Rural and Urban Population 
According to Department and Municipal Records 
on 31.12.1977 
Departments and· Total Urbar.i. % Rural 
Municipalities 
' 
rrhe Department 94133 38577 41.0 1 55556 
; 
Est eli 42577 25993 61.0 16584 
Condega . 15352 4036 23·3 11316 
Pueblo Nuevo 11715 1872 16.0 9843 
San Juan de Limay 10029 2413 24.0 7616 
La Trinidad 14460 4263 29.5 10197 
% 
59.0 I 
I 
39.0 I 
73-7-
I 84.0 
' 
76.0 
70.5 
Source: Oficina Ejecutiva de Enuestas y Censos - OEDEC, 1977 
e.z 
0 
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'rable II Labour Force employed in Tobacco Production before and after the 
Liberation War 
EstiEated labour force 1978 for 600 manzanas* Estimated labour force 1979 for 284 ~nzanas 
Activity Number of Tasks Activity Number of Tasks 
Persons Persons 
Agricultural labour 450 Preparation ::, Agricultural labour 208 Cultivation 
maintenance of 
the cultivation 
Drying 760 Dr:ting 
Drying 1616 Care and drying 
of leaves Pre-industrialization 320 Cu:-ing and 
selection 
Pre-industrialization 695 Curing and 
selection ! Industrialization 367 Elaboration 
Industrialization 770 Elaboration & 
ani packaging 
packaging Administ:::ation 250 Suuervi sion 
and. technical 
Administration 530 Supervision and advice 
Technical advice 
Total 406'1 Total 1905 
- ---- -- -
Note 'iransportation is not included in the above figures 
*a manzana = 1.72 acres 
Source l"JJNV AH, 1979 15 
I 
i 
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Table III 
Crop type 
Maize 
Rice 
Beans 
Sorghum 
Total 
-
Area of Cultivation for staple grains in manzanas in the Department 
of Esteli before and after the Liberation War 
Years of Cultivation 
' 
":972 '1973 <974 '1975 1976 Total Crop type 1979 
'1973 - '1974 ":975 '1976 :i977 area 1980 
6'1 '19 8819 <5202 7189 '1 0873 48202 I J'"Iaize 15428 
20 - - -'!6 7 43 Rice -
3'199 4024 -:2595 8209 9319 37346 Beans 9069 
5247 5565 8396 7805 4446 31479 Sorghum 4526 
14585 18408 36193 13219 24665 117070 
I i 
' 
- --- -- -------~-
Total 
Total 
area_ 
15428 
-
9069 
4526 
29023 I 
Note: There are no Tecords concerning the cultivation are for the war period 1977-1978-1979-
Source: OEDEC, 1977 
ETTA, 1980 
' / 
~ in MINVAH, 1979 
J 
17 
~ 
0 
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'rable IV Economically 1-.ctive P0pulation by Branch of Activity in the Department 
of Esteli. Years ~965 to 1973 and 1977 
Branch of Activity 1965 1966 1967 .1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1977 
Primar~ Activit~ 14894 14853 14812 14772 14732 14693 14650 14611 14572 14398 
Agricultul·e, hunting, 14886 14844 14802 1476"'1 14720 14679 14634 14593 14552 14373 fishing 
1'1ining 8 9 10 11 12 14 16 18 20 25 
Secondary Activity 2293 2390 2491 2596 2706 2822 2944 3070 3201 3631 
Manufacturing industricE 1821 1890 1962 2036 2114 2194 2280 2367 2457 2760 
Construction 472 500 529 560 593 628 664 703 744 871 
Tertiar~ Activit~ 3542 3730 3933 4153 4394 4663 4969 5316 5722 6629 
Commerce, Rest, Hotels 915 954 999 1037 1081 1127 1175 1226 1277 1449 
Transport, Shops, Commerce 319 343 369 397 427 460 496 . 534 575 691 
Banks, Insurance, others 31 33 35 38 41 44 48 52 56 63 
Electric-Energy, Drinking 26 29 32 35 38 42 46 50 55 58 Water 
Communal & Social Services 2222 2330 2443 2562 2687 2818 2955 3099 3290 3734 
Other Services 29 41 59 84 120 172 249 356 509 624 
EAP Total 20729 20973 21236 21521 21833 22178 22563 22997 23495 24658 
Source: Study carried out by Centrode Investigaciones y Estudios de la Reforma Asraria - CIERA, 
rgnagua, 1980. 
% 
58.4 
58.3 
0.1 
14.7 
11.2 
3-5 
26.9 
5-9 
2.8 
0.3 
0.3 
15.1 
2-5 
100.0 
1..":1 
c 
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Table V Damage caused by the war to the Local Comm~rce · 
of the City of Esteli - September. 1979 
i 
Function1ng Functioning -! .ff n 
before the war after the war J Dl ere ce 
' 
Commerce 411 93 I -318 
! l---~--.,...--,.------+----------l--------__,;,.-+-------··-
1. Large Commerce 64 12 ~52 
2. Small Commerce 
(composed of mise 347 81 j -266 · 
corner shops) 
Source :*MINVAH, 1979 : 34 
Note: *The above data was drawn from a table which contained many 
inaccurate totals. The relevant figures have been extracted. 
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I APPENDIX II : INTERVIEWED PERSONS 
AND THEIR SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Reg. Name Sex Age Previous Present U\.IU.\....L..LV.::..> Other 
. No. Occupation Occupation Tlli t.Prim. Sec. Uni v. Information 
1 Pedro I"' 38 tailor officer in 
.x Sandinista 
army 
2 Priest I"' 30 priest the same X Born in Esteli 
3 Don Juan I"' 45 craftsman the same X He is a 
cursilli sta 
4 Don Guayo I"' 43 carpenter the same X He is a 
cursilli sta 
r-
0 5 lvianuel I"' 19 student the same X He works for 
Cit the CDS 
6 Rene l"' 24 cler-student political X Works in l"'ana-leader gua for the CDS 
7 J.Varia Antonieta F 30 technician full-time Works in 
political X Al"'T.'ITtAE 
leader 
8 Patronila F 40 housewife the same X Involved in the 
women's organ-
isation 
9 Dona Maria F 40 housewife the same X II II II 
Reg. Harne Sex Age Previous Present Studies Other 
Ho. Occupation Occupation Illit.Prim.Sec.Univ. Information 
'10 To no M 2'1 worker- student X Part-time 
student political 
cadre 
'1'1 Don Chepe K 48 trader and small farmer X Part-time in 
small farmer political work 
'12 Samuel J:'I 47 farmer government X He was a officer combatant 
'13 Ricardo JVI 32 small farmer political Involved in the 
combatant leader X organization of 
all 
the peasantry 
and rural 0 labourers ct 
'14 Amalia F 30 teacher the same X 
'15 Alberto M 22 student the same X Ex-guerrilla 
fighter 
16 Margarita F 58 tortillera, housewife, X Mother of a dead 
clothing- does little Sandinista hero~ 
maker jobs 
·--
'17 Pepe M 28 bricklayer officer in X He was a com-the Army bat ant 
Reg. Name Sex Age Previous Present Studies Other 
No. Occupation Occupation Illit.Prim.Sec.Univ. . Information 
'!8 Don Augusto l'-1 50 shoemaker political X He was a 
Wr)rkerS I leader guerrilla 
.leader fighter 
"19 Roberto l'-T 25 tobacco the same X trade union 
worker ·leader 
20 Don Damian Yi 54 shoemaker political . crippled 
workers' leader X worker 
leader 
24 Socorro F 25 teacher the same X Became leader 
Q in her barrio 
e 
Cit 
22 Don Nacho l'-1 49 rural the·same X He :participates 
labourer actively in the 
CDS 
23 Mario r1 43 manager the same X He is a 
cursilli sta 
24 Dona Amanda F 43 housewife the same X Involved in 
CDS's tasks 
25 Don Gerardo 1'1 50 clerk, labour Known for his 
working-class inspector X good grounding 
leader in political 
theory 
Reg. Name Sex Age Previous Present Studies Other 
No. Occupation Occupation Illit.Prim.Sec.Univ. information 
26 Don Julio 1'1 48 merchant the same X President of 
the local 
·Chamber of 
Commerce 
27 Don Felipe 1'1 50 small town hall X businessman clerk 
28 Don Severo 1'1 44 merchant the same X He ·is not interested 
in politics 
0 29 Eduardo 1'1 --:8 student the same X Part-time ~~ Sandinista C\l 
cadre 
APPENDIX III : DAMAGE.CAUSED .BY THE. WAR 
TO THE DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SECTORS OF ESTELI 
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Table I Unemployment in various sectors of Industry 
Esteli, October ~979 
Industrial Activity 1 I Ho. of jobs 2 No. of jobs 
previously. ·1 after war 
1. Manufact;uring 695 277 
J I Tobacco industry 585 277 
Garment Making I 49 -Furniture Making 61 -
i 2. Craft Industry N.D. -
3· Construction N.D. -
I Total 277 
~ According to Industrial Census, CATASTRO, ~977 
2 According to the Local Planning Commission 
Source : MINVAH, 1979 : 28 
Unemployment 
I -418 
I 
-308 
' I 
! -49 
I 
I 
-61 i 
-38 
-400 
-856 
M 
~ 
Cll' 
Table II C0mmercial Establishments in the City of Esteli 
before and after the Liberation war 
Number of establishments Number of establishmente. 
before ": 979 September 1979 
l'"Iaj or Commerce 64 12 
l"'Jinor Commerce 347 86 
Groceries 223 37 
1st class stalls 16 5 
2nd class stalls 29 5 
3rd class stalls 77 20 
4th class stalls 29 7 
Others 124 49 
! 
Difference 
-52 
-261 
-186 
-11 
-24 
-57 
-22 
-75 
T1ajor Commerce embraces: domestic electrical appliance shops, car dealers, repair 
shops, cloth and fabric stores. 
i 
I 
l"'Jinor Commerce includes: large groceries, vegetable shops, small-scale commercial shops. 
Stalls: difference size of groceries, fruit and vegetable shops, soft drinks, etc. 
Source : l'-'lilN .AH ": 979 : 34. 
~ 
-M 
Cll 
Table III Damage Caused by the war to the Commercial Sector, in the 
central areas of Esteli, September 1979 
L'-:ame of Barrio No. of Commercial Total amount of damage 
establishments damaged in Nat. currency 
Rene Barrantes 3 7,246.0 
~ilenia Hernandez 25 24,375.0 
Juno Rodriguez y Urania 22 9,672.0 
Igor Ubeda 42 9,442.0 
Filemone Rivera 6 416.0 
Total 98 51' 151.3 
-
--
- ------ -----· ---- --- --- - ----
Source: MI~NAH, 1979 : 36. 
! 
I 
' 
I 
I 
I 
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Table IV Damage Caused by the Liberation War to the Local 
Services of the City, September '1979 
Before the After the I . 
War 1978 War Sept.1979- Dlfference 
Financial Institutions 7 6 -1 
IIo·tels and the like -1-1 4 
-7 
Restaurants 9 5 -4 
it hers 67 - -67 
Total 94 15 -79 
.. 
Source l"'IJ\TV AH , 1 9 79 37-
Q 
""" Cll 
Table V Housing Def~cit by Barrio before the war in the 
City of Esteli according to a Census carried 
out by the CDS 
Name of Barrio Deficit of housing 
.. 
Sandi no 
' 
130 
Elias Moncada 147 
Igor Ubeda 48 
El Calvario 200 
I 
Jose Benito Escobar 128 
i 
Panama Soberana 46 
Filemon Rivera 70 
Total 769 
•• ____..J 
Source :MINV .AH, Managua 1979 47 
APPENDIX IV THE CDS' s STRUCTURE 
a> 
...-! 
C\t 
CDS at r--::runicipal level, '1980 
J:Iunicipal C0uncil and 
Rural CDS c,..,r;.rdinators 
Executive C>mmittee of 
the Municipal CDS 
(headed by a general 
secretary" 
Secr.Organization Secr.Propaganda I Seer. Education 
and Political Culture and Sports 
Education 
I -r I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l I I \ I \ I I . I I l 
General Coordinators of the 27 barrios 
of the city of Esteli and the coordinators 
Comarcales* 
Newspaper 
Seer. Defense of the 
Economy 
Seer. Health and Community 
Development 
* The CDS of Comarca is formed by 3-4 rural communities which have their 
own CDS. The 3-4 CDS 0f Comarca also form the Executive Committee of Comarca. 
S'"lurce Esteli's Executive C1mmittee of the CDS, 1980. 
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